The Coming of "Chrysler Imperial": Ukrainian Youth and Rituals of Resistance*

ALEXANDRA HRYCAK

Students and young professionals played a role of unparalleled importance in *glasnost*-era national mobilization in Ukraine.[1] They led each new stage of political activism during that period, from the establishment of Ukraine's first "informal associations" to the organization of the Rukh inaugural congress and such subsequent protests as the human chain joining L'viv and Kyiv, the draft resistance movement, and the student hunger strike that finally brought down the republic's prime minister. Indeed, they were the first group to help mobilize public support for the opposition movement at a time when the Soviet Ukrainian government had successfully used violence and threats to keep participation in public protests low. What motivated this group's support for Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union? Below, I examine a festival that I will use to demonstrate and account for a particularly effective strategy used to help mobilize young protestors' support during *glasnost:* the inversion of familiar official Soviet youth rituals.

The subject of *glasnost*-era public protest is vital for understanding the two types of Ukrainian nationalism that have arisen since independence. One took a form that opponents of nationalism both in Ukraine and abroad recognize as traditional (sometimes extreme) ethno-nationalism. This type of nationalism perpetuates a traditional, romantic model of national identity that represents national culture as deeply rooted in Ukraine's past, and casts Ukrainians in a romanticized role not unlike populist official Soviet histories produced during Stalinism.

The other type of nationalism does not at first resemble ethno-nationalism, but rather is a cosmopolitan or civic form of national ideology that is now frequently adopted by groups of liberal intellectuals and cultural producers in Eastern Europe. When applied to Ukrainian culture, this approach advocates a creative appropriation of European culture, and, as in the case of this festival, builds a new series of attachments between Western youth subcultures and Ukrainian identity. This strategy self-consciously and deliberately "shifts" the public's perceptions of Ukrainian identity from the cliched positive/negative heroes that peopled Soviet Ukrainian narratives to make Ukrainians seem "Western." This second type of nationalism is usually referred to as "civic" nationalism and is increasingly opposed to ethno-nationalism.[2] It was this type of nationalism that attracted students and young professionals to the Ukrainian

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national movement during *glasnost.* And yet—because of the way in which nationalism is commonly understood—the development and promotion in Ukraine of this type of nationalism has largely been ignored by most observers.

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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, interest in the formation of *glasnost*-era social movements—what sociologists refer to as "collective action"—has proliferated among both domestic and foreign observers. The result has been a slow but steady stream of published accounts of the "new" Ukrainian nationalism and why it led to independence. One of the most remarkable aspects of many such accounts is their tendency to assume that there is a direct or easy relationship between the appearance of such movements and general upturns in economic and political grievances. Another is their tendency to treat nationalism as a unitary, undifferentiated phenomenon.

Deprivation-based arguments vastly oversimplify the motives of activists. They lead observers to imply that particular varieties of nationalism can easily be classified either as "bad nationalism"—which is caused by the displacement of ethnic hostility (Brumberg 1992; Maryniak 1993; Tishkov 1997), or as "good nationalism"—which is caused by illegitimately thwarted national aspirations (Diuk and Karatnycky 1990, 1993). Both of these two false alternatives attribute a great deal of causal force to generalized beliefs and emotions that are then typically ascribed to some preexisting latent disposition found in society at large. What these approaches take for granted is an aggregate psychological framework that views nationalism as a magnification of suppressed personal discontent that must be expressed once it reaches a certain threshold. In this way, each falls into the trap of earlier social scientific research that assumed collective action was an essentially unmediated psychological phenomenon in which atomized individuals spontaneously reacted to frustration by targeting a scapegoat or seeking redress in some other way.[3] This approach minimizes the role played by social movements, political authorities, and other interested parties who stand to benefit from particular ways of framing public concerns. It also leaves unanswered why a relatively privileged group—students and young people—jeopardized their chances of future success by joining protests, while the most deprived groups in Ukraine—collective farmers and industrial workers—remained on the sidelines.

As social scientific research on collective action has repeatedly discovered, grievances are a fairly constant feature of modern life. Expressions of collective discontent are, by contrast, relatively infrequent. They are particularly rare in authoritarian contexts like *glasnost*-era Soviet Ukraine, where government authorities continued to use threats and coercion against participants in public protest well after such activities were freely taking place elsewhere in the USSR. According to rational choice explanations of high-risk collective action, movement success in such cases depends on lowering the price of participation

by offering converts selective incentives.[4] But in the case of the establishment of the Ukrainian independence movement, it is just as inadequate to conceive of activism as driven by grievances alone as it is to see it as simply the sum total of self-conscious cost-benefit analysis. High-risk collective action may occur in authoritarian contexts when activists learn to "hide in plain sight" by gradually pushing the limits of the permissible at officially sanctioned public events that are essentially no risk to them. As I will show below, the participation of Ukrainian students and young people in public protests during the late eighties was not the result of their rational decision to participate in high-risk protest activity. Rather, Rukh activists gradually and imperceptibly co-opted institutionally organized activities targeting young people.[5] The purpose of official Soviet youth events and organizations was gradually subverted so as to circumvent active consideration of the risk involved on the part of both participants and authorities.

The present approach draws on sociological theories that view social action as embedded within the full range of possible meanings, perspectives, and definitions of a given situation normally adopted by individuals socialized in a given society (Mead 1932, 1938). In other words, it takes collective action as a product not of personal grievances or material benefits, but of "roles"—previously structured interactions that constrain and channel behavior. Accordingly, I assume that human participants rarely respond in an unmediated way to an event. Instead, participants are guided by their familiarity with established cues or "frames" that strip reality of many of its potential attributes and establish a particular well-learned definition of a situation that carries with it attendant roles and expectations. Following Goffman's (1974) work on "frame analysis," social movement theorists have argued that the formation of collective action "frames" is also a necessary precondition for effective mobilization of support for social movements. According to this perspective, social movements and, by analogy, state authorities, "function in part as signifying agents" that are actively engaged in the production and manipulation of such frames (Snow and Benford 1992, 137).[6] It was through their subversion of official frames and adoption of Western youth culture that Rukh activists persuaded students and young people to participate in high-risk collective action in Ukraine during *glasnost.* The result was a new type of Ukrainian nationalism remarkably different from the ethno-nationalist tradition that had been propagated by Soviet authorities. This new nationalism more closely resembled the Western, civic model of nationalism that the Soviets had long suppressed.

"Vyvykh-92": A Typical Youth Ritual Observed

The effective redeployment by Rukh activists of preexisting collective action frames produced by the Soviet state arguably explains the public's participation in an event that I witnessed not long after my arrival in Ukraine to conduct sociological research on Ukrainian national mobilization. In 1992, just weeks

after the first anniversary of Ukrainian independence, a self-proclaimed "national" festival captured the attention of the western Ukrainian city of L'viv. For four days, "Vyvykh-92" transformed the city's central square with a blanket of patriotically colored yellow and blue posters and banners and a program of well-attended public events focused on the presentation of a new Ukrainian national myth. Each day, public rock concerts and a series of contests and competitions attracted capacity crowds of young people that, to an outsider, seemed surprisingly large and enthusiastic given the relative lack of interest most Ukrainians exhibited toward other self-consciously patriotic public events, concerts, and demonstrations.[7] In contrast to the boredom and sparse attendance evident at most ballet, opera, and theater performances I had observed, this festival was marked by people struggling to gain admission to the city's Opera House for the premiere of the opera "Chrysler Imperial." The spectators seemed barely able to contain themselves during the performance. The public's enthusiasm was also evident at the film screenings and various contests that took place in the city's normally half empty theaters. From the eve of the festival, until the festival closed four days later with an elaborate ritual burial of "Ukraine's troubles," the festival was attended by large, enthusiastic crowds.

Why did this event succeed in attracting the sustained interest of its youthful public? It is tempting (but inaccurate) to see this event's success as the simple outcome of a rational decision to support the Ukrainian national activists who gave it funding and organized it and many previous events like it: a public opinion survey of participants, conducted by local sociologists, revealed that the young public attended the event in order to "meet interesting people," rather than to "support new forms of Ukrainian culture" or "participate in the Ukrainian national revival."[8] This was also the organizers' conclusion.

Public events do not normally command the attention of the young people who attended this festival. Never before had a sold out performance at the Opera House provoked them to riot. With few exceptions, most of the students and young people who attended the festival seemed to want more than anything to be admired by their peers—especially the self-described "hippies," "punks," and "rockers" who attended the festival in droves and seemed to be its obvious focus of attention. When I questioned them, members of the bands that performed at this festival and their entourages were indifferent to much of what now transpires in local public life, hazy about many of the principal players, and ill-informed about the facts and figures that sociologists and scholars typically assume guide a person's decision to forego some other activity in favor of attending a nationalist festival. Nonetheless, this festival was intended by its organizers to inculcate national values, and to do so imperceptibly. In this, it was a resounding success.

Reframing National Identity

How are non-native participants to make sense of this seemingly incongruous event? As is often the case in the region, neither participants nor the organizers seemed willing or able to articulate precisely what it was about this particular festival that made it so remarkable. ("You wouldn't understand," I was repeatedly told.) And yet, the festival's organizers told me that in its use of "Aesopian language" and appeal to young people this festival was typical of the events that the Ukrainian independence movement used during the *glasnost* era to create public support at a time when most Ukrainians were still too afraid of repercussions to join public protests.

In order to understand why an event like "Vyvykh-92" succeeded in mobilizing the participation of young Ukrainians, it is necessary to understand the similarities and differences between the strategies of mobilization this festival's organizers used and the ones that the Soviet Ukrainian cultural establishment itself once adopted in seeking to educate students and young people through official Soviet youth culture.[9] Through its use of rock music and inversion of historical narratives, this festival self-consciously sought to lead young people to question the official establishment that had organized the city's previous youth festivals and other public celebrations. A focus on the rhetorical sleights of hand this festival's organizers used will demonstrate that their effectiveness depended on the organizers' ability to ridicule the style of nationalism the official cultural establishment publicly advocated, in the process creating support for the alternative style of nationalism the national movement advocated.

The sociological paradigm of micro-interactionism maintains that social action is always guided by preexisting roles and expectations. One of the more obvious ways to begin making sense of this festival is to compare the structure of interaction the organizers sought to foreground in this festival relative to typical roles and expectations they assumed to be their audience's frame of reference. In fact, the event was self-consciously modeled in opposition to L'viv's official city holiday, and by analogy, other official holidays with which the youthful audience was familiar.

"City day" was a Soviet invention that celebrated L'viv's annexation by the Soviet Union in early October 1939, an event that what was officially viewed as L'viv's liberation from Fascist rule. In many respects, "City day" was no different from other official festivals through which the Soviet cultural establishment attempted to inculcate patriotic values. It presented its public with a series of events that celebrated official Soviet understandings of city history, to the exclusion of alternative interpretations. In years past, "City day" events tended to amplify and reenact the heroic deeds of official Soviet Ukrainian history: glorifying not only Lenin but also the Ukrainian Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as well as Soviet Ukrainian leaders who had ostensibly fought to defend the Ukrainian and Russian "fraternal" peoples from "foreign"

invaders. Although all citizens were expected to participate in such events, schoolchildren, adolescents, and students were as a rule present because their participation was easiest to organize and ensure by virtue of school-based units of such organizations as the Young Pioneers and Communist Youth League, in which membership was virtually obligatory.

The major elements of a generic Soviet official holiday structured the 1992 festival. Typically, in preparation for official Soviet holidays, "socialist competitions" in honor of the upcoming celebration had been held in factories as well as other workplaces. On the eve of a given holiday, rituals of initiation would take place to induct new members into the Young Pioneers and other official youth organizations. Preparations would culminate on the actual holiday with public concerts and fireworks accompanied by processions of floats enacting key turning points in Soviet history followed by organized contingents representing the city's major industrial, commercial, political, cultural and educational institutions, the Communist Party, as well as the Komsomol, "youth," "women," "the peasantry," and, finally, the "working masses." Processions would be followed by cultural events and amateur activities on patriotic themes (frequently targeting the same abstract social groupings represented in the procession). Huge portraits of Lenin and other Soviet leaders would be suspended throughout the site of the festivities. Abundant use would be made of red banners and flags as well as large panels inscribed with officials slogans and declarations related to the Five Year Plan. Newspapers gave primary focus to articles on commemorative themes, grandiose achievements of Soviet economic might, and feats of military prowess. All of these features were also present in the case of the 1992 festival, albeit in ways that underscored their ideological underpinnings.

One element that constituted a primary target of "Vyvykh's" organizers was the highly staged initiation rituals that once inaugurated official holidays. On the eve of the holiday, the festival's organizers convened what to me at first seemed to be a mock trial of the editor of *Post-postup*, a newspaper that had publicized the event. Gradually, it became clear to me that this event was an inversion of ritual inductions: it took place on a ritually transformed stage, complete with a portrait of Ukraine's president festooned in blue and yellow, the colors of the national flag. After introducing the editor, a master of ceremony mock-ceremoniously recounted the editor's contributions to his nation, and then asked members of the audience to address the editor's civic contributions. This unleashed a seemingly unending series of motions from the floor, as one after another, artists and entertainers rose to give long impassioned speeches—many decrying the editor's lack of moral character. Often, these speeches were delivered in exaggerated Western Ukrainian dialect or in officious mock populist language, verse, or song, in a loud, melodramatic voice, with frequent recourse to flamboyant patriotic metaphors.[10] Even I, an outsider, gradually came to understand that speakers were imitating the official Soviet style of Ukrainian patriotism. Judging from the audience's response,

they did so to great comic effect. This became particularly apparent after one of the participants rose to deliver an uproariously funny parody, "Love Oklahoma," of the mechanically written Soviet Ukrainian patriotic poem, Volodymyr Sosiura's "Love Ukraine" ("Liubit' Ukrainu"; 1944), a World War II recipient of the Stalin Prize later officially denounced for its nationalism.[11] Through such parodies, the organizers carefully distinguished their own position from traditional Ukrainian nationalism.

Reframing Official Holidays

The festival not only drew on official Soviet formulas as the basis for the general structure of its scheduled events. It self-consciously sought to subvert the style of nationalism such events inculcated. In other words, the style of this event seemed to draw its forcefulness and effectiveness from its consistent focus on a well-known symbolic target (the official holiday), as well as its consistent adoption of a particular style of delivery: satire.

Satirical intent is often signaled in literature as well as speech through the use of a frame that informs the spectator that the performance that follows is not intended to be viewed realistically. Often, satire will be framed as a contest between the satirist (or, more reasonably, his persona, a fictive counterpart, the "I" of the poem) and an adversary. The frames through which the festival's organizers attempted to create an adversarial context for this event drew on many connotations of the word "vyvykh" in attempting to "invert" the official Soviet order that seemed their primary object of attack—the role spectators played in official holidays did not evade their attention.[12]

Illustration 1. Public reading near the center of L'viv. *Photo courtesy of Anatoly Mizerny.*

Illustration 2. Public gathering near the center of L'viv. *Photo courtesy of Anatoly Mizerny.*

One central target was the Soviet use of holidays to motivate productivity. Official "holidays," advertisements implied, were in fact highly choreographed efforts organized by the official order "from above" to control the leisure time of the population and channel it into productive activities beneficial to the state. The organizers thus issued invitations to the public in such a way as to jokingly insult Ukrainians as "fools" who had long participated in such obvious charades:

> For some time now people haven't had a real celebration— that is, if it could be said that we have ever had one. After all, how could we ever unite the entire Ukrainian people? . . . Some people are so bright that they ignored the unveiling of the statue of Shevchenko in L'viv, instead sitting at home in front of the TV or drinking beer in some pub—it's not for nothing that Taras came out that way, as if a mug of beer had just slipped through his hands. Well at last we have found a holiday for Ukraine that will bring us all together. And for people like us, who have been playing the fool for between 50 and 70 years by now, and are continuing to play the fool, the only possible holiday could be "Vyvykh."[13]

In short, the organizers implied, all members of Ukrainian society who had secretly resisted the official order's manipulation to do "extra work" for the state during holidays could openly celebrate now that Ukraine was independent.[14]

Another invitation to the holiday printed in the same newspaper even more directly mocked the official order's efforts to squeeze more work out of holiday

activities: an official edict with thirty two distinct points ostensibly issued by the Student Union's Security Service (the former KGB) that commanded students of each of the city's major educational institutions and all other youth to participate in the festivities. Each distinct subcategory of the youthful population was issued mock injunctions in highly sentimental language identifying how best to serve their people (from student-biologists, who were told "to increase the number of warm-blooded bodies of domestic production" to student-foresters, who were told to "preserve our forests: they may come in handy"). Items twenty-nine, thirty, and thirty-one commanded the public to "love Ukraine," "love Oklahoma," and "to love [one another]"; the final item, number thirty-two, ended with the old slogan "Glory to October!"[15] This and other advertisements framed the holiday in opposition to official celebrations in which students and schoolchildren would be expected to "play the fool" by "voluntarily" attending the holiday, as if their participation in "Vyvykh" was, by contrast, a true choice.

The Coming of "Chrysler"

The rock opera "Chrysler Imperial," which organizers declared to be the festival's "epicenter," further exemplified the organizer's own clever inversion of official rituals. The festival's culmination, newspaper advertisements proclaimed, this opera was to reveal "a new national myth" to the general public.

"Chrysler Imperial" was performed each night of the festival in the L'viv Opera House, an Art Nouveau building dating from the late nineteenth century, and the site of many previous official Soviet holiday concerts. Located in the symbolic center of the city, the Opera House is not far away from the building that housed the city's branch of the Central State Museum of Lenin, where exhibit halls once displayed popular reproductions of his clothing and personal effects. An official tourist guidebook described the city's main statue of Lenin (1952) as depicting the Soviet leader on "a red granite pedestal, modeled on a tribune, in a dynamic pose intended to show him turning to the city's workers" (Trebuhova and Mykh 1989). It dominated the area in front of the Opera House until 1990, when it was the first Soviet statue of its kind to be publicly demolished by *glasnost*-era activists—an event that was televised throughout the Soviet Union and shocked authorities and civilians alike (Grant 1995; Tumarkin 1997).

The festival's location in this spot was no coincidence. "Vyvykh-92" maintained a clear focus on the cult of Lenin and its dependence on poetry, ballet, opera and other forms of elite culture. Indeed, much of the excitement surrounding the event seemed derived from its location in the city center, and its "ritual defilement" of previously sacred places. "Victory square," as the central square was called during the Soviet era, had been a space carefully policed by Soviet authorities. Officially named in honor of the Soviet conquest of Germany, the space had been carefully monitored in the past so as to prevent

unofficial activities and create an appropriately solemn focus on Lenin.[16] As the country's symbolic leader, Lenin was also appropriately the focus of previous official city holidays, which invariably included elaborately dramatized speeches delivered by an actor who specialized in this impersonation.

The cult of Lenin, and its expression in various high cultural institutions, was a central frame through which "Vyvykh's" organizers depicted their own event's didactic intent. Where the statue of Lenin once stood, the organizers built an immense rock music stage modeled on the ornate Opera House roof. Where previously one would find posters in red and black depicting Lenin and other Soviet leaders, the organizers covered all available walls with yellow and blue posters depicting mythic creatures, collages of kitsch and drawn on lips covering Leninesque heads, and "Chrysler Imperial's" authors, the poetry collective "Bu-Ba-Ba," dressed in Ukrainian military costumes standing atop pedestals on the central square. Organizers redecorated a large building located at the other end of the central square with sentimentally patriotic parodies of official Ukrainian poetry. They even suspended forty-foot-long phallic clear plastic balloons from the trees and light posts that lined the square. Although newspaper ads claimed these balloons were a reference to "sausage mentality," a phrase used to describe people who can not rise above thinking about their stomach all the time, I observed that quite a number of shocked onlookers who gathered to discuss the meaning of these decorations clearly thought otherwise. I saw one middle-aged woman react with horror by averting her child's eyes and rushing off in another direction. During "Vyvykh," pedestrians froze in their tracks once they reached the periphery of the central square.

Earlier, official holidays invariably culminated in the attendance of youth organizations at didactic theater performances intended to celebrate the heroism of model citizens—typically Lenin or some other Soviet leader portrayed as a young man who learns to sacrifice private happiness so as to protect the fatherland from various internal and external enemies. As official history, many of these plays shared the faults of much patriotic writing: their analyses of motives were often superficial, their chronology of events faulty, the facts upon which they were based were exaggerated and sometimes fabricated outright. Such performances featured contrived speeches written in a heavy handed moralistic manner, frequently punctuated by long, elaborately choreographed musical numbers imitating operas, ballets, and other examples of "legitimate" high culture.

Similarly, advertisements for the festival focused attention on nightly performances of the opera "Chrysler Imperial," an "opera" expressly written for the edification of the city's youth. This burlesque performance clearly seemed to mock the gratuitous use of "high culture" in official youth culture, and to celebrate the values of Western pop music subcultures.[17]

"Chrysler Imperial"

Prior to the curtain rising, the opera's director mock-ceremoniously reads a florid plot summary to the audience describing a seemingly generic and yet nonsensical epic plot focusing on the adventures of a decidedly unheroic trio of protagonists, the members of the poetic collective "Bu-Ba-Bu":

> The young beauty Amalthea Garazdets', during her debutante ball, is kidnapped by an evil sorcerer. The old prince Popil', stepfather of the young beauty, calls all the rich men of Swaziland to go out in search of his stepdaughter. Only the three brave Bubabists volunteer—Vernyhora, Vyrvyrdub, and Krutylytsia. From their first step on their journey the evil enchantress Clytemnestra tries to stand in their way. The big-eared Troll helps her in this endeavor. But when the three volunteers finally end up losing their way in the snares of the sly enchantress, there appear Samiilo Nemyrych and Andrii Delcampo, twin enchanted princes the evil enchantress has transformed into a pair of donkeys. Having freed the heroes, their previous appearance returns, after which they set out together with the brave ones in search of the beauty. But their further journeys are also full of adventure and danger. A pack of nurses-Furies under the direction of the Girl with the Pies puts them under a spell with her chimerical and magical song. The heroes fall asleep and it is only the coincidental appearance of the Flying Head that rescues them from total destruction. The same Flying Head leads them forward to new achievements and victories. A decisive battle finally occurs in the cave of the sorcerer, in which the heroes are opposed by the executioner Pavlo Matsapura, Iurko Nemyrych, Mr. Bazio, Martofliakova Martha, and other embodiments of evil and obscurity. After a bloody battle, the beauty Amalthea is able to free herself from the enchanted dungeon. A general victory. The song of the Eastern Slavs is heard, and the heroes triumphantly return home. Happy Ending.[18]

Immediately afterward, the pit orchestra plays an overture that interweaves an anthem-like heavy metal rock song entitled "The Flying Head" and the Ukrainian national anthem. Suddenly, from above, the attention of the crowd shifts to the angelic voices of a children's choir emanating from the uppermost tier of seats. The children, dressed like Young Pioneers, wear the colors of the Ukrainian flag, blue and yellow, around their neck instead of the familiar red kerchiefs. The choir sings what at first sounds like a somber composition honoring a grave personage, but gradually it becomes clear that their object is the poetry collective "Bu-Ba-Bu," a name the altos intone in rhythmic, bell-like tones while the sopranos sing nonsensical phrases about poetry and fame (as if by sheer coincidence, a term of profanity is embedded in the adjoining syllables of two words in the song's refrain).

The performance follows what is presented as a fairly cliched rite-of-passage story of a young poet, ritually transformed by a Party Secretary into a Ukrainian prince (and clearly marked as a representative of high culture), as he travels on a journey to rescue the beautiful princess, set contrapuntally against



Illustration 3. From "Chrysler Imperial." *Photo courtesy of Anatoly Mizerny.*

a nonsensical savior myth about the coming of "Chrysler" that is performed primarily through rock music. A variety of mock heroic elements are used to underscore the ridiculously exaggerated nature of the savior myth as well as the anti-heroic nature of the poet and would-be hero-prince. The dissonance between the two frames of reference is also accentuated through the constant opposition between mock-serious high culture performances (opera, ballet, symphonic music) and episodic appearances by popular local rock musicians and their bands. Thus, immediately after the mock-heroic orchestral overture and choral prelude, the curtain rises to reveal a strange scene resembling the emergence of the first humans from the mists of time. A small group of half-clothed individuals slowly awakes from their slumbers as the sun rises. Throughout, the L'viv Opera House orchestra plays the cliched overture from Edvard Grieg's Pier Gynt Suite. Three or four figures garbed in rags crawl out from under newspapers in a shadowy L'viv street and stare into the spotlight shining down on them into their eyes. One of them gesticulates into the light with horror, and with difficulty tries to form words.[19] He repeats a phrase three times. Although the phrase resembles the traditional Orthodox Easter greeting "Christ has risen," it is actually "Djul-Bars has hanged himself." The contrast—Djul-Bars being a common dog's name—evokes laughter from the audience.[20] The cheap special effect smoke that has surrounded the figures suddenly and dramatically spreads out into the audience, as the curtain falls.

Next, an actor dressed in black tie and rabbit ears appears in the rear of the opera, scurrying up to the stage while repeating the words "Chrysler," with varying degrees of astonishment, wonder, and solemnity. Turning to the audi-

ence, he begins to sing the praises of the future savior "Chrysler Imperial" in the sing-song voice one would expect of an Alice-in-Wonderland character. In addition to possessing the wisdom and magnanimity generally attributed to religious prophets, this one, the rabbit assures us, will bring "American dollars, German marks, English pounds, and a car for each and everyone of us." The appearance of a man on stage startles the rabbit, who hides in a nearby telephone booth and furtively observes two figures walk on stage.

A man dressed in a baseball cap, an orange and black hunting shirt, and a down vest walks on stage. His speech and mannerisms mark him as an older man from the Ukrainian-American diaspora—yet another cliché, the half-mythic "rich American uncle" who the authorities repeatedly warned young Soviet citizens to avoid. (In this case, he also is a psychiatrist, a doubly subversive figure.) Walking with him is a young boy—whom we soon discover to be a poet—dressed in the tracksuit and sneakers many teenagers in L'viv wear. Before the boy knows what is happening to him, the Ukrainian-American commands him to a reception, but tells him that he cannot go dressed as he is. Throughout this and the rest of the opera, the poet remains mute except for a single question he asks at this point. A voice over a loud speaker echoes "Will they ask me to read my poems?" The psychiatrist responds, "Your poems are of no interest to them. All that matters to them is that you are a famous Ukrainian poet."

The psychiatrist next leads the boy into a nineteenth century drawing room, where an attendant dressed as a Communist Party Secretary proceeds to un-

Illustration 4. From "Chrysler Imperial." The three leads are the triad that make up Bu-Ba-Bu. From left: Viktor Neborak, Yuri Andrukhovych, and Oleksandr Irvanets'. *Photo courtesy of Anatoly Mizerny.*

dress the boy (in a suggestive manner) stripping him down to a pair of pale blue ballet tights. A string quartet in court costume and powdered wigs begins playing Handel.[21] The Secretary stamps his foot, and clothes of every description appear to float up from the floor. The leering Party Secretary gravely selects a halter top the color of the Ukrainian flag with a flower attached to its center, and proceeds to dress the boy in it. He then chooses a pink and blue spangled frock coat, all the while stroking the boy lasciviously.

Fantastically transformed "from a poet into a prince," the boy proceeds to a strange party, where the diabolic diaspora psychiatrist introduces him to a princess and her parents. The princess in turn introduces the young poet to the various strange characters that populate the mythic world they have now entered, quite a few of whom seem to be phantasmagorical creatures from past centuries. After the presentation of various grotesque and absurd characters, the poet is seen in the background playing cards with the devil, and losing. The croupiers carry him off to a black mass (choreographed in the style of Fellini). He is about to lose his life when the princess, who tries to save him, appears. As they are making their escape, a dancing girl weaves her way through the audience, and onto stage, flourishing a decapitated head on a platter—a clear illusion to Herod's execution of John the Baptist. The song "the Flying Head" plays while she dances, provocatively presenting the decapitated head to the audience, and then to the rabbit.

The head next reappears on stage, flying through the air, and is magically reattached by the groping hands of what appears to be its decapitated, searching body. If the head on the platter of the dancing girl was an allusion to John the Baptist, then it can be assumed that the headless body is the return of some kind of prophet.[22] But the "second coming" of this prophet reveals that he is a totalitarian leader, endowed with absolute power. The figure identifies himself as the "Eternal Jew, the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ, Beelzebub, a Nazi, an alchemist, a French chansonnier, a mujahedeen, a millionaire." All this he chants rhythmically to the sound of whining electric guitars. By the end of the song, he himself is no longer simply chanting, he adopts a Fascist pose, gives the Fascist salute, raising one arm stiffly to the crowd (the crowd is visibly confused), and marches off stage. Several scenes later, at the end of the opera, as if for no apparent reason, the bare shell of a Chrysler Imperial is rolled out onto the stage while Led Zeppelin music plays. This is the "coming of Chrysler," foretold by the rabbit. The effect is anticlimactic. The Chrysler Imperial consists solely of two enormous headlights that partially blind the audience, but these blinding lights do not prevent viewers from seeing that this car, their savior, lacks substance. In the finale, all characters unite in song, the curtain closes, and the children's choir sings the Dadaistic Bu-Ba-Bu song with which the opera began. The audience seems surprised that the opera has come to an end.

In a facile inversion of socialist realist historical narratives, "Chrysler Imperial" reveals the impossibility of the triumphant return of their dead savior.

Their prophet is transformed into a tin pot despot who believes that he is endowed with universal, supernatural powers. The would-be savior, Chrysler Imperial, is revealed to be an empty shell. An immortal prophet—in what some have taken to be a reference to Lenin—is revealed to be a fascist.

At the outset of "Chrysler Imperial," the event's artistic director presents to the audience a plot that frames the action to come, introducing its main characters and creating a horizon of expectations regarding what will happen to them within the two-hour opera to follow. Yet the opera fails to live up to these expectations, in large part because the protagonists fail to fulfill their expected functions within the narrative. The plot should lead the audience to expect that the poet and his attempts to rescue the princess will be the central goal, and that actions will gradually progress toward the attainment of this goal. But the performance as a whole consists of a variety of individual performances that are only circumstantially united. The heroic plot which apparently joins the opera together is spurious: most of the action in the opera takes place through performances by characters who are oblivious to each other's existence, and who have no bearing on the outcome of the alleged plot. Neither the fulfillment of the poet's quest, nor the appearance of the Flying Head—nor even the coming of Chrysler—are true dramatic climaxes. The opera does not build progressively up to a moment of dramatic tension in which the heroine is about to be rescued. The other characters are not presented as devices for moving along this plot. The main characters remain stereotypes with no substance. The central protagonist's heroism is itself repeatedly challenged by his inability to master the peripheral characters. The latter go on with their performances without contributing to, or interfering with, the poet's alleged progress toward a goal at the ostensible center of the opera. Conventional cliched understandings of nationalism and leadership are made to look absurd in this performance by artists and musicians who adopt the identity of Western rock-and-roll stars.

Collective Identity and the Success of the Ukrainian Independence Movement

It should be somewhat understandable why events like "Chrysler Imperial" would attract the interest of young Ukrainians previously deprived of the right to openly enjoy rock music. Clearly, antics of the sort presented at the rock opera examined above would tickle the fancy of young Communist Youth League members. But what relationship do events like this have to Ukrainian nationalism?

Most approaches to *glasnost*-era Ukrainian national mobilization equate it with traditional ethnonationalism and assume that the national movement attracted support through appeals to ethnic grievances and expectations of material benefits. While many Ukrainians who voted for Ukrainian independence after the Soviet Union collapsed were undoubtedly swayed by traditional ethnonationalism, this is not an adequate explanation for the early phases of mobilization, when most acts of civil disobedience were carried out by students

and young Ukrainians like those who attended "Vyvykh." Appeals to traditional nationalism, or to ethnic grievances and material benefits, did not motivate this social group to support national activists. One clear indicator of this is the fact that Soviet authorities had long advocated a socialist variety of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and featured it at official Soviet holidays. Young Ukrainians were unlikely to be moved by appeals to a style of thought that had for so long been associated with official culture.

Effective contemporary social movements do not grow by attracting individual recruits through appeals to grievances or material benefits. They tend instead to recruit existing voluntary associations. Thus, successful collective action in this case depended on the transformation and extension of preexisting roles and expectations to create a collective identity that appealed to a sizeable preexisting community: members of the official Soviet youth group, Komsomol.

Collective identity has come to be seen by many social scientists as an important variable shaping the success of social movements. According to one influential anthology on social movements, many prominent theorists: "consider 'collective identity' as a social construct linking the individual, the cultural system, and, in some cases, the organizational carrier of the movement" (Mueller 1992, 15). Because appeals to traditional Ukrainian identity had long been used by Komsomol and other official Soviet organizations to attract support, they could not possibly have worked to motivate support for *glasnost*-era national mobilization.

One crucial element of success in the Ukrainian case was the construction of an effective "collective action frame" that harnessed the youthful aspirations of politically apathetic Ukrainian adolescents brought up on a diet of compulsory political activism and official nationalism. It made them willing to voluntarily attend public rock concerts sponsored by a political movement every bit as nationalist as the Communist Party had by then become. Such a collective action frame is a set of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns, serving "as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action" (Snow and Bedford 1992, 137). Although recent studies have tended to split over which other factors typically influence social movement formation and success, the crucial mediating role of such frames and other cognitive dimensions of collective identity has emerged as a major point of agreement among theorists from a wide variety of disciplinary orientations.[23]

Typically, other observers of this and other festivals have focused more than I have on the motives and beliefs that might lead Ukrainians to join the national independence movement. Uncovering the motives of the festival organizers is no easy task—which I learned both while researching this festival and later while presenting early drafts of my work to academic audiences. A number of influential Western observers who interviewed members of the artistic coali-

tion that sponsored this and other youth festivals have later gone on to publish reports that failed to account for the rock-music inspired style of national identity constructed by the festival's non-conformist organizers, suggesting only that western Ukrainians had embraced a potentially dangerous form of nationalism.[24] There is a double irony here: not only were the writers in the "Vyvykh" group self-consciously opposed to the strategies used by most local nationalists, but many members of the academic audiences before whom I later presented my results were unable to recognize the possibility that these creative west Ukrainians had adopted an alternative approach to traditional nationalism that was itself *nationalist.*

Collective identities work most successfully to create movements precisely when they define a "we" that resonates powerfully with the understandings and expectations of a heterogeneous audience that is already enrolled in formal organizations. Activists will be particularly effective if they target an organization like the Communist Youth League that has lost what little popular appeal it once had under the impact of Western youth culture and, in effect, give its members what they want. (In this case, rock music.) As sociological studies of micro-interactionism suggest, one of the most effective ways of delegitimating a preexisting collective identity is to demonstrate that it is constructed in opposition to culturally accepted values held by the "role models" that an organization's members aspire to emulate. The frames that were used by the festival's organizers were clearly devoted to this end: they quite successfully delegitimated the preexisting collective action frames used to mobilize youth by contrasting them to the apparent freedom and excitement of Western youth culture. During *glasnost,* this made it easy to attract young supporters (quite unwitting nationalists) to public protests structured as rock concerts.

The festival's organizers sought to promote an atmosphere within which they could attract the support of a public capable of challenging the Soviet state's monopoly on mass public events. To do so, they did not have to fully reveal their own identity project (indeed, this would no doubt have been ineffective). Rather, they simply had to self-consciously subvert the particular collective action frames associated with the "official nationalism" promoted under Communism. The competing identity projects of the latter had created a mass organization of bored youth, many of whom would jump at the chance of attending a rock concert.

At the most general level, the frames the organizers used could also be seen as drawing on three sets of values commonly stressed in Soviet education: rationality, self-determination, and pluralism. These themes emerged repeatedly in the way the organizers represented their event. Implicitly and explicitly, their strategies asserted that other public authorities base their own identity projects on myth, conformism, and homogeneity.

The festival's appropriation of frames that helped define their opposition to myth, conformism, and homogeneity was expressed most obviously in its advertisements. "Vyvykh" advertisements transformed the gray cityscape of

L'viv, covering the walls of most downtown shops with a blanket of brightly colored posters announcing upcoming events. Two of the most frequently used posters featured the poetry collective, "Bu-Ba-Bu." One poster depicted the members of this collective, garishly garbed in nationalist military costumes, standing in heroic poses atop the pedestal that normally supports the statue of Adam Mickiewicz that is located in the center of L'viv. Another poster featured the cartoonish "flying head" of Victor Neborak, member of Bu-Ba-Ba and author of the poem of that name that became a central motif of the opera "Chrysler Imperial." Depicted in much the same pose as holiday posters of Lenin (see Tumarkin 1997), Neborak's face was occluded by a collage of kitschy magazine cut-outs, decidedly unlike the typical portraits of Lenin that it seemed to mock. A third poster satirically invoked the vulgar use of political symbols characteristic of communist political posters. Across a somber red and black field, there appeared a schedule of the rock and rock groups that would perform during the festival written in the shape of a musical note, also surrounded by kitschy cartoon cut-outs. These three posters each framed communism and nationalism as rhetorical equivalents, by contrast, suggesting that the festival represented a real alternative to both ideologies.

Non-conformism also determined the choice of rock music performances and other events that took place during the festival. Non-conformism, as it was formerly understood in the Soviet Union, focused in large part on the adoption of various forms of Western popular culture. Rock music dominated "Vyvykh": the several days of rock music concerts by popular bands took place on the city's central square, on a stage located on the spot in the city's central square where L'viv's main statue of Lenin had until recently stood. Ideological non-conformism was also expressed in various other events: a jazz performance, a number of contests (e.g., "erotic poetry and jokes," "contortions, grimaces, and masks," and "stand-up comedy and satire"), an art exhibit, a contest for re-decorated cars, and a movie festival focusing on the debut of the satirical documentary "A Message for Margaret Thatcher" (in which the filmmaker chronicles his efforts to send Margaret Thatcher a Ukrainian Easter egg—one of the most sentimental and kitschy objects of Ukrainian folk art known in the West). The festival organizers arguably used familiar images of kitsch to lampoon the cliched roles and expectations Communists wished to force upon young Ukrainians. Thus, they achieved their goal of reconstituting the manifest functions of organized youth culture, making young Ukrainian rock-and-roll fans available for potential anti-Communist activities.

Conclusion

Several lessons arise from an analysis of "Vyvykh-92." First, typical approaches to Ukrainian nationalism, adopted by many observers during glasnost, mistakenly assumed that the Ukrainian national movement that arose during *glasnost* was fueled by the grievances of a large ethnic group whose identity had been artificially suppressed for nearly a century (in the case of Eastern Ukraine). This is an incorrect interpretation of Ukrainian nationalism. It misunderstands not only the structure of opportunities that gave rise to this particular movement, but also the mechanisms by which social movements arise in complex societies. It also tends to lead to apocalyptic media pronouncements about the dangers posed by unleashed ethnic sentiments, and, in some cases (China's Tiananman Square is one famous example), provides a convenient justification for government crackdowns on student protests.

How then should we understand this movement's success? First, it is important to recognize that the Ukrainian national movement differed little from preexisting organizational and institutional behavior. It was shaped by preexisting norms, styles of communication, and institutions. It was not spontaneous, unorganized, irrational, or emotional. Indeed, as in the case of events like "Vyvykh," the public events through which the national movement widened its circle of influence differed in quite carefully controlled ways from highly scripted official events.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the national movement was a coalition that united a variety of preexisting social strata and groups, many of which were (and remain) self-consciously opposed. The movement was a reflection of what Soviet Ukraine had become by *glasnost:* a diverse, highly educated society whose positions of authority were occupied by urban elites educated in Soviet institutions. The students and young Ukrainians who organized "Vyvykh" led the movement because they were already being groomed for leadership positions in their respective fields. Leadership of the movement was a simple extension of the roles these young individuals had been encouraged to adopt by the Komsomol and other Soviet institutions. Rather than rejecting their society, they were products of it.

Still, the students who participated in early stages of *glasnost* national mobilization were different in their goals and expectations than the activists and adherents the movement later attracted through careful coalition building. Thus, in the early stages of high-risk activism, young non-conformist poets and rock stars were typical ideologues of Ukrainian nationalism; but their hybrid style of nationalism was not for everyone. As the national movement grew, it could not afford to alienate the official Ukrainian cultural establishment that "Vyvykh's" organizers so deftly lampooned.

Nonetheless, both the non-conformist style of nationalism and the traditional variety that had been promoted by the Soviet cultural establishment ultimately shared a common goal (even if supporters of civic Ukrainian nation-

alism are loath to admit this). Their activities privilege the role that the Ukrainian language should play in public life. Their common adherence to an ideology linking personal identity to speaking a "prestigious" language emerges as the primary latent function served by the "national" festival "Vvykh-92." Moreover, as social movement research has found in many other cases, truly disadvantaged speech communities rarely possess the skills and resources needed for national independence. Had it not been for the Soviet state's generous funding of Ukrainian culture, "Vyvykh"—as well as other events through which the Ukrainian language acquires new prestige—would scarcely have been conceivable, let alone effective. The Soviet Union's institutions in fact created the seeds of their own demise—not by suppressing Ukrainian culture, but rather by mass-producing it on a previously unimaginable scale.

Appendix

Proclamation

"Vyvykh-92"—is a grandiose carnivalesque action, that will move all strata, mini-strata, castes and groups, dying as well as nascent classes of "independent of aging" L'viv, granting them new directions for new, yet-unseen movements.

THE MOVEMENT ABOVE ALL ELSE!

The crown of the carnival—is limitless. Its stalk—Liberty prospect. And this is deeply symbolic. From the paintings on the cobblestones to the firework-illuminated skies above the opera theater stretches its holiday space. The word, sound, color, scent, touch will become embodied in the most unexpected artistic forms. The blind will see, the mute will begin to speak, the deaf will hear.

UKRAINE IS TEARING THE MASK OF SORROW FROM ITS FACE!

The epicenter of the carnival will be the poeso-opera "Chrysler Imperial"—a vision and forewarning, foreshadowing and manifestation, appearance and disappearance, a unique performance directed by Serhii Proskurnia based on motifs of a newly-formed national myth created by the poetic association "Bu-Ba-Bu." They are already known on all the world's continents, including Africa and Antarctica. This is a page of the new Ukrainian culture, which is being written before your eyes. Invest your stocks! Sign your name! Create it with us!

YOUTH, WHICH PARLIAMENTARIANS HAVE FORGOTTEN,
STILL EXISTS!
IT WANTS TO BE HAPPY!

That is why at the festival we will laugh, change our clothes, go on treasure hunts,
discover new lands at arm's length.
Let us not forget our diaspora!
Let us help America -
and America will help us!
Long live Vyvykh -92
Glory to Ukraine!

In the name of the organizational committee,
Viktor Neborak

Source: Post-postup 29 September 1992: 6

NOTES

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1. Throughout this paper I shall make clear that the phenomena I am investigating are defined by the Ukrainian experience of *glasnost* (usually translated as 'openness') under Gorbachev in the USSR. Note, though, that the defining event that I investigate, the "Vyvykh" festival of September 1992, falls outside the chronological period of *glasnost,* but is nevertheless still defined by processes begun under it.

2. See Kohn 1965 for an excellent discussion of the difference between the two varieties of nationalism.

3. Thus, in Arendt's (1951) *Origins of Totalitarianism* and Kornhauser's (1959) *Politics of Mass Society*, among other examples of what was then called the study of "collective behavior," scholars assumed that Nazism, Stalinism and other mass political movements were more or less unmediated psychological phenomena supported largely by individuals spontaneously reacting to the disorganization and frustration brought about by modernization. This approach largely failed to explain the *timing* of such movements, which emerged simultaneously in countries at various stages of modernization. Because it neglected to study the construction and manipulation of public opinion by social movements, political authorities, and other interested parties, this approach could also not account for their *location*—why only some countries and not others responded to modernization in this way.

4. See Loveman 1998 for a discussion of rational choice explanations of high-risk collective action.

5. Thus, for example, one young conservatory student I interviewed told me that she never actively made a choice to join the human chain linking L'viv and Kyiv because Komsomol channels were used to organize this activity (interview, September 30, 1992). Similarly, a young art student recalls never making an active choice to participate in public protests. Rather, a Komsomol meeting was called in which the organizer explained in detail where and when an upcoming protest would take place.

When he and his classmates were not directly told not to go to this event, they interpreted this ambiguity as a tacit invitation to encourage them to attend (interview, name withheld upon request, November 14, 1992).

6. A focus on what is now often called a social movement's "identity" was absent from the terminology of the older collective behavior school that focused on grievances and deprivation (as represented for example by Turner and Killian 1957 [1972; 1987]), as well as resource mobilization theory and newer rational choice explanations of collective action (e.g., Tilly 1978, Chong 1991). But, in the last decade, frames and other building blocks of identity have become an increasingly central focus in theoretical accounts of collective action (see Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Oberschall 1993).

7. My informants told me that, since the Soviet Union's collapse, most patriotic public events Rukh officially organizes fail to attract the interest of Ukraine's apathetic post-Soviet population. Indeed, public demonstrations, concerts, and meetings I witnessed were almost invariably poorly attended. It is not unusual for organizers and participants to outnumber audience members and onlookers at many such events. By contrast, "Vyvykh" drew large, enthusiastic crowds of teenagers and young adults that organizers estimated at twenty to fifty thousand. Even if this estimate was somewhat exaggerated, the festival flooded the city's central square and filled local cultural institutions to capacity. By contrast, other festivals and performances frequently took place before half empty halls of bored school children on class outings.

8. When I interviewed them, theater directors and actors who had in the past participated in official festival performances condemned the festival. Similarly, newspaper accounts made clear that this festival was yet another example of a long series of "youth" festivals, all of which were "anti-cultural" and "anti-artistic" in their values (e.g., Romaniuk 1992). But a public opinion survey commissioned by the city council, conducted by university sociologists, and published in the newspaper *Post-postup,* concluded that the event was a success precisely because the event was not seen as nationalist by its audience. In its final report, the commission stated: "Of course, today's realities dictate that any large scale cultural event include the meta-goal of the achievement of certain national cultural goals. But the achievement of these goals is more effective the greater the national agent is mediated and diluted by an artistic event" (Rybak 1992).

9. Youth culture has for over two decades been the object of considerable attention among American and British scholars. There are numerous general studies of the effects of Rock music on youth culture, most of them focused on Anglo-American musical subcultures and their influ-

ence (see Brake 1980; Frith 1996 for reviews of this field). Recently, a number of scholarly treatments of socialist and post-socialist youth culture have appeared that focus primarily on Russia's largest urban centers (see Coulloudon 1988; Pilkington 1994; Rayport Rabodzeenko 1998; Riordan 1988, 1989; Ryback 1990; Traver 1989; Weaver 1992). Although Ukrainian journals like *Suchasnist'* and newspapers like *Post-postup* have in the past decade devoted considerable attention to Ukrainian youth culture, few Western scholars have written about this field (for exception, see Bahry 1989; Wanner 1998).

10. Considerations of space prevent further examination of the festival's organizers stress on their own self-consciously urban identities, in opposition to the country bumpkins that they suggested once ruled Ukraine.

11. This and most other "Bu-Ba-Bu" poems featured in "Chryslter Imperial" appear in a subsequently published anthology, *Bu-Ba-Bu* (1995).

12. Although it has no easy English equivalent, the noun *vyvykh* is a nominalization that refers to dislocation as either a physical or mental state or process. Used figuratively, it refers to strangeness in thinking or reasoning. Its verb form, *vyvykhnuty* refers either to the spraining or dislocation of a joint, or figuratively, to mental abnormality. With a reflexive suffix, *vyvykhnutysia* refers to circumvention or avoidance of duties or obligations through subterfuge (see Andrusyshen and Krett 1955[1990], 65).

13. *Post-postup* 29 September 1992: 2.

14. See Appendix, p. 83.

15. *Post-postup* 29 September 1992: 2.

16. As part of the introduction of Soviet rule to L'viv, state authorities devised an official general plan for the development of the city. Great attention was paid to the expansion and what officials called the "bringing to order" of the public squares in the city center. In the case of the central square, this process entailed the removal of many of the preexisting commercial enterprises and private dwellings that lined the square, and the removal of tram stops from the area. Private-use buildings were taken over by official institutions, and the pre-war Museum of Applied Arts became a branch of the Central Museum of Lenin (see Trehubova and Mykh 1989).

17. "Chrysler Imperial," belongs to a particular genre of literature, burlesque. Works in this genre typically imitate a serious literary or artistic form in such a manner as to develop an extravagant incongruity between the subject and its treatment. In this opera, as is common with burlesque, the serious is treated lightly (elite culture in general, and Soviet youth culture in particular) and the frivolous seriously (pop culture in general, and Western pop culture in particular). Throughout, patriotic emotions typi-

cally sentimentalized by official culture were trivialized, and trivial emotions typically villified by official culture were elevated to a dignified plane.

18. The opera takes its plot from the novel "Recreation," written by Yuri Andrukhovych, also a member of "Bu-Ba-Bu." This novel first appeared in the inaugural Ukrainian issue of the Ukrainian literary and political journal, *Suchasnist'*, formerly published in New York City, before relocating to Ukraine after independence. In introducing the novel, Mykola Riabchuk (1992), a prominent Kyiv literary critic facetiously hailed this novel as just as important for the present time as the publication of Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, the Ukrainian mythmaker. For the author's subsequent thoughts on the novel and "Chrysler Imperial," see Andrukhovych (1994, 12–13).

19. This actor first became known throughout western Ukraine for his performance of folk songs and ballads, and achieved fame during *glasnost* for founding the cabaret theater *Ne zhurys'* (Don't Worry) that performed a critical role in national mobilization.

20. This is a reference to a Neborak poem about a dog hanged by its own chain. Various literary critics have tried to analyze this poem as a metaphor for the death of a nation, or of the suspicious death by hanging of a famed Ukrainian bard believed to have been killed by the KGB, but the author has repeatedly insisted that the poem is just about his dog, which hanged itself on its chain one night. See "Monologue with a dog's ghost," Viktor Neborak, *Litaiucha Holova* (*The Flying Head*, 1990), p. 34.

21. The Party Secretary opens a book he is holding, and announces "Georg Friedrich Handel, minuet in D," barely correcting himself when he mispronounces the last name in the way that Russian-speakers do, substituting a *g* sound for the sound *h*, which does not exist in the Russian language.

22. Here there is another note of irony. One may recall that in the Gospel narrative, John the Baptist called the people of Israel to repent their sins and lead Godly lives. He also criticized Herod, the Jewish tetrarch (and representative of Roman power), for coveting his brother Philip's wife, Herodias. For this, Herod arrested John the Baptist, but lacked the courage to put him to death for fear of popular protest. After watching Herodias' daughter dance, he was so pleased with it that he granted her a wish and promised to fulfil it unconditionally. Prompted by her mother, she asked for, and received, John the Baptist's head on a platter. Later, John the Baptist's disciples retrieved the prophet's decapitated body, carried it away, buried it, and sought Jesus out to report their loss. Jesus, after listening to their story, removed himself from the crowd, and went off to pray, rather than rallying the masses. Later on, of course, Jesus, like John the Baptist, was arrested and put to death. His despondent

followers also took His body, entombed it, and returned to find that Jesus had risen; they rejoiced that they had not been abandoned. This narrative reference reinforces the motif of the prophet's "second coming."

23. As mentioned above, identity, and in particular, collective identity, were absent from the terminology of the older collective behavior as well as resource mobilization paradigms. In the past decade, however, this has become a critical term in reviews of the literature on social movements. Thus, a review of the recent work of prominent scholars (see Gamson 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Friedman and McAdam 1992) concludes that collective identity has come to be seen as central to movement success by a variety of recent approaches, which often now either "emphasize the construction of social movement identities from existing structured inequalities" or "locate social movement mobilization in existing collective identities associated with social roles that heighten a sense of grievance or offer a social basis for mobilization" (1992, 16).

24. A number of influential Western journalists were conducting research on the threats posed by Ukrainian nationalism while I was conducting this research. Brumberg's (1991) *New York Review of Books* article, entitled "Not So Free At Last," caused quite a stir within the Ukrainian scholarly community in L'viv as well as the United States while I was conducting this research. Maryniak's (1993) subsequent report on Ukraine entitled "Legalised Lawlessness," also offended at least some of those who cooperated with her. By contrast, Ignatieff represented the national strivings in Ukraine in quite favorable terms relative to other expressions of the "new nationalism" he covered in his BBC series and analyzed in the accompanying (1994) book he wrote, although he clearly misunderstood "Vyvykh," which he reported to be an indication that Western Ukrainian youth were unconcerned with things European. In an article on "Vyvykh" published in *The Observer* in October 1992, Ignatieff wrote that "The crowd is wearing a wild array of costumes and funny faces, decked with old Soviet army hats, decorated with the blue and yellow ribbons of independence; a girl walks by with a toy pistol inside a militia man's holster; nobody is imitating the West here. They are doing their own Galician, Carpathian thing."

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