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Gender and the Outcomes of the 2010 Presidential Election

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A gender analytic perspective is used to explore the outcomes of the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections. Gender differences within the Tymoshenko and Yanukovych electorates are assessed at the regional level through exit poll data. Comparisons to the outcome of the 2004 presidential election show that the 2010 elections exhibited very different gendered patterns of electoral support. The exit polls suggest that Tymoshenko lost due to "gender bias"—she failed to receive the support of a substantial number of men who voted for Yushchenko in 2004. Meanwhile, Yanukovych achieved victory despite a substantial decline in support among female voters.

Keywords: *gender; elections; Ukraine; Yulia Tymoshenko*

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine. He narrowly defeated Yulia Tymoshenko, the incumbent prime minister, 49 to 46 percent. After the Orange Revolution overturned his initial victory in the rigged second round of the 2004 presidential election, Yanukovych was widely considered to have lost his only chance of becoming president. Viktor Yushchenko—the "Orange" candidate who pledged to promote Western integration, combat corruption, and reform the economy while transforming Ukraine into a European country—was initially viewed as a shoo-in for a second term. But Yulia Tymoshenko soon eclipsed Yushchenko in popularity and came to be seen as the frontrunner in the race for the presidency.

Why did Tymoshenko's Cinderella story end in this electoral defeat? What options are open to her if she is to run for office again? Tymoshenko, a former close ally of Yushchenko, achieved popular acclaim for her courageous leadership of protest during the Orange Revolution. She became an object of popular adoration, likened by fans to a "Ukrainian princess." Her meteoric rise in Ukrainian politics continued after the revolution, when she twice served as prime minister. In the 2007 parliamentary

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election, her political coalition, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, expanded its representation in parliament by nearly 10 percent, to 31 percent. Meanwhile Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc remained at 14 percent. Conceivably, these two electoral bases could together have outvoted Yanukovych's electorate, repeating their victory in 2004. Yet the Yanukovych campaign defeated Tymoshenko in 2010 by nearly nine hundred thousand votes, without employing the methods of vote rigging and fraud that marred the 2004 election.

In this article, I employ gender analysis to examine the electoral dynamics of the presidential election of 2010 and explore the popular base of support Tymoshenko has developed. Gender analysis is an approach to political as well as social processes that assesses the impact of societal standards of masculinity and femininity. It has been used to gain insight into the outcomes of elections, as well as various other aspects of the social and political transformations taking place in postcommunist countries.[1] However, little serious attention has been devoted to the role gender has played in Tymoshenko's political career or in Ukrainian politics more generally.[2] Instead, explanations of the results of elections have focused on ethnonational loyalties. Principally, observers assume that electoral support in Ukraine is driven by regionalism, which pits the "East" and the "West" of the country against one another in conflicts over Ukraine's national identity and geopolitical orientation.[3]

The issues of regionalism raised by observers of Ukrainian political contests are crucial to explaining patterns of electoral support. However, elections in Ukraine are also deeply gendered. The prominence of a female frontrunner for the presidency in 2010 provides an opportunity to analyze the obstacles that women must overcome to be included in the post-Soviet political system. Gender analysis sheds light on the determinants of women's agency vis-à-vis the state, demonstrating that gender intersects in complex ways with understandings of inclusion that are ethnonationally based. Here I show that women and men in the electorate responded differently across Ukraine's four regions when presented with the choice between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko in 2010 than they did to the choice between Yanukovych and Yushchenko in 2004. I first examine trends in women's political representation and participation, placing Ukraine into comparative perspective relative to other postcommunist countries. I then use official results and exit polls to explore the social bases of support for Yanukovych and the other candidates who stood against him in 2004 versus 2010. I consider the extent and nature of the decline in support for Tymoshenko among "Orange voters" relative to the previous election. Last, I explore the potential effect of the authoritarian crackdown under Yanukovych on support for Tymoshenko.

Gender and Elections in Ukraine

In her 1993 book *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe*, Barbara Einhorn became one of the first scholars

Table 1
Percentage of Female MPs in Post-Soviet Countries

World Rank	Country	Elections	Seats	Women	Percentage
22	Belarus	9/2008	110	35	31.8
39	Kyrgyzstan	12/2007	90	23	25.6
44	Republic of Moldova	7/2009	101	24	23.8
47	Estonia	3/2007	101	23	22.8
52	Latvia	10/2006	100	22	22.0
52	Uzbekistan	12/2009	150	33	22.0
62	Lithuania	10/2008	141	27	19.1
63	Tajikistan	2/2010	63	12	19.1
70	Kazakhstan	8/2007	107	19	17.8
73	Turkmenistan	12/2008	125	21	16.8
83	Russian Federation	12/2007	450	63	14.0
93	Azerbaijan	11/2005	123	14	11.4
103	Armenia	5/2007	131	12	9.2
112	Ukraine	9/2007	450	36	8.0
120	Georgia	5/2008	138	9	6.5
Average					17.9

Source: The Inter-Parliamentary Union online database on women in parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm; accessed 8 Sept. 2010). Data are provided here for the lower or single house.

to explore the political role that gender was playing in the transition from state socialism. Throughout the postcommunist region, she noted that women were being marginalized politically in reaction to a resurgence of traditional gender values coding women as mothers and wives and representing politics as a masculine domain that was "not for women."[4] Einhorn warned that a significant erosion of women's rights would take place unless women came together to challenge the new patriarchal order: "Only time, the revival of civil society networks, and women's activism may change this. If socialism subordinated women to the macro needs of the economy and demographic demands, as some maintain, so now nationalism is instrumentalizing women by reducing them to their reproductive role."[5]

The transformations that swept countries undergoing transitions have brought many of the problems Einhorn discussed: rampant unemployment and underemployment for women, compounded by stresses resulting from the impoverishment of much of the population. Just as Einhorn predicted, initially few women were able to break into politics. Nevertheless, over the course of the subsequent two decades, the level of women's representation and visibility in politics has risen significantly in most postcommunist countries. By 2010, the average level of women's representation in parliament had reached 18 percent for post-Soviet states and 19 percent for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These levels of representation place these two groups of postcommunist countries at or near the worldwide average of 19 percent and only a few percentage points below the average for the countries of Europe, 22 percent (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table 2
Percentage of Female MPs in Select Postcommunist Countries

World Rank	Country	Elections	Seats	Women	Percentage
19	The F.Y.R. of Macedonia	6/2008	120	39	32.5
45	Croatia	11/2007	153	36	23.5
52	Czech Republic	5/2010	200	44	22.0
54	Serbia	5/2008	250	54	21.6
58	Bulgaria	7/2009	240	50	20.8
60	Poland	10/2007	460	92	20.0
63	Bosnia and Herzegovina	10/2006	42	8	19.0
77	Slovakia	6/2010	150	23	15.3
75	Albania	6/2009	140	23	16.4
81	Slovenia	9/2008	90	13	14.4
93	Romania	11/2008	334	38	11.4
95	Montenegro	3/2009	81	9	11.1
104	Hungary	4/2010	386	35	9.1
Average					19.0

Source: The Inter-Parliamentary Union online database on women in parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm; accessed 8 Sept. 2010). Data are provided here for the lower or single house.

In Ukrainian politics, however, the representation of women remains very low. In the 1980s, due to gender quotas imposed throughout the Soviet Union, women comprised 33 percent of all deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, the legislature of Ukraine. Women's representation in the Rada plummeted with the advent of competitive elections. In 1990, at the first election to the Ukrainian parliament, women won only 3 percent of the seats. In later elections, their representation increased modestly, hovering between 5 and 8 percent. Since the parliamentary elections of 2007, women deputies have held 8 percent of the seats in the Rada. Currently, this level of women's representation places Ukraine 112th in world rankings.[6] Among postcommunist countries only Georgia, with 7 percent, and Mongolia, with 4 percent, have lower percentages of women in parliament. Even though women numerically outnumber men in the electorate and Yulia Tymoshenko has twice served as the country's prime minister, men comprise the vast majority of politicians and figure prominently behind the scenes as funders and strategists.

The neotraditional attitudes toward "female" and "male" authority that concerned Einhorn shape electoral dynamics in numerous ways. Most obviously, gender bias in Ukrainian politics is revealed in the language that permeates elite discussions of political affairs. In Ukraine it is common to hear it said that "politics is no place for women." Studies of political discourse find that today a woman in Ukraine is expected to be a *Berehynia* (hearth guardian)—a devoted mother or wife who tends to the home and family. Such gender scholars as Oksana Kis have found that a second model of femininity also exists: the sex symbol, or "Barbie."[7] Both these models discourage Ukrainians from seeing women as viable political leaders.

Nevertheless, there appear to be two alternative readings of the *Berehynia* figure. According to a neotraditional reading, Ukrainian women should devote themselves to their family and play supportive (and hence, subordinate) roles in political life. However, an alternative feminist-nationalist reading views Ukrainian women as "empowered" by their gender role to play a significant role in reforming the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. According to this second perspective, in Ukraine it is men who are the "weaker sex." Due to a gender imbalance resulting from a long history of colonialism, men are too weak to lead their nation politically, and it is women who have a special mission to "save" their nation. Such a standpoint on women's political participation has been promoted by women's associations that emerged from the Ukrainian independence movement and are active mainly in Western Ukraine. These women's organizations see women's political participation as necessitated by the gendered impact of colonialism, which robbed Ukrainian men of their masculinity and compelled women to become the main bearers of nationhood and national identity in the home as well as public life.[8]

The low level of representation of women in parliament and the prevalence of gendered discourses in politics might suggest that the public generally prefers for women to play traditional roles in Ukrainian society and politics. However, public opinion polls conducted in 1996 and 2006 by the World Values Survey show that attitudes toward women's empowerment have grown less traditionalistic over time.[9] Overall, there has been a decline since the mid-1990s in support for beliefs that might lead voters to oppose the candidacy of women for public office. For example, while in 1996, according to the World Values Survey, 63.4 percent of the population of Ukraine agreed with the statement, "Men make better political leaders than women do," by 2006, these rates had dropped significantly to 54.8 percent. Moreover, a shift appears to be taking place away from more conservative beliefs regarding gender roles.[10]

Openness to women's political empowerment has been more pronounced among women than it has been among men. In 2006, the World Values Survey showed that 58.7 percent of women versus only 28.8 percent of men expressed support for women as political leaders. Women also have been adopting more positive attitudes toward women's political rights. Evidence for such a shift is suggested by their more favorable attitudes toward equal rights for women and men. In 2006, there was a 10 percentage point gender difference in response to a question asking whether equal rights for women and men was essential to democracy: 52.2 percent of women as opposed to 42.7 percent of men considered equal rights essential to democracy.

The World Values Survey also demonstrates that attitudes toward women's political empowerment differ significantly across Ukraine's four regions. In 2006, when asked by the World Values Survey whether equal rights for women and men are essential to democracy, strong agreement was expressed by 74.9 percent of Western Ukrainians, 67.0 percent of Eastern Ukrainians, 52.5 percent of Central Ukrainians, but only 50.3 percent of Southern Ukrainians. Thus, Western Ukrainians appear to express the

strongest support for gender equality. They are followed closely by Eastern Ukrainians. However, Central and Southern Ukrainians exhibit the least supportive attitudes toward gender equality. By contrast, when asked whether men make better political leaders than women, disagreement was expressed by 56.4 percent of Central Ukrainians, 44.9 percent of Western Ukrainians, 44.1 percent of Eastern Ukrainians, and 27.8 percent of Southern Ukrainians. Thus, when asked to assess whether men are better political leaders, Central Ukrainians expressed views that were the most potentially supportive of women political leaders, while Western and Eastern Ukrainians were only moderately supportive. Generally, Southern Ukrainians were the least supportive of women's political empowerment.

Overall, these data suggest that there is growing demand for electing women to public office and for other forms of empowerment. Yet demand varies considerably by gender and region. There is greater general support for women political leaders among women. A majority of the population assumes that men make better political leaders than women. Indeed, only in Central Ukraine does a slim majority of the population reject this view. Yet women's empowerment is not universally opposed. There is considerable support in Western and Eastern Ukraine for gender equality. It might be possible for a strong candidate to mold these values into a general political platform supportive of women political leaders. However, there also appears to be a significant share of the electorate that exhibits support for conservative gender roles. Indeed, men in general appear to hold beliefs that might act as barriers to women who challenge traditional gender roles.

Tymoshenko as a Political Leader

Yulia Tymoshenko has struggled with the complex gender dynamics of Ukrainian politics during her career as a public figure. She has nonetheless proven herself capable of meeting and exceeding the gendered expectations women politicians face. Early in her career as a politician, Tymoshenko was cast by her detractors as the "Gas Princess" and the "oligarch in skirts." Presumably, these terms were employed to indicate that she was deemed not only too "sexy," but also too involved in the masculine domain of energy trading, to be considered a good Ukrainian woman, let alone a good politician. In response, she transformed herself into a veritable *Berehynia*. She learned to speak Ukrainian, allied herself with the traditionalistic Victor Yushchenko, and donned her signature wrap-around peasant braid. During the Orange Revolution, her fiery speeches and willingness to stand up to armed troops earned her new sobriquets that were more positive, but no less gendered: "Ukrainian Joan of Arc," "warrior princess," "Orange Princess," and "Goddess of the Revolution."[11]

Since the revolution, Tymoshenko often has been depicted using language that suggests that she was "born" into her position of leadership. Frequently, she has been

referred to as Ukraine's "very own princess," "Lady Yu" (in reference to England's Princess Diana, "Lady Di"). In a nod to the national discourse of Ukrainian "empowered womanhood," Tymoshenko has also been represented as the "only real man in Ukrainian politics." Indeed, she repeatedly has faced accusations from other politicians of being too strong and domineering. Some critics have even compared her to Stalin and Catherine the Great, or branded her a common criminal.[12] Perhaps to soften her image as a leader, she has embraced maternalist policy issues related to improving the welfare of families and children, recoding herself as the guardian of future generations (e.g., significantly increasing "mother's pensions" given after the birth of a child, introducing improvements in the public health system). Similarly, she has avoided causes associated with women's rights advocacy groups (e.g., increasing the representation of women in parliament, defending women from sexual harassment in the workplace).

During the 2010 presidential campaign, Tymoshenko worked hard to counter public criticism aimed at the Yushchenko administration for its failures to deliver on the promises made during the Orange Revolution. She typically appeared in public as the "Mother of the Nation," a quasi-mythic matriarchal figure clad in chaste white embroidered folk garb. In her campaign speeches, in keeping with the ambivalent gender role expectations of Ukrainian political discourse, she constantly reassured the public that she was a traditional woman who valued nurturing and cooperation (and prayer), and who wanted to become president not because she sought power but because she cared so deeply about the needs of her "family," the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, her campaign slogan, "She is Ukraine," represented Tymoshenko as the embodiment of the nation and counterpoised her to the corrupt (male) world of Ukrainian politics (e.g., "they squabble, she works, she is Ukraine," "she will win, she is Ukraine").

By contrast, the Yanukovych campaign depicted Ukraine as a country that needed the discipline provided by a strict father figure: Viktor Yanukovych. The desirability of a restoration of "natural" gender roles in politics and private life was a crucial aspect of the Yanukovych campaign's message. Both Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko were portrayed in unfavorable terms as "gender deviant," failing to conform to their "natural" gender roles. Nevertheless, the assertion that only Yanukovych possessed the strong masculine qualities needed to resolve Ukraine's economic and political problems was used more forcefully against Tymoshenko. This became clear shortly before the first round of the 2010 election, when Yanukovych refused to participate in a televised debate with Tymoshenko, stating publicly in regard to Tymoshenko that "*if* she is a women, then she should go to the kitchen and show off her talents there" (якщо вона жінка—то повинна йти на кухню і показувати там свої примхи). Hanna Herman, the only woman in Yanukovych's inner circle of advisors, defended Yanukovych's standpoint on gender roles, further stressing that the problem was not Yanukovych's sexism, but Tymoshenko's failure to understand the "natural" division

of political labor in Ukraine. According to Herman, "not only do most women consider preparing lunch and tending to the home a woman's 'highest mission,'" but Tymoshenko "*should know* that tending to the welfare of her family is the greatest thing a woman can do for Ukraine."[13]

The 2010 Election

Yulia Tymoshenko's impressive performance increased her share of the vote from 25 to 46 percent between rounds one and two of the 2010 election. Yet she lost the election. Why? Most observers have found recent Ukrainian elections to be driven by regionalism. Colton, for instance, has argued that Yanukovych's victory was accomplished through a rising tide that lifted support for his candidacy slightly in his two key subgroups in the East and South regions of the country.[14]

Yet overall analysis of the results suggests that Yanukovych's victory was accomplished despite waning support for his candidacy in the two regions considered to be his base. The Southern and Eastern regions of the country were the core areas of support for Yanukovych in both the elections of 2004 and 2010. His share of the Southern vote indeed increased from 70 percent in 2004 to 73 percent in 2010. He also carried the East in both elections with 79 percent of the vote. However, his level of support among voters in both regions in 2010 was considerably lower in absolute numbers of votes than it had been in 2004. In the South, official election results indicate that he received 2.8 million votes in 2004, but only 2.6 million in 2010. In the East, official results show that he received 7.6 million votes in 2004, but only 6.6 million in 2010. Overall, in these two regions of the country, Yanukovych received nearly 1.2 million more votes in 2004 than he did in 2010.

What, then, accounts for his victory and her defeat? Tymoshenko carried the Western and Central regions, receiving 80 percent of the Western Ukrainian vote and 64 percent of the Central Ukrainian vote. This lead is sizeable, indeed it might easily be considered a landslide. But Tymoshenko fell far short of the levels of support Yushchenko received in the previous election in these core regions.[15] Indeed, Tymoshenko received 1 million fewer votes than Yushchenko did in the West in 2004 and nearly 2 million fewer votes than Yushchenko did in the Center in 2004. Many Yushchenko supporters sat out the 2010 elections, or followed Viktor Yushchenko's recommendation to vote "against all." A sizeable group crossed lines and voted for Yanukovych. Such defections of Yushchenko supporters in the West and Center contributed decisively to Tymoshenko's defeat. Indeed, relative to the previous presidential election, support for Yanukovych among Western voters nearly doubled, increasing from around 500,000 votes in 2004 to just under 800,000 in 2010. Support rose even further among Central voters, increasing from 1.9 million votes in 2004 to 2.4 million in 2010.

Gender and Exit Polls

In trying to explain Tymoshenko's defeat, it is necessary to consider the interactive effects gender and region had on patterns of electoral support for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Exit polls indicate that gender played a crucial role in the outcome of the presidential elections of 2010, helping to turn the tide of this close race against Tymoshenko and in favor of Yanukovych. Nationwide, Tymoshenko did slightly worse among men than women. Overall, 44.6 percent of men versus 46.4 percent of women voted for her. By contrast, Yanukovych performed almost equally well among men and women, receiving 48.8 percent versus 48.5 percent of the vote.[16]

Compared to Western countries, this pattern of support constitutes a relatively small "gender gap." Nevertheless, in 2004, Yushchenko held a six percentage point lead among men and Yanukovych received nearly six percentage points more votes among women than men (men voted for Yushchenko 60 percent to 38 percent, while women voted for Yushchenko 54 percent to 44 percent).[17] Moreover, Tymoshenko's weaker showing among men represents a significant departure from previous electoral dynamics, as men in Ukraine have tended to outnumber women among supporters of candidates coded as right-leaning.[18]

Exit polls reveal that in response to Tymoshenko's candidacy, complex gender and national loyalties (and antipathies) came into play. This was particularly the case within the Orange electorate. Tymoshenko performed considerably better among women than men in two of the country's regions: the West and the Center (see Table 3). In the West, there was a 4 percent gender gap, with 81 percent of women as opposed to 77 percent of men voting for Tymoshenko. In the Center, there was a gender gap of 8 percentage points, due to the considerably higher levels of support Tymoshenko received among women voters, with 67 percent of women voting for her, but only 59 percent of men. These gender differences are striking when taking into consideration that there was no gender gap in 2004 in these two regions, as men and women exhibited similar levels of support for Yushchenko (92 percent among Western voters compared to 82 percent among Central voters). In sum, Tymoshenko received the support of significant numbers of Yushchenko voters in both these core regions. However, exit polls indicate that her attractiveness as a candidate varied by gender. "Orange" women—women who voted for Yushchenko in the West and Center during the 2004 elections—were more likely to transfer their loyalties from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko than their male counterparts.

The effects of gender loyalties and antipathies on the outcomes of the 2010 election come into sharper focus when extrapolating from the 2010 exit polls to estimate the gender breakdown of Yushchenko votes lost by Tymoshenko (see Table 4). In the West, 2.7 million women voted for Yushchenko in 2004, while 2.2 million women voted for Tymoshenko in 2010, a shortfall of roughly 470,000. By contrast, in the West, 2.6 million men voted for Yushchenko in 2004, while just under 2 million men

Table 3
Percentage Breakdown of Electoral Support by Region and Gender

	Men	Women	Gap
West			
Yushchenko, 2004	92.1	91.8	0.3
Tymoshenko, 2010	77.4	81.1	–3.7
Yanukovych, 2004	6.8	7.3	–0.5
Yanukovych, 2010	16.1	14.3	1.7
Central			
Yushchenko, 2004	82.4	81.5	0.9
Tymoshenko, 2010	59.0	66.3	–7.4
Yanukovych, 2004	14.8	15.7	–0.9
Yanukovych, 2010	33.1	27.5	5.6
South			
Yushchenko, 2004	36.2	30.2	6.0
Tymoshenko, 2010	23.5	21.7	1.8
Yanukovych, 2004	60.5	66.7	–6.2
Yanukovych, 2010	68.0	72.4	–4.4
East			
Yushchenko, 2004	16.0	12.1	3.9
Tymoshenko, 2010	11.7	12.4	–0.8
Yanukovych, 2004	81.4	86.0	–4.6
Yanukovych, 2010	83.1	83.2	–0.1

Note: Due to rounding and the omission of voters who voted "against all," percentages do not total 100.
Source: Weighted exit poll data provided by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, analysis by author.

Table 4
Western Ukraine: Estimated Votes by Gender

	Men	Women	Total
Orange electorate			
Yushchenko votes (2004)	2,551,877	2,704,845	5,256,722
Tymoshenko votes (2010)	1,960,245	2,238,222	4,198,467
Estimated vote loss/gain	–591,632	–466,623	–1,058,255
Blue electorate			
Yanukovych votes (2004)	239,596	273,523	513,119
Yanukovych votes (2010)	402,338	392,376	794,714
Estimated vote loss/gain	162,742	118,853	281,595

Source: Weighted exit poll data provided by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, analysis by author.

voted for Tymoshenko in 2010, a difference of nearly 600,000 votes. Tymoshenko also appears to have received considerably more votes from "Orange" women than men in the Central region. Around 3.4 million Central Ukrainian men voted for Yushchenko in 2004, but fewer than 2.3 million voted for Tymoshenko in 2010, a

Table 5
Central Ukraine: Estimated Votes by Gender

	Men	Women	Total
Orange electorate			
Yushchenko votes (2004)	3,433,219	3,740,625	7,173,844
Tymoshenko votes (2010)	2,250,123	2,976,254	5,226,377
Estimated vote loss/gain	–1,183,096	–764,371	–1,947,467
Blue electorate			
Yanukovych votes (2004)	865,357	1,011,219	1,876,576
Yanukovych votes (2010)	1,212,416	1,184,946	2,397,362
Estimated vote loss/gain	347,059	173,727	520,786

Source: Weighted exit poll data provided by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, analysis by author.

loss of nearly 1.2 million potential votes. By contrast, 760,000 fewer women voted for Tymoshenko in 2010 than for Yushchenko in 2004 in Central oblasts (3.7 million in 2004 versus 3 million in 2010). All together, Tymoshenko failed to receive some 3 million of the "Orange" votes that Yushchenko received in 2004 in these two regions. Men comprised nearly two-thirds of the Orange voters who failed to support Tymoshenko's bid for the presidency in the Western and Central oblasts. By withholding roughly 1.8 million votes, they cost her the election.

Men and women also contributed at different rates to the increase in voter support for Yanukovych that took place in 2010 in the two core regions that backed the Orange Revolution. In the West, exit polls show a small gender difference among voters who supported Yanukovych in 2004 and 2010. In 2004, equal proportions of women and men voted for Yanukovych (7 percent). Meanwhile in 2010, Yanukovych doubled his support among women and more than doubled his support among men in this region by increasing his support to 14 percent of women and 16 percent of men**.** Extrapolating from the exit polls to the official results, we can estimate that he received around 160,000 more votes from men in 2010 than he did in 2004 and just under 120,000 more votes from women. This estimate suggests that in the West, there were gender differences among "swing" voters, Western Ukrainians who switched their allegiance from Yushchenko in 2004 to Yanukovych in the West in 2010. Yushchenko's male supporters in this region were somewhat more likely than his female supporters to vote for Yanukovych.

In the Center, the impact of gender bias among voters was even more considerable (see Table 5). In 2004, exit polls indicate that Yanukovych experienced a slightly lower level of support among men than women in the Central region (14.8 versus 15.7 percent). In 2010, by comparison, Yanukovych enjoyed a significant edge among men, with 33.1 percent of men as opposed to 27.5 percent of women voting for him.

Region wide, Yanukovych gained an estimated 500,000 votes relative to the previous election. But he was more appealing to men than women, and this gender

Table 6
Southern Ukraine: Estimated Votes by Gender

	Men	Women	Total
Orange electorate			
Yushchenko votes (2004)	497,145	520,282	1,017,427
Tymoshenko votes (2010)	356,307	400,994	757,301
Estimated vote loss/gain	–140,837	–119,289	–260,126
Blue electorate			
Yanukovych votes (2004)	1,174,672	1,624,593	2,799,265
Yanukovych votes (2010)	1,148,127	1,489,102	2,637,229
Estimated vote loss/gain	–26,544	–135,492	–162,036

Source: Weighted exit poll data provided by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, analysis by author.

difference was considerable. Extrapolating from exit polls to estimate the number of votes he gained suggests that Yanukovych received an estimated 1.2 million votes from men in 2010 in this region, versus around 870,000 in 2004. This means he gained the support of nearly 350,000 more men in the Center, relative to the number of men who voted for him in 2004. By contrast, in the Central region an estimated 1.2 million women voted for him in 2010, versus 1 million in 2004, a difference of around 170,000. In sum, men contributed two-thirds of the additional votes Yanukovych received in Central oblasts relative to his 2004 performance.

In the South, Tymoshenko's attractiveness to "Orange" voters also varied by gender. Her showing among women was slightly worse overall than Yushchenko's in 2004 (22 percent in 2010 versus 30 percent in 2004, a drop of 8 percent). Furthermore, while 24 percent of men voted for her in this region in 2010, this was nevertheless 13 percentage points lower than the level of support Yushchenko received in 2004. Extrapolating from the exit polls reveals that Tymoshenko probably failed to receive the votes of around 140,000 men and 120,000 women (see Table 6). A better showing in the South probably would have made only a small difference for the election's result.

In the South, Yanukovych's attractiveness to voters who previously supported him also varied by gender. In the South, women were more likely than men to vote for Yanukovych in both the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections. However, when faced with a choice between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, men in the South increased their support for Yanukovych, narrowing the gender gap in this region from 6 to 4 percent. Due to the fact that turnout overall was lower, Yanukovych nonetheless lost votes in this region relative to 2004, receiving 27,000 fewer votes among men and 136,000 fewer votes among women.

In 2010 in the East, Tymoshenko received the support of 12 percent of women voters, the same level of support that Yushchenko received in 2004. But she won 11 percent of the support of men in this region, performing considerably worse among

Table 7
Eastern Ukraine: Estimated Votes by Gender

	Men	Women	Total
Orange electorate			
Yushchenko votes (2004)	810,171	796,189	1,606,360
Tymoshenko votes (2010)	613,227	770,611	1,383,838
Estimated vote loss/gain	–196,944	–25,578	–222,522
Blue electorate			
Yanukovych votes (2004)	3,211,169	4,408,710	7,619,879
Yanukovych votes (2010)	3,044,143	3,592,469	6,636,612
Estimated vote loss/gain	–167,026	–816,241	–983,267

Source: Weighted exit poll data provided by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, analysis by author.

men than Yushchenko did in 2004, with 16 percent. In the Eastern oblasts, nearly all Orange women appeared to transfer their loyalties from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko at the polls. By contrast, Orange men were more likely to withdraw their support, a pattern that resembles the gender dynamic observed in the West. Tymoshenko lost only around 26,000 votes among Orange women in the East (see Table 7). An estimated 770,000 women voted for her in 2010, while an estimated 800,000 women voted for Yushchenko in 2004. By contrast, she failed to receive the votes of close to 200,000 Orange men. An estimated 610,000 men voted for her in 2010, while 810,000 men voted for Yushchenko in 2004. These estimates suggest that Orange voters tended to differ both by gender and by region in their likelihood of transferring their loyalty from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko.

Variations in electoral support based on gender can also be observed among past supporters of Yanukovych in the East. There was a gender gap of 4 percent in 2004 among his supporters in this region, with 86.0 percent of women versus 81.4 percent of men voting for him. By contrast, in 2010, the gender gap disappeared, and he received equivalent levels of support among men and women: 84 percent**.** Regionwide, Yanukovych lost around a million votes relative to the previous election in the East. Extrapolating from exit polls, we see that Yanukovych lost the votes of 167,000 men in the East, but he lost the votes of more than 800,000 women. Thus, Yanukovych did significantly worse among women than men who voted for him in 2004. These figures suggest that in the East, gender mattered a great deal in how Yanukovych's base responded to the choice between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Eighty percent of the million Eastern voters who failed to support him this time around were women.

My analysis of the 2010 election in this section suggests that the erosion of support among Yushchenko and Yanukovych voters varied by gender. Tymoshenko had much greater appeal as a political leader among women than men. But her appeal clearly

also varied by region. Electoral support for Yulia Tymoshenko demonstrated that gender and region both affected how individuals viewed her as a presidential candidate. This bias could not be explained by regionalism alone. The edge Yanukovych enjoyed in 2004 among women disappeared. His 2010 victory was likely due to two different processes. First, the Tymoshenko campaign lost the support of a significant number of voters, the majority of whom were male. Exit poll analysis comparing the gender breakdown of the Tymoshenko electorate to the Yushchenko electorate suggests that men constituted a majority among the Orange voters who failed to vote for Tymoshenko in the West (56 percent), Center (61 percent), South (54 percent), and East (89 percent). Second, the Yanukovych campaign message stressed male dominance, losing many women's votes (a whopping 816,000 in Eastern Ukraine), but gaining considerable support among male voters, many of whom presumably supported Yushchenko in the previous election. Were Tymoshenko able to retain equivalent support among men and women, she might have narrowly won the election. Instead, due to gender biases in the Orange electorate, she lost, despite considerable support from women.

Exploring Future Options for Anti-Authoritarian Mobilization

The pattern of voter realignment analyzed in the previous section indicates that in Ukraine, women as voters are now leading a broader shift away from political traditions that are patriarchal. The outcome of this election also indicates that men remain conservative. In 2010, many who supported Yushchenko in 2004 were not ready to view a woman as a viable political leader. How likely is it that Tymoshenko or some other leader can mobilize the broader electorate and build on her position of political prominence?

The defeat of Yulia Tymoshenko and the election of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine's president raise new questions about the possibility of future mobilization drawing upon the activist networks of the Orange revolution. These protesters followed Tymoshenko and her allies in challenging unpopular incumbents in the past. Yulia Tymoshenko is no longer prime minister and has declared her radical opposition to the new president and his cabinet. How available are local-level activists for future mobilization, particularly as the country appears to have entered a new cycle of competitive authoritarianism?

The Yanukovych government has initiated an authoritarian crackdown on civil society that creates new grievances, thereby encouraging oppositional mobilization among local activists. It has returned many of the incendiary political figures of the late Kuchma era to positions of visibility and influence. The new president, minister of education, and prime minister appear to be playing ethnonational and gender cards that they avoided under Kuchma's watch. Their statements are already making waves

and resulting in protests by some familiar actors (e.g., students and national activists in Western Ukraine) as well as less familiar ones. Acts of protest coordinated by the countries' leading women's rights activists in Eastern Ukraine, and FEMEN, a group of Kyiv women's rights activists who organize theatrical protests, have attracted a great deal of media coverage at home and abroad. Whether there will be a cycle of civil disobedience and protests depends to a large degree on whether the current government will continue to engage in repressive activities as well as whether anti-presidential forces will unite around Tymoshenko, who has not previously forged ties to such groups, but who may begin to do so now.

Male dominance may continue to be a primary basis for Yanukovych's style of leadership. Since Yanukovych has assumed office, the Yanukovych administration has appointed the first all-male cabinet in Ukraine's history. Members of his new cabinet have repeated claims that only men can handle Ukraine's national crisis. Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, when questioned in public about the gender composition of the government, maintained that the government cabinet is no place for a woman, as "women have no business attempting to carry out economic reforms."[19]

Public discussions of the new masculinist gender regime reveal that most commentators in fact do appear to accept the premise that politics is a masculine domain. With the exception of a small circle of women's rights advocates, commentators have expressed highly gendered expectations about the qualities, appearance, and behavior of politicians. Fairly typical were the remarks readers posted on a newspaper website in response to a public letter of protest signed by prominent women's rights advocates: "A woman politician is neither a woman nor a politician"; "They should have compared Tymoshenko to Mary, the Mother of God, and not to Hillary Clinton and Margaret Thatcher"; "I guess Yulia Tymoshenko proves that women can be politicians as well as women; but Thatcher really scares me"; "If they [the authors of the petition] maintain that women constitute 75% of civil servants, then they are responsible for all the corruption we deal with today . . . women don't want equality of representation in high office, they want to become the majority, that is, they want to seize power."[20]

However, the current administration is creating a charged atmosphere that is fostering new grievances and sending a new wave of activists to the streets. Indeed, the presidential administration has already faced several days of protests by women's rights activists from FEMEN and has been the object of a petition initiated by Krona, a women's rights center based in Kharkiv. One visible leader of this wave of activism is Kateryna Levchenko, a former Kharkiv women's leader who served in parliament as a member of the Our Ukraine bloc and who is also the president of La Strada, an antitrafficking and women's rights NGO in Kyiv. Levchenko has already joined other prominent women's rights activists and is planning to bring a lawsuit against Azarov for violating Ukraine's equal opportunity legislation when he suggested that women lack the stamina to occupy positions in the Yanukovych cabinet. Nevertheless, such groups are small in scale and lack a mass following.

Studies that examine high-risk mobilization within nondemocratic states provide a useful concluding point for future work exploring the conditions under which oppositional mobilization will spread beyond such smaller-scale feminist micropublics. Research has found that oppositional forms of collective action in authoritarian settings typically emerge from within universities or churches.[21] These studies argue that "mobilization potential" can develop in authoritarian regimes when states use repression to limit the size of formal social movement organizations, as long as such institutional contexts are available that are relatively autonomous from power holders and can offer protection from repression.

Pfaff's study of the seemingly spontaneous protests that took place in the GDR in 1989 came to a similar conclusion. The crucial site where activists helped overcome barriers to collective action in the GDR were churches. It was there that small-scale groups began to refashion the official state discourse of the "Volk" into a protest identity, "a politically relevant identity constituted by and for the purposes of movement mobilization."[22] Pfaff's concept resembles what Gould calls a "participation identity," which he defines as "the social identification with respect to which an individual responds in a given instance of social protest to specific normative and instrumental appeals."[23] Similarly, in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the notion of "peoplehood" that had been created in the past by the Soviet state, and the governments that were in power after independence, became the basis for a new understanding of the "Ukrainian people" that protesters in Kharkiv turned into a powerful tool for mobilizing mass protest against power holders.

Sustained participation in grassroots activism is crucial to the success of movements. Youth NGOs with links to transnational networks and grants from Western foundations are widely considered to be central to the success of electoral revolutions.[24] Most research on contentious collective action emphasizes the role of "social movement organizations" in mobilizing challenges to state authority.[25] Similarly, explanations of the Orange Revolution and other electoral revolutions tend to focus on youth NGOs. But such social movement organizations have lost their mass following, and some appear to have dissolved altogether. Most of the participants in the Orange Revolution were only loosely affiliated with civic or political organizations. Yet quite a few university students and many recent graduates nonetheless became involved in the Yushchenko campaign or served in electoral precincts as poll watchers.

Structurally, universities themselves are crucial in the success of challenges to the new wave of authoritarianism. In 2004, it was the pressure that Yanukovych and state authorities placed upon university students that first generated a sense of outrage that led them to become inclined toward political action and civil disobedience. In response to administrative pressure, many students who were previously politically disengaged or deeply alienated and had no network ties to youth groups became politically engaged and volunteered to work as poll watchers for the Yushchenko campaign.[26] Universities also served as sites of bloc recruitment of protesters who

participated in direct action. This finding may prove important for understanding potential for future mobilization against authoritarian controls that are now being applied by the Yanukovych administration to institutions of higher learning.

Students, rather than women as a group, are likely to act as the social base for further oppositional mobilization. To explain the likely centrality of students to future movements, it is useful to turn to the concepts of biographical availability, structural availability, and political engagement. Studies of social movement activism suggest that these three factors are significant predictors of individual-level participation in protest in Western countries.[27] *Biographical availability* refers to the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage and family responsibilities."[28] *Structural availability* refers to the presence of networks and other microstructures that link a person with other activists and facilitate recruitment into protest. *Political engagement* refers to political attitudes and beliefs that make individuals receptive to activism. These include liberalism and a well-established sense of personal or group-level political efficacy. These three factors are also useful for understanding participation in the Orange Revolution.

What structural, biographical, and ideological factors help explain the determinants of women's involvement in local efforts to challenge the state in authoritarian postcommunist countries? In Ukraine as in most post-Soviet countries, women as a group are constrained biographically as well as structurally. They tend to work full time and shoulder heavy domestic responsibilities. In addition, they are highly reliant on state bureaucracies that provide employment and social services and control educational access. Thus, they are particularly vulnerable to penalties for disobeying administrative pressure.

My own conversations and research with women protesters and activists at the local level in the Eastern city of Kharkiv found related structural and biographical availability factors explained why despite gender constraints they were able to participate in the Orange Revolution. First, many were students, that is, the institution that made them structurally available for revolution was the university (and not an NGO). Second, many understood student participation in the Orange Revolution as the result of the flexibility of their schedules and the fact that they had relatively few family or employment duties. Without these constraints, their main motivator could be their "duty as citizens of Ukraine"; that is, as students, they were biographically available.

Ideologically, student activists were recruited for activism mainly because of their commitment to a liberalism tinged to varying degrees by Ukrainian nationalism. Activists stressed the need to defend one's right to vote but, more broadly, to elect a government that would respect constitutional rights and freedoms. More generally, activists stressed the need for voters to choose representatives that would respect individual and economic freedoms. They also emphasized commitment to self-government

or government by "the people"; that is, they sought an end to authoritarian rule from above by power holders who used fear to control citizens. Most, however, remained "Eastern Ukrainians," that is to say, they continued to define themselves as Ukrainians who speak Russian. Changing the status of the Ukrainian language did not mean much to them. Nor for the most part did they care about changing the status of the Russian language.

Conclusion

This article began by asking why Yulia Tymoshenko was defeated by Viktor Yanukovych and went on to address whether Tymoshenko's electorate might respond to her electoral defeat and the resurgence of authoritarianism observed today in Ukraine by returning to oppositional politics, perhaps with her as their leader. I suggested that women were a major social base for Tymoshenko. Men, particularly in the country's Central region but also in the West, seemed reluctant to support her in her bid for the presidency. What is next? To determine whether the "Orange electorate" in Ukraine might be available for future oppositional mobilization, future analysis should explore universities as sites of oppositional mobilization. Returning to Tymoshenko's future options, the availability of the Orange electorate for further mobilization remains an open question. But Tymoshenko would be wise to look to university students and cultivate communities of protesters in Ukrainian universities, if "administrative resources" once again become involved in electoral politics. Universities often act as incubators of activism in authoritarian contexts where public space remains controlled by power holders.[29] This was also the case in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, not only in such cities as Lviv and Kyiv, which typically contribute popular support to oppositional activism, but also in such Eastern cities as Kharkiv, which have a latent potential for challenging Yanukovych if the conditions are right. The large student population in these cities remains biographically, structurally, and ideologically more available than most voters and should be considered a crucial resource in future political mobilization.

Notes

1. B. Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1993); N. Funk and M. Mueller, eds., *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993); S. Gal and G. Kligman, *The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and S. Gal and G. Kligman, eds., *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2. Gender as an analytic category has been employed by only a few scholars to understand Tymoshenko's rise to power. See O. Kis, "'Beauty Will Save the World!' Feminine Strategies in Ukrainian Politics and the Case of Yulia Tymoshenko," spacesofidentity.net 7:2(2007), http://www.yorku.ca/

soi/_Vol_7_2/_HTML/Kis.html (accessed 15 May 2008); S. D. Phillips, *Women's Social Activism in the New Ukraine: Development and the Politics of Differentiation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); and M. Rubchak, "Yulia Tymoshenko: Goddess of the Orange Revolution: Calling Tymoshenko the Goddess of the Orange Revolution Is More than Glib Praise" (2005), http://eng.maidanua.org (accessed 14 May 2005).

3. L. Barrington, "The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38:10(2007): 601–14; S. Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52:6(2000): 1017–41; T. Colton, "The Aligning Election of 2010 and the Ukrainian Political Community" (Paper presented at the "Workshop on Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election: What We Learned," Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 2010); and P. Kubicek, "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52:2(2000): 273–94.

4. Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, 156–57.

5. Ibid., 260.

6. Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments" (2010), http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm (accessed 13 July 2010).

7. O. Kis, "Modeli konstruiuvannia gendernoi identychnosti v suchasnii Ukraïni," *Yi* 27 (2003): 37–58.

8. A. Hrycak, "Gender and the Orange Revolution," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23:1(2007): 152–79.

9. All statistics in this section were calculated by the author using the 1996 and 2006 Ukraine panels of the World Values Survey, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

10. For instance, in the 1996 wave of the World Values Survey, 40.6 percent of respondents in Ukraine expressed disapproval of women choosing to become single parents, while ten years later, only 28.5 percent disapproved.

11. Kis, "Beauty Will Save the World!"; and M. Rubchak, "Yulia Tymoshenko, Goddess of the Orange Revolution" (Paper presented at the 37th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 3–6 Nov. 2005, Salt Lake City, UT).

12. See "Тимошенко проти її порівнянь з Катериною і Сталіним" [Tymoshenko proty ii porivnian' z Katerynoiu i Stalinym], *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 30 Jan. 2010, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/01/30/4688700/ (accessed 1 Sept. 2010).

13. See "Herman nahadala Tymoshenko, shcho kukhnia—naivazhlyvisha misia zhinky," *tsn.ua*, http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/german-nagadala-timoshenko-shcho-kuhnya-naivazhlivisha-zhinocha-misiya.html (accessed 4 Sept. 2010).

14. Colton, "The Aligning Election of 2010."

15. Tymoshenko also failed to receive the support of the potential voter base that voted "Orange" in the South and East. In the previous presidential election, 1 million Southern voters and 1.6 million Eastern voters supported Yushchenko. By comparison, in 2010, 750,000 Southerners and 1.4 million Easterners voted for Tymoshenko. Nearly half a million "Orange" voters in the South and East failed to support Tymoshenko's bid for the presidency. Bearing in mind that Yanukovych lost around a million votes in the South and East, Tymoshenko nevertheless could have come out ahead had she received more support in the West and Center from the 2004 Orange electorate.

16. Just as in round three of 2004, men were also somewhat more likely than women to vote against both candidates in round two of 2010.

17. Analysis of exit polls in 2004 by Khmelko and Oksamytna reveals statistically significant gender gaps nationwide and at the regional level during the third round of the election. Yushchenko enjoyed a significant edge among men. Nationwide, 5 percent more men than women supported Viktor Yushchenko (59.6 versus 54.3 percent) while nearly 6 percent more women than men supported Viktor Yanukovych (43.5 versus 37.9 percent). In the Western and Central regions of the country, the difference between the levels of support these candidates received from men and women was less then 1 percent. However, in the Southern and Eastern regions of the country, they observed gender gaps that were moderate and

statistically significant. In the South, 6 percent more men than women voted for Yushchenko (36.2 versus 30.2 percent), while 6 percent more women than men voted for Yanukovych (66.7 versus 60.5 percent). Similarly, in the East, 16.0 percent of men compared to 12.1 percent of women voted for Yushchenko (a difference of just over 4 percentage points), while 86.0 percent of women and 81.4 percent of men voted for Yanukovych (a difference of nearly 5 percentage points). In essence, Yanukovych elicited more support among women in both regions. See V. Khmelko and S. Oksamytna, "Regional Divisions of Ukraine in the 2004 Presidential Elections: Gender, Age and Educational Effects of Electoral Preferences" (Paper presented at the First Annual Danyliw Research Seminar, University of Ottawa, Canada, 2005).

18. S. Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2000).

19. See "Provodyty reformy—ne zhinocha sprava," UNIAN, 19 Mar. 2010, http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-368344.html (accessed 4 Sept. 2010).

20. See "Reformy, ne zhinocha sprava," *Info-porn*, 31 Mar. 2010, http://infoporn.org.ua/2010/03/31/reformy__ne_zhnocha_sprava/ (accessed 4 Sept. 2010).

21. P. D. Almeida, "Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings," *American Journal of Sociology* 109:2(2003): 345–400; R. L. Einwohner, "Identity Work and Collective Action in a Repressive Context: Jewish Resistance on the 'Aryan Side' of the Warsaw Ghetto," *Social Problems* 53:1(2006): 38–56; M. Loveman, "High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina," *American Journal of Sociology* 104:2(1998): 477–525; K. Schock, "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma," *Social Problems* 46:3(1999): 355–75; D. Trevizo, "Dispersed Communist Networks and Grassroots Leadership of Peasant Revolts in Mexico," *Sociological Perspectives* 45:3(2002): 285–315; and J. S. Viterna, "Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women's Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army," *American Journal of Sociology* 112:1(2006): 1–45.

22. S. Pfaff, "Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989," *Social Forces* 75:1(1996): 91–117.

23. R. V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 13.

24. V. Bunce and S. Wolchik, "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39:3(2006): 283–304; and T. Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions," *Communist & Post-Communist Studies* 39:3(2006): 365–86.

25. J. C. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social-Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9(1983): 527-53; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

26. In both West and East, university students seemed to provide the initial foundation for election campaign activities and, later, for the protest. In Eastern Ukraine, students also seemed to form the main contingent of Yushchenko representatives that worked as observers or poll-watchers at local electoral precincts (A. Hrycak, ethnographic research notes, December 2004).

27. McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986): 64–90; and A. Schussman and S. A. Soule, "Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation," *Social Forces* 84:2(2005): 1083–1108.

28. McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism," 70.

29. Loveman, "High-Risk Collective Action"; and S. Pfaff, *Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

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