Book reviews

International Relations theory

The global commonwealth of citizens: toward cosmopolitan democracy. By Daniele Archibugi. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2008. 298pp. Index. £17.95. ISBN 978 0 69113 490 1.

Daniele Archibugi's new book offers a radical but intelligently conceived proposal to extend democracy beyond the state and into the global sphere. It is preferable, he argues, 'to look ahead and propose a world political system in which self-determination establishes internal democracy, impartial institutions intervene to the people's advantage, and global constitutionalism replaces sovereignty' (p. 279). To be sure, this proposal remains deeply controversial and will be deemed by many to be tainted with utopianism. Nevertheless, Archibugi provides a thought-provoking and well-considered case for cosmopolitan democracy that is both rewarding and enjoyable.

The first half of the book—'The theory of cosmopolitan democracy'—explores the theoretical underpinnings of Archibugi's thesis. The author believes that many legitimate models of democracy presently exist across the globe. Toleration of diversity, however, has its limits. It is made clear that 'however many different paths there may be to democracy, milestones exist that each community must adhere to' (p. 24). One is therefore left with many, but certainly not countless, paths towards democracy within bounded political communities. Yet in order to successfully govern the contemporary world, Archibugi argues, democracy must be reinvented outside the inherent limitations of the nation-state. Indeed, the fiction of autonomous political communities is repeatedly stressed throughout the book.

Archibugi's reinvention of democracy seeks to share a small number of substantial objectives globally. These range from the innocuous, including calls for cultural diversity, to the more contentious, such as controlling the use of force within and outside the nation-state. He openly accepts that many may consider this project to be mere fantasy. 'Nevertheless', he argues, 'political theory has the task of setting objectives and endeavouring to identify the instruments to achieve them' (p. 89). This conviction in the value of his research is visible throughout. Before concluding the first half of the book, Archibugi deftly confronts the major criticisms levelled at the democratic cosmopolitan project. The challenges posed by political Realists, Marxists and Communitarians, among others, are all addressed in an engaging and credible manner. Given its accessibility, those wishing to familiarize themselves with the critical debates on cosmopolitan democracy would do well to consult this chapter.

The latter half of the book—'The practice of cosmopolitan democracy'—seeks to explore how the principles of cosmopolitanism can be applied in concrete situations. Archibugi succeeds admirably in this ambition. Whether considering humanitarian intervention, the exportation of democracy or the challenge of linguistic diversity, the reader is increasingly convinced of the cosmopolitan democracy project's practicability and, moreover, its importance. Although Archibugi's conclusions

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may appear provocative at times, it is difficult to fault the thoroughness or sophistication of his analysis.

The latter half of the book is well represented by Archibugi's assessment of the United Nations. 'The cosmopolitan democracy project views the UN', he states, as 'the pivot of the entire world judicial and political system' (p. 156). Despite this rather optimistic appraisal, Archibugi is painfully aware of the organization's repeated failings, recognizing what he considers to be its democratic schizophrenia and lingering hypocrisy. Venturing beyond mere criticism, however, the author skilfully weaves his analysis through the many ambiguities and difficulties residing within the UN. Archibugi shows not only why incremental changes are indeed plausible, but why they are necessary. His arguments for reforming the Security Council and the Judiciary, alongside the creation of a World Parliamentary Assembly, are well developed and erudite. Upon completion of the chapter it is hard not to be persuaded by Archibugi's conclusions regarding the democratization of the UN.

There is little to fault in this book. Yet, in adopting such a broad scope, at times its analysis can appear somewhat underdeveloped. An examination of the relationship between ethical cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism, for example, would have been useful. Yet it receives little more than a page of attention. This is all the more surprising given the author's admission that it would be extremely useful to compare both more attentively (p. 148). Such small points aside, Archibugi's sophisticated contribution to the study of cosmopolitan democracy is to be welcomed. This book should be enjoyed by a wide audience and will certainly appeal to those interested in global governance, democracy or globalization.

David Gill, Aberystwyth University, UK

Order, conflict, and violence. Edited by Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro and Tarek Masoud. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008. 456pp. $90.00. ISBN 978 0 521 89768 6.

This collection of essays originates, in broad terms, in the idea of cutting through the epistemological, ontological and related to that, the theoretical divides so prevalent in US political science. The editors need to be applauded for undertaking such an enterprise, knowing that this is a minefield. Nonetheless, this compilation remains limited to debates within the United States.

Acknowledging that 'students of order, conflict, and violence so rarely speak to each other', the editors manage to centre the contributors' attention on the 'single enduring and fundamental metaquestion: how order emerges, is sustained, challenged, destroyed, transformed, and recreated' (p. 3). Therefore, the book's first part (chapters 2 to 7) is pertinent to the first three patterns, and the second to the latter three (chapters 8 to 15). Chapter 16 by Kalyvas offers a conclusion.

To give a brief, though selective, overview, in the first part Robert H. Bates 'attempts to discover the conditions under which those who control a given territory … choose to defend rather than prey upon its inhabitants' (p. 4). Michael Hechter and Nika Kabiri then assess the 'peculiar challenges faced by external powers in imposing order in the territories they occupy' (p. 5) and focus on the current situation in Iraq, which might seem slightly outdated since the talk on which the chapter is based was given in 2004. Karma Nabulsi offers a 'critical account of the historical development of legal norms governing the conduct of states in war', delving into the tension between the intellectual debate on Grotius's ideas and the practice of international law. It remains arguable whether the Grotian 'legal tradition … serves only to arbitrarily legitimate some forms of violence' (p. 7) in light of the sophisticated advances of international law after the Second World War, and especially since the end of the Cold War and the legalization of law. A fascinating account (first published in 2005), based on cooperation between a political theorist (Shapiro) and a Middle East political scientist (Ellen Lust-Okar), deals with the 'question of how order is created out of the disorder that often plagues ethnically and religiously divided societies' (p. 7) via comparison of post-apartheid South Africa, Palestinian–Israeli negotiations and talks between Northern Ireland's Unionists and Republicans. Establishing the 'conditions necessary for the cessation of conflicts and the establishment of democracy', they find that 'success depends on whether the negotiators are able to consistently claim and cultivate public support for a settlement' (p. 8).

Regarding the second part, it is especially the chapter on 'Preconditions of international normative change' by Jack L. Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri which stands out. The authors contemplate the 'challenges faced by the diverse set of actors—from states to NGOs—that seek to bring about normative change in the international community'. Crucially, they remind the emerging post-modern and post-positivist strand in political science of the inevitable need for 'those who seek to transform the culture of contemporary anarchy … to work within an existing material and institutional setting that may enable, derail, or pervert efforts to promote change' (p. 13). It is important to note at this point that the notion of change through other means than war is solely reflected in this account. Indeed, this is an understanding of international politics as the dialectic between diplomacy and war which has been reintroduced to US political science since the end of the Cold War.

Thus, when Kalyvas's conclusion rightly, though unsurprisingly, states that 'both phenomena [order and violence] must be understood with reference to each other' (p. 14), it becomes clear that this splendid collection of essays touches—without mentioning it—on a wider aspect of international relations: an underlying and narrow understanding of anarchy. This is why other approaches on international order and anarchy, encouraged by the writings of, for instance, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Ian Clark, Helen Milner and Charles Beitz, would have been a valuable addition to the accounts provided.

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Human rights and ethics

Torture and democracy. By Darius Rejali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2007. 880pp. £28.95. ISBN 978 0 69111 422 4.

Torture and democracy is the most extensive work on the history and use of torture by democratic states to date. It is ambitious, combining encyclopaedic detail with comprehensive analysis of relevance to academics, policy-makers and human rights campaigners. The stated aim of the work is to establish a set of historical claims, which describe how torture techniques have appeared and evolved, with particular attention paid to the role of democratic states. Rejali's meticulous research of the often fragmented but substantial body of evidence results in a compelling justification of those historical claims, with devastating findings.

Much of the book is dedicated to providing a comprehensive account of the different forms of torture that have found their way into the policing and military practices of democratic states, the evolution of those practices, and their adoption by agents of other states. It is within the context of this comprehensive history of torture that, in the closing chapters of the work, Rejali is able to challenge common assumptions about the history of torture, its purposes and its supposed utility. One by one, he dispels a series of myths: that torture is the instrument of authoritarian rather than democratic states; that a single state—variously Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia or the US—is the main source of torture training and technology dissemination; that torture is a science; that torture secures credible intelligence; and that the use of torture can be controlled.

While it is often assumed that much contemporary 'stealth torture' (torture that leaves no physical marks) was developed by Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia or the CIA, Rejali shows that such methods actually had their origins in the policing practices of various democracies, including Britain and France, predating the Second World War. This leads to one of Rejali's most compelling arguments: he concludes that stealth torture evolved primarily in response to the development of systematic human rights monitoring in democratic states, and in turn, that stealth torture was not widely adopted in authoritarian states until much later, since those regimes were not subjected to the same levels of scrutiny that democratic states are.

With disturbing insight into the world of the torturer, and an appreciation of complex cognitive and physical processes relating to pain, Rejali demonstrates that torture is not a science, even though technological developments have been deployed, often by democratic states, to aid the work of the torturer. The outcome of specific practices used by torturers will vary from victim to victim, and

context to context, and cannot be foreseen. This is significant because it challenges those who assume that torture can result in specific outcomes, and can therefore be justified in certain circumstances.

With detailed analysis of the use of torture as a means of securing intelligence, and with particular reference to the use of torture by the French military in Algeria, Rejali demonstrates that rarely does torture secure credible intelligence; other means of intelligence gathering, such as surveillance and field operations, produce far more accurate material than torture ever does. In fact, torture is effective where the goal is to instil fear in populations in pursuit of specific aims, a point Rejali demonstrates well throughout the book. But where the use of torture for intelligence is concerned, its use can result in the pursuit of red herrings which hinder military operations. This is significant, given the arguments of members of the Bush administration as well as influential legal professionals, that torture should be permitted and regulated in the pursuit of intelligence to thwart terrorist attacks. Purely on strategic grounds, Rejali shows torture to be of no real utility in attaining credible intelligence.

In line with the repeated assertions of human rights organizations that torture can rarely be controlled and regulated by torturing states, Rejali amasses the evidence to comprehensively demonstrate this point. Numerous factors result in agents of the state gradually targeting more and more victims and increasing the amount and intensity of the torture. The upper echelons of the state cannot be relied on to limit torture's use and in this regard, again, Rejali shows recent arguments in support of the use of torture to be unfounded.

Rejali's work gives cause for hope. Human rights monitoring has not diminished, and thanks to this comprehensive book, the tireless efforts of anti-torture organizations, and the growing numbers of scholars and investigative journalists who have committed themselves to exposing and challenging these practices, we are better equipped as scholars and activists to draw attention to and challenge the unsavoury practices of our governments.

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Sexual enslavement of girls and women worldwide. By Andrea Parrot and Nina Cummings. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2008. 200pp. £25.95. ISBN 978 0 275 99291 0.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation has attracted considerable public and political concern in recent years. Indeed, the high-profile United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking boasted a wide range of collaborative partners, from non-governmental organizations to transnational corporations to celebrity-led networks of goodwill ambassadors. The problem of trafficking typically conjures up images of vulnerable women and children being traded and exploited by all-pervasive organized crime networks. Yet trafficking is only one of the many forms of sexual enslavement around the world.

Written for specialist and non-specialist readers, *Sexual enslavement of girls and women worldwide* is a thought-provoking examination of the different dimensions of the problem of sexual slavery and the economic, political, and cultural conditions conducive to sexual slavery of women and girls in the contemporary context. Indeed, some of the five main types of sexual slavery discussed in the book—that is, trafficking, war-induced sexual slavery, ritual sexual slavery, forced marriage and sexual servitude—have been less publicized and less researched, thus attracting a great deal less enforcement attention than others. The book is concise (106 pages excluding appendices, glossary and bibliography) and packs a great deal of information into its ten chapters, especially internet-based material. The accessible style of writing reflects the authors' mix of academic background and professional experience in television and other media work. One particularly striking aspect of the book is the way Parrot and Cummings have interspersed stories of victims and survivors of sexual slavery throughout—over 50 of them altogether, many quoted from the Polaris Project website: 'We hear from girls and women around the world describing how sexual enslavement has tortured them physically, emotionally, and spiritually, whether they suffered at the hands of prison guards in Turkey, criminals in Washington, or buyers dealing with parents who sell their daughters for the sex slave trade in Greece, Belgium, or France.' While many of these stories illustrate the harsh realities of

sexual slavery in a poignant manner, they are somewhat less effective when taken out of the broader political, socio-economic and cultural contexts of gender exploitation and power inequalities.

The main strength of the book lies in its attempt to challenge the conventional assumptions in our thinking about the nature and perpetrators of sexual slavery. For instance, as the chapter on war-induced sexual slavery reminds us, women and children often suffer disproportionately during armed conflict and in post-conflict conditions: they are exploited not only by enemies, organized criminals and rebel groups, but also by members of the military or civilian authorities who are in control of the areas they inhabit, or even peacekeeping troops who are supposed to protect them.

The concluding discussion of individuals and NGOs 'that have made a difference' seems less convincing, and I am a little sceptical of the basis on which two individuals and five NGOs were chosen as exemplars for a chapter on 'Solutions: success stories and legislation'. A lesser reliance on the US Department of State Trafficking in Persons report's assessment of 'international good practice' might have yielded a rather different result, and perhaps a more critical assessment of international anti-sexual slavery initiatives. Nevertheless, the book provides interesting insights into current thinking about the global problem of sexual enslavement, and is an informative and welcome addition to the existing literature on the topic.

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International law and organization

International justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: virtual trials and the struggle for state cooperation. By Victor A. Peskin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008. 294pp. £45.00. ISBN 978 0 52187 230 0.

Victor A. Peskin's *International justice in Rwanda and the Balkans* examines a critical but largely overlooked aspect of international prosecutions: the politics of arresting war crimes suspects. The author coins the term 'virtual trials' to describe the adversarial battles waged between international prosecutors and the governments of Serbia, Croatia and Rwanda to 'facilitate investigations, indictments and prosecutions of [the government's] own national, ethnic, or political group' (p. 29). In this novel study, Peskin draws from around 300 open-ended interviews conducted between 1999 and 2007 to craft a narrative that is in turn nuanced and accessible. In so doing, he creates a parallel history of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), in which the courtroom is relegated to the penumbra and the negotiating table comes to light.

The book is written as a series of case-studies, beginning with the state that has perhaps evinced the most renowned show of recalcitrance towards the tribunals' chapter VII mandate: Serbia. The prosecutor's role as keen political negotiator is brought out in these chapters. Peskin adeptly describes the shaming and counter-shaming tactics deployed from The Hague and Belgrade, highlighting how diplomacy can be a double-edged sword. He shows how western governments use the threat of prosecution as a form of political currency to buy peace, in turn dictating the pace of Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY. One key challenge is to persuade western governments to make prosecutions an ongoing priority after warring parties have been brought to the negotiating table, which is at least as significant as getting targeted states to cooperate in the investigation of their own countrymen. This becomes a recurring theme, and invokes the 'justice versus peace' debate, with Peskin's analysis providing useful insights into the problems now faced by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Peskin highlights the complexities and nuances of the choices involved, rather than glibly giving us any answers. He concludes that the choice between ensuring accountability and respecting the fragility of emerging democracies is never an easy one.

Chapters looking at roughly the same period in Croatia and revealing Zagreb's kaleidoscopic stance follow; the shifting shape of state cooperation seems at its most vivid here. Although Croatia initially welcomed the prospect of an international tribunal, this was largely dependent on it perceiving itself as the victim in the Yugoslav conflict. The Croatia case-study is interesting in this regard, due to the state's eventual willingness to acknowledge some responsibility for the actions of Croat commanders

in Bosnia, while being far less able to do so when it came to the acts of war that took place in Croatia itself. Again, Peskin's study highlights that the West largely supported Croatia's position in the 1990s, pointing to the underlying recognition that victor's justice is still the norm, even though the rhetoric of liberal states would have us believe otherwise.

The argument reaches its climax as the book examines the relationship between the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the ICTR. In this final case-study, Peskin argues convincingly that the RPF has continued to maintain the adversarial upper hand, exerting 'direct influence over the court's prosecutorial agenda by blocking the investigations of Tutsi war crimes committed against Hutu civilians in 1994' (p. 152). Former prosecutor Carla Del Ponte points to the lack of international pressure as the crucial variable in her failure to elicit cooperation. Peskin asserts that both tacit and explicit acceptance from the West that only Tutsis can be victims in the Rwandan conflict threatens to undermine the ICTR's reputation as a neutral arbiter of justice. The author hopes the situation may change under the stewardship of prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, as tribunal operations draw to a close.

The book's case-studies tend to reveal more about the interactions between various actors than to advance any particular theoretical argument about the latter's underlying motivations. Hence, the more complex question of why blood ties and political allegiances continue to trump a cosmopolitan notion of humanity is largely left in the shadows. As a result, Peskin's conclusion—that the establishment of the ICC must come to be perceived as a moral good in itself in order to secure a permanent place for global justice—can be challenged. One could equally argue from Peskin's findings that the ICC will need to create and maintain political allegiances with powerful western governments if it intends to maintain its relevance, legitimacy and necessity as an institution. Still, the book provides a useful empirical study of state cooperation, and one that is extremely digestible. Furthermore, it constitutes a fascinating counterpoint to Gary Bass's *Stay the hand of vengeance* (Princeton, 2001), in showing that the divide between liberal and illiberal states is more nuanced than it might at first appear.

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Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: Iraq, Darfur and the record of global civil society. By Aidan Hehir. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 196pp. $74.95. ISBN 978 0 23054 221 1.

The ongoing calls by civil society organizations for military intervention in Darfur, and the controversy over the suggestion of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to invoke the 'responsibility to protect' and militarily enforce the delivery of aid to Myanmar in the aftermath of the devastating cyclone in the summer of 2008, highlight the continued divisiveness of the concept of humanitarian intervention.

Aidan Hehir's book offers a succinct criticism of the moral arguments made for a right to humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo. While he is committed to the moral substance of the argument—that egregious violations of human rights should elicit an international response to end them—he is highly critical of the strategy put forward by the main proponents of what he calls the 'normative thesis' of humanitarian intervention, in particular their reliance on the civilizing influence of global civil society.

Using the distinction first introduced by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo—that NATO's intervention was 'illegal but legitimate'—the book first examines the legal restrictions on humanitarian intervention, and the normative argument in favour of it. This discussion usefully highlights the extent to which proponents of a moral right to humanitarian intervention rely on global civil society to mobilize public opinion and governments in favour of intervention, to provide such interventions with legitimacy, and, most importantly, to constrain the abuse of humanitarian arguments for the use of force to promote narrow national interests: 'This effort at constraining intervention was predicated on the assumption that states were mindful of the power wielded by global civil society and their domestic populace and would undertake interventions only if they could be endorsed by this community' (p. 46).

The book's examination of the record of humanitarian intervention after Kosovo—or rather of the invocation of humanitarian purposes to call for or justify the use of force—reveals the

problems with this reliance on global civil society. In the case of Darfur, calls by a coalition of non-governmental organizations might have contributed to the US government's decision to describe the crisis as genocide, but it has not contributed to more forceful action by western democracies. In the case of Iraq, the widespread and vocal opposition to the war did not prevent the US, Britain and their eclectic coalition of the willing from invading the country. As Hehir convincingly shows, the national interests of powerful states, including democratic ones, are evidently not constrained by the moral arguments of global civil society.

The next chapters examine the problems inherent in the normative thesis and in moving outside international law to justify and regulate humanitarian intervention. At the core of this criticism is the argument that the replacement of positive international law with morality opens the door to the unregulated, self-interested use of force by powerful states. While this argument is hardly novel, the author's dissection of the different elements of the normative thesis is useful and convincing. Less convincing, however, are the proposals to address these flaws, though Hehir includes the caveat that 'it is highly unlikely that these provisions will be adopted any time soon' (p. 130). He argues that what is needed is a more effective and consistent application of existing international law—an end to the selectivity of the Security Council's approach to humanitarian emergencies. To that end, he proposes two reforms: first, the establishment of an international body whose members are elected by the General Assembly to decide on the basis of both existing international law and 'reports from objective observers on the ground' (p. 130) whether an intervention should occur or not; and second, the establishment of a United Nations army which could be deployed in such an intervention.

These proposals rely on two deeply problematic assumptions about the character and functions of the UN in general and the Security Council in particular. First, they assume that the selectivity of the Council is predominantly the consequence of its composition and decision-making structures, especially the veto, rather than the complexity of many international crises and the inherent difficulties in addressing them. Ironically, this supposition also informs the argument that humanitarian intervention should be guided by morality, not international law. Second, this position assumes that the Security Council is a mechanism for maintaining the international rule of law, rather than an institutionalized process for managing international crises. The selectivity displayed by the Council is a consequence of this role, and reflects the constraints of the international environment within which it operates. The other side of this coin of selectivity, however, has been the innovation that the Council has shown when addressing conflicts, such as expanding the category of threats to international peace and security to include major human rights violations. In its focus on the decision to intervene, the book unfortunately does not address the equally important question of what a military force should do once intervention has been decided. As the deeply divisive arguments about the status of Kosovo almost ten years after NATO's intervention highlight, this might pose even bigger challenges to international order than the decision to intervene in the first place.

Nevertheless, *Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo* offers a thoughtful critique of the humanitarian intervention debate. It will be of interest to all involved in current debates on regulating the use of force.

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Foreign policy

America and the world: conversations on the future of American foreign policy. By Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and David Ignatius. New York: Basic Books. 2008. 304pp. Index. £15.99. ISBN 978 0 46501 501 6.

With a new US president having taken office in early 2009, there is an abundance of literature prescribing how to remake American foreign policy to meet increasingly complex global challenges. *America and the world*, however, is particularly significant because two of America's pre-eminent practitioners advocate an enduring philosophy that has largely been abandoned in recent years. The United

States, they argue, must pursue a disciplined foreign policy, rooted in core national interests, guided by a sense of historical and strategic responsibility.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, and Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H. W. Bush, are critical of America's current course. Since the turn of the century, they argue, US foreign policy has been guided by an illusion that 'we could define the rules of the game in [the] international system' (p. 15). Brzezinski describes this choice as 'a dramatic, tragic and avoidable turning point in our history' (p. 16).

America's misstep coincided with (and perhaps precipitated) fundamental changes to the international order. The United States, they argue, now confronts a world with 'one hundred pinprick problems' (p. 3), in which power is more dispersed and global challenges more complex. But the American era is not over. In this environment, the United States must engage the international community, not recoil from it. The authors call for renewed American leadership that listens, rather than dictates, and inspires collective solutions to global challenges.

America and the world, which is a dialogue between Brzezinski and Scowcroft moderated by journalist David Ignatius, provides a rich analysis of the international political landscape. The unusual format allows for a wide-ranging discussion about the interrelated nature of global challenges. Surprisingly, these two foreign policy heavyweights, from different sides of the political aisle, find much common ground.

One rare point of difference is the Iraq War. While both men spoke out forcefully against an American invasion before the war, they disagree on the solution today. For Scowcroft, an American military presence is necessary to foster stability in Iraq. For Brzezinski, the American presence is part of the problem since an indefinite US occupation will never yield a stable, self-governing Iraq.

On US–Iranian relations, Brzezinski and Scowcroft agree that America should engage, not isolate, the Islamic Republic. They acknowledge that the Iraq War has empowered Tehran by eliminating its long-time adversary. But they also recognize that Iran remains vulnerable: a stressed economy despite tremendous oil wealth; an overwhelmingly young population disillusioned with the religious leadership; and internal ethnic divisions. Indeed, Iran is not the hegemon it claims to be, and Brzezinski and Scowcroft believe that strategic discussions, which recognize Tehran's security concerns, could help thaw the cold US–Iranian relationship.

These two wise men of the foreign policy establishment are also optimistic that the United States can mend its recently rocky relationship with Russia. They suggest that America ought to seek cooperation on areas of common interest and 'avoid special provocations' (p. 175). But some of their prescriptions are sure to irritate Moscow: they support additional pipelines linking Central Asia's natural resources to Europe in order to break Russia's near monopoly and they commend NATO's eastward expansion (although Scowcroft opposes promotion of membership for Ukraine and Georgia in the near term). Nevertheless, these two former cold warriors sense that in the long term, Russia will move ever closer to the West if the United States takes a firm but cooperative approach.

On the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Brzezinski makes the case for active American involvement because the issues are 'too big, too emotional [and] too deeply rooted … [for the involved parties] to solve … themselves' (p. 80). The next US president, he argues, must 'take the bull by the horns right away' (p. 88) and outline parameters on the thorny final-status issues based on previous negotiations.

There is good reason to be sceptical that a diplomatic full-court press by the Americans will bear fruit unless the underlying conditions are ripe for resolution and Israel's security concerns are met. But Scowcroft rightly suggests that the alternatives are equally unattractive: 'the risk for Israel of concluding an agreement is considerably less than the risk of remaining isolated in a bitterly hostile region and depending on the United States for security' (p. 90).

America and the world also provides an incisive discussion of the consequences of Asia's rising powers. Brzezinski and Scowcroft are cautiously optimistic that emerging countries, like China and India, will take a moderate course, but acknowledge that America must be flexible in embracing these transformations. Greater global interdependence will require a supple response from Americans, who, they argue, are largely unfamiliar with the world that is taking shape around them. As Brzezinski notes: 'If we're intelligent in responding to the challenge of Asia, we'll do all right. But if we go into a kind of xenophobic shelter, a gated community of fear, we lose' (p. 153).

The conversational format of this book does not allow a deep analysis of the international issues discussed, but it does provide a fascinating glimpse into how two of America's greatest policy-makers view the world. And even though this world has changed drastically since Brzezinski and Scowcroft walked the halls of the West Wing and advised the US president, their perspective on foreign policy is timeless. The United States, they suggest, must be willing to adapt to a rapidly changing and complex global environment, but remain committed to shaping it. The new president would be wise to heed their advice.

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Conflict, security and armed forces

Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' choices after civil war. By Virginia Page Fortna. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2008. 214pp. Index. Pb.: £17.95. ISBN 978 0 6911 3671 4.

One of the many qualities of this timely book is the impressive combination of hypothesis-testing and theory-building on the one hand, and a sophisticated methodology drawing on case-studies, interviews and statistical data on the other. The resulting analysis genuinely moves knowledge and understanding forward, in relation to both peacekeeping and the dynamics of civil wars, in a style which, despite the complexity of aspects of statistical analysis, remains accessible, engaging and jargon-free.

The material is presented in seven chapters covering research questions, definitions and research design; evidence from case-studies and statistics about peacekeeping locations and deployments; a causal theory of peacekeeping; and analysis of the factors correlated with effectiveness. As might be anticipated from the ambition and objectives of the author, the book is rich in data and statistical tables. However, Page Fortna does not allow the detail to obscure the larger picture, which is to lend understanding and effectiveness to the role of peacekeeping in helping to end civil war and prolong the prospects for peace. She correctly points out that peacekeeping has been the subject of a burgeoning literature, and while peacekeeping has been recognized as a powerful and preferred tool for international conflict management, not enough research has been conducted via robust and systematic methodologies around the question of whether it works and, if so, how. For Page Fortna, the important questions are: what motivates the deployment of peacekeeping missions? What is the effect of peacekeeping on 'the peace-kept'? And probably most importantly, whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices. To help answer these three and related questions, data are generated that build on the work of Doyle and Sambanis and cover 60 civil wars over the ten-year period from 1989 to 1999. These data are used to address two specific questions: first, where peacekeepers go, and second whether their deployment makes peace more durable. In addition to the statistical data, three case-studies are selected, the Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict in Bangladesh (where there were no peacekeepers) and the civil wars in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. These case-studies are included to address the question of *how* peacekeeping works—as opposed to whether it works, which is the task of statistical analysis.

The author's conclusions are clear, direct and, for this reviewer, refreshingly optimistic: Page Fortna states that peacekeeping works, reducing the risk of a return to war from between 50 per cent to 75 per cent or even 80 per cent. In essence, this is her answer to the 'whether' question. As for the 'how' question, peacekeeping works, because the presence of a peacekeeping force changes 'the incentives of the parties, providing them with credible information about each other's intentions, preventing and managing accidental violations of the peace, and preventing either side from hijacking the political process in the transition to peace' (p. 17).

From such positive findings and conclusions, the author goes on to suggest that peacekeeping does indeed have more relevance and positive utility in resolving current conflicts than has generally been acknowledged. Interestingly, in view of the crisis in Gaza, ongoing at the time this review was being written, she suggests that 'the fractured peace efforts in Palestine, between Israelis and Palestinians … would be much more likely to succeed if international peacekeepers were actively involved' (p. 17).

Maybe so, and this would at least be some kind of meaningful response, assuming such a force could be put together and approved. However, this raises another aspect of peacekeeping, which has been less tested in the book: the question of not only whether and how it works, but also for whom and to what ends. There is a new literature on this question, which is not much touched upon in this book, yet which is much less positive about the impact of peacekeeping on global order. For while peacekeeping may be effective in securing what has been called negative peace—stabilizing and controlling violence—its role in positive peacebuilding, as a liberating force which empowers the disempowered, is much more questionable. Yet this is a debate beyond the concerns of this review, and, perhaps, is asking too much of Page Fortna's book, which is a welcome and valuable addition to the literature in the field.

Tom Woodhouse, University of Bradford, UK

Fighting terror: ethical dilemmas. By Alex J. Bellamy. London: Zed Books. 2008. 196pp. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 978 1 84277 968 2.

This book is a very interesting account of the ethical dilemmas emerging from the war on terror. Alex J. Bellamy convincingly demonstrates the need to rethink the just war tradition in the context of the war on terror. He engages with 'the moral understanding of war itself' and asks to what extent 'the war on terror can be labelled a just war' (preface). In so doing, Bellamy takes 'ethics seriously' (p. 17) and his book draws extensively upon the philosophical and historical insights of just war theory. He provides a strong argument against the killing of innocent civilians and suggests that 'ethical behaviour is a prerequisite for victory' (p. 27) in war. Bellamy's book displays a distinct normative undertone, and even though he reveals little about his own conception of ethics in general, it is plain that the author is an astute supporter of the United Nations and international law, strongly opposing harmful treatment of non-combatants.

One of Bellamy's most insightful propositions is that the war on terror is not a single articulation but rather a 'series of wars' (p. 70). From this follows that there is no single ethical—or unethical—response to the war on terror, but several. Bellamy's discussion of the concept of just war is equally compelling, particularly his broad normative claim that certain aspects of the just war tradition need to be adapted to the ethical challenges posed by the war on terror. He also suggests that just war theory—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—has to take account of the parameters of 'consensus, universalism and consistency' (p. 25). Ethical reasoning, the author argues, should thus be informed by consensus-building, and we should enquire to what extent our distinct moral principles are agreeable to others and universally applicable across borders. There is no doubt that these parameters are useful in seeking to adapt the just war tradition to the pressing demands posed by the war on terror.

In the second chapter, Bellamy goes on to 'put forward a moral definition' of terrorism, labelling it a 'deliberate targeting of non-combatants for political purposes'. He discusses the nature of terrorism in a detailed manner and arrives at the conclusion that it is ethically indefensible because of its 'deliberate targeting of non-combatants for political purposes' (p. 38), which is a train of thought consistent with the overall argument of the book.

In chapter three, the author revisits the question whether there can ever be a just war on terror. As Bellamy himself argues, politicians tend to deliberately couch the war on terror in ethical language, using just war theory to underpin their decisions to militarily intervene in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Bellamy distances himself from this tendency by arguing that the war on terror is not an inherently ethical activity. Nor should we conceptualize the war on terror in singular terms, but rather as 'a series of distinct and separate wars' (p. 70) demanding multiple ethical solutions. Given this, the author argues that there cannot be a 'single justification' for resorting to violence in fighting occurrences of global terrorism. By implication, governments can only respond to individual acts of terror rather than make a single 'articulation of a global war on terror' (p. 70). In order to make an ethically informed decision on the use of brute force, state leaders need to determine whether a specific act of terror has 'systematically violated the rights of non-combatants' and whether 'the crisis is immediate' (p. 71); if so, there might be occasions when a war can be legitimate, despite

not fulfilling the criteria laid down in international law. Arguably, this is a controversial idea that demands further theoretical and empirical investigation. Bellamy's book provides a good starting point for such scholarship.

The latter part of the book explores the ethics of pre-emptive war, torture and postwar reconstruction. Bellamy provides a very thorough and methodologically tight account of each one of these practices by demonstrating the difficulty of determining their ethical contents. Those interested in the ethics of the war on terror will no doubt find Bellamy's book an indispensable piece of work.

Annika Bergman Rosamond, University of Leicester, UK

Twilight war: the folly of US space dominance. By Mike Moore. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute. 2008. 390pp. Index. £17.05. ISBN 978 1 59813 018 8.

In *Twilight war: the folly of US space dominance*, Mike Moore offers a comprehensive and wide-ranging overview of the increasing salience of outer space in US security since the end of the Second World War, and a sustained reprimand of the direction American space policy has taken more recently. Moore is particularly critical of the failure of the US to lead the way in formulating a new international regime on the use of outer space. The placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space was prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, which is—as Moore notes at length—very much a product of the Cold War. The treaty's provisions consequently deal with the context of a nuclear arms race, but fail to cover the issue of conventional weapons and how they might be used in and from space, or from Earth against satellites using so-called anti-satellite or ASAT weapons. This latter issue has become much more pertinent in the wake of China's demonstration of its ASAT capability when it destroyed one of its own obsolete weather satellites in January 2007 with a ballistic missile, and of a similar strike by the US against one of its malfunctioning spy satellites in February 2008.

Moore is critical not only of the apparent lack of US interest in negotiating a successor agreement to the OST, but also of the unilateralism that has marked recent US space policy. Most notable here is the National Space Policy issued by the Bush administration in 2006, in which the US stated its claim to freedom of action in space and the right to deny access to space to its adversaries if necessary. This position, Moore argues, is a manifestation of a much older aspiration towards space dominance, which has persisted in the US since the beginning of the space age. Much of *Twilight war* is devoted to giving a detailed exposition of the longevity and persistence of this aspiration within certain elements of the American space policy community, and the often fantastical proposals and rationales for space weapons associated with the idea of space dominance. Moore details the thoughts and fortunes of various space warriors, those 'men and women who believe that conflict in space is inevitable' (p. xvi), and who consequently tend to dismiss US efforts at arms control in space as both self-limiting and misguided. These 'space warriors' have not always had their way—indeed, as Moore notes extensively, under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson the US generally maintained as its official position that space should be preserved for peaceful purposes. However, they continue to form a significant presence in the US military establishment, and the current orientation of US policy appears to lean towards the space warrior position much more than the multilateralist approach advocated by the author.

Although he doesn't doubt the sincerity of the interest in preserving the national security of the US, Moore is convinced that the aspiration of space dominance is wrong-headed and ultimately self-defeating. As the nation with the greatest number of both non-military and military assets in space, the US has the most to lose from conflict in space. This, the author contends, should spur the US to instigate negotiations on a new arms control regime for space, rather than making a drive towards developing new means of space dominance.

Twilight war broadly succeeds in making this case, although it also generates several unresolved issues in the process. On several occasions, the author lauds the capacity for 'precision' strikes and the ability to fight quick and 'clean' wars afforded to the US by space technologies, but he never really addresses the question of how and whether a new space treaty would affect these advantages.

Elsewhere, Moore attributes much of the longevity of the idea of space dominance to American exceptionalism, yet his own call for regulation of outer space is simultaneously predicated on the leadership of the US as the 'indispensable nation' (p. 203). By invoking the notion of exceptionalism, Moore clearly wants to embed the contemporary debate on space security in the US within a broader historical perspective and to link it to questions about American values and political culture. He does so in a clear, accessible and engaging fashion that addresses several important issues—missile defence, proposals for space weapons, strategic doctrine—but simultaneously avoids the arcane and jargon-heavy language sometimes employed in texts that deal with the issue of space technologies. For these reasons, this book will serve as a useful and informative introduction for those new to the subject of US space policy, while those already familiar with this area may be more interested in the particular line of argument put forward.

Columba Peoples, Bristol University, UK

Global non-proliferation and counter-terrorism: the impact of UNSCR 1540. Edited by Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2007. 253pp. $24.95. ISBN 978 0 81571 017 2.

Being first is tough. It is also valuable. *Global non-proliferation and counter-terrorism: the impact of UNSCR 1540* has all the strengths and shortcomings of one of the first book-length treatments of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, an important new non-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. Prompted by concerns over non-state actors as both active participants in the proliferation process and beneficiaries of proliferation-related transactions, the UN Security Council adopted the resolution unanimously on 28 April 2004.

The resolution is explicitly designed to address gaps in the existing non-proliferation regime, and it does so in interesting ways. First, it was adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the Security Council authority to determine that a threat to international peace and security exists, and to decide what measures are necessary to counter that threat, extending, as 1540 does, obligations to all UN member states, regardless of whether or not they are parties to existing non-proliferation treaties. Second, the resolution is the first such measure to identify generic non-proliferation obligations, rather than specific binding obligations, such as the requirement to impose sanctions against a particular country. Third, the resolution identifies extensive, if not comprehensive, measures for member states, including a wide range of controls that nations must put in place, such as legal prohibitions, physical security measures, material controls, border arrangements and export controls. Finally, 1540 stresses the involvement of more players in managing security risks, calling, for example, for all states to work with and inform private industry, the public and the scientific community.

This edited volume does a creditable job exploring these novel and important dimensions. For example, the chapters by Elizabeth Prescott, Sarah Meek and Chandre Gould, and Gerald Epstein, when taken together, provide useful insights into the challenges to fostering sustained engagement in proliferation risk management by the scientific community. All of these articles, but Epstein's in particular, highlight the different perspectives and interests that obstruct the necessary cooperation among the diverse range of communities needed for managing proliferation risks and impede non-proliferation progress.

Similarly, the book offers chapters with useful discussions of the resolution's relationship to existing non-proliferation tools, including the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as new measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). As a group, these chapters underline how hard it is for the international community to devise a shared, coherent global strategy to fight an increasingly complex and multifaceted problem.

Another good contribution is the chapter by Ted Whiteside on means of delivery, which too often are not included in assessments of the proliferation challenge as they focus on the traditional categories of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Whiteside also includes a discussion of the development of civilian and space launch technology, another issue that, while recognized as potentially important, is frequently inadequately addressed.

On the positive side, then, the book does an admirable job of capturing the reasons UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is novel and important in a rapidly evolving proliferation environment. The volume, however, is not without some serious drawbacks. One, it is repetitive: too many chapters summarize the resolution's basic provisions. The editors could have done so once only in their opening chapter, thus leaving more space for the authors to explore further the implications of the resolution for the individual issue on which they focus.

Two, what the book does not include is also important. In particular, the volume would have benefited from discussions of the politics of 1540, describing the dynamics at the UN and elsewhere that produced the document in its final form and laid the foundation for some problems it continues to encounter. Why, for example, did China refuse to include a specific reference to PSI, which the United States badly wanted? Further background on the political dynamics would also have highlighted the view of several UN members that, although legal under the UN Charter, the process by which the resolution was developed and passed by the Security Council was unfair, a view that continues to cast shadows over the resolution's legitimacy. Such a discussion would have also provided an opportunity to explore the view expressed by some countries and non-government representatives that the nuclear weapons states were exploiting their status as permanent members of the Security Council to impose non-proliferation obligations on others, while they did nothing about the obligations imposed on them by article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to take concrete steps towards disarmament.

Three, the book already seems dated. No real discussion is included, for example, on how states have performed in implementing the resolution, and why that record is uneven at best, although results began to be seen in 2006, if not earlier. The editors might have included a final short epilogue that at least touched on what the early results were suggesting.

UNSCR 1540 is new and important in the non-proliferation world. It is important to understand why, and this book contributes greatly to that understanding. But the story is not over. This volume tells only the very beginning.

Michael Moodie, International Security Programme, Chatham House, UK

National missile defense and the politics of US identity: a postcultural critique. By Natalie Bormann. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 192pp. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 7190 7 470 7.

Natalie Bormann's short but insightful and provocative study is far from being just another addition to the growing arsenal of missile defence literature. In fact, it may offer a starting point, from which to move beyond the canonical confines of the current debate. The work seeks primarily to deal with the interesting and problematic relationship between threat construction and US identity, and with how and why these concepts have become entwined, if not intrinsic to the American quest for missile defence. Why, the book asks, has missile defence become the longest-running and also most expensive US defence project in history when technology, costs, threats and even international reactions have made it so inherently problematic? In order to understand the American love affair with the concept, if not the reality of missile defence, Bormann suggests that we must move beyond the simplistic, polemical, predominantly strategic and surface-level literature that tends to dominate our understanding of this particular phenomenon.

Bormann proposes that we might do this by studying missile defence from the perspective of critical post-structuralist international relations theory. Drawing upon the thinking and writings of Michel Foucault and more recently David Campbell, the work recommends a closer focus on the role of US identity and threat in the missile defence story. Put simply, Bormann contends that US identity is the product of a dialectical US relationship with the outside world, and is therefore formed not by US culture or by material capabilities, but by its relationship with and understanding of other states and other external entities. Most importantly, Bormann argues, this particular US identity needs difference to gain meaning—achieved most recently through the construction of a 'rogue state' threat. The malevolence of this 'evil other' is consequently seen as the standard by which to judge US goodness and morality: missile defence is consequently perceived as both a performance of a righteous US identity and a response to the 'rogue state' threat. Thus, the book maintains, a

distinctly American interpretation of 'rogue state' threat is the vehicle through which the current push for missile defence has been formulated.

Missile defence in this view is therefore intrinsically linked to certain knowledge claims made about the nature of threat. What is more, this Manichaean view of the world has been reinforced by what Bormann terms 'technological regimes of truth', which have served to legitimize and prioritize missile defence as not only the best but also the only policy option to be considered in response. In this sense, and in a world often dominated by the possibility of threat rather than its reality, technology has almost become the standard upon which to judge what is regarded as a risk to national security. Consequently, a self-perpetuating dialogue is established. The Bush administration's embrace of pre-emption, Bormann contends, is merely a further iteration of this distinctly American phenomenon.

Perhaps the most important effect of this book might be its ability to broaden the basis upon which we seek to understand what is too often a political, rather than a scholarly, debate over missile defence. However, a consequence of this is that while reading the book, one consistently seems to be left with more questions than answers. For example, although Bormann's analysis certainly has value and offers a truly refreshing insight, one cannot help thinking about how much this book might have benefited from a further examination of the impact of American 'strategic culture', or perhaps how US identity and missile defence are shaped by the impact of domestic politics, ideology or the military-industrial complex. The reader is also left wondering whether missile defence is actually the product of a conscious American elite, or whether it might be better understood as the inadvertent product of an unknowing American public. That Bormann raises these questions may, however, be seen as a strength: furthering, widening and diversifying the types of questions we ask in order to understand missile defence can only be conducive to our comprehension of US foreign and security policy in more general terms.

Unfortunately, Bormann's bold and often insightful argument is regularly let down by poor editing, the presence of numerous spelling mistakes and, on occasion, factual error. Nevertheless, this book provides a fascinating, timely and well-thought-out addition to the literature, and should provide a springboard for the use of other unconventional and perhaps under-used approaches in understanding the US quest for missile defence.

Andrew Futter, University of Birmingham, UK

The way of the world: a story of truth and hope in an age of extremism. By Ron Suskind. London: Simon & Schuster. 2008. 432pp. Index. £17.99. ISBN 978 1 84737 117 1.

As with his last two books, *The price of loyalty* (Simon & Schuster, 2004) and *The one percent doctrine* (Simon & Schuster, 2006), the revelations—or claims—in Ron Suskind's new book have made headlines, not least his assertion that George W. Bush jeopardized the trial of those allegedly involved in a plan to bomb transatlantic planes in 2006 by forcing the UK authorities to move too soon. Unlike the previous book, though, this volume takes in a much wider cast of locations and characters. *The way of the world* aims to represent a snapshot of the war on terror and its impact on a wide range of people, from an Afghan exchange student to the late Benazir Bhutto.

While very worthy, the book's account of the trials and tribulations of the more minor characters is not as interesting as the author's revelations about intelligence and high politics, including the Bush administration's failure to follow up intelligence from Tahir Jalil Habbush, the then head of the Iraqi intelligence service, that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. Suskind's story of an MI6 officer meeting with the head of Iraqi security on the eve of war in Jordan seems, indeed, like something out of the BBC television series *Spooks*. As to why Saddam Hussein did not try to prevent the US invasion by openly declaring that he had no weapons of mass destruction, Habbush's explanation is that Saddam was 'worried about the Iranians, and other countries in the region, finding out that he had no WMD' (p. 367). Saddam believed, by contrast, that the United States' threat to invade was a bluff, since occupying Iraq would be 'a nightmare' (p. 367).

Many readers will ask, of course, whether Suskind is really suggesting that the US should have aborted war at the last moment on the word of the head of the Iraqi intelligence service. The author

instead sees the failure to follow up the claim (not least to increase obvious tensions within the regime itself) as part of the Bush administration's wider shortcomings in intelligence and diplomacy. Suskind asserts that the Bush administration was ready to order the CIA to fake a letter from Habbush connecting Saddam Hussein to one of the 9/11 plotters, Mohammed Atta. The author also argues that the Bush administration was dismissive when informed of the Ba'ath regime's plans for an insurgency, and failed to act on an approach from Iran indicating its willingness to cooperate against Al-Qaeda. Iran not only suspended its project to weaponize enriched uranium, but was also willing to talk about an Al-Qaeda cell within its border 'discussing the purchase of Russian suitcase nukes' (p. 382). When rebuffed, however, Iran made trouble with 'an entrepreneurial zeal' (p. 383), harbouring Al-Qaeda and supplying arms to insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. If true, this claim obviously negates one of the main reasons for the war, which was to make rogue states more willing to cooperate. Indeed, George W. Bush has cited Libya's willingness to stop its nuclear programme as a direct product of the Iraq War.

What also stands out is the account of Benazir Bhutto's last days, and her complicated relationships with both General Musharraf and the US. The author mentions an apparent threat made to Bhutto by General Musharraf, and the fact that Bhutto's security detail was withdrawn on the day of her assassination.

If the book has a notable fault, it lies in the author's overwrought prose. It is, indeed, ironic that while Suskind obviously dislikes George W. Bush, he shares the same folksiness, almost to the point of cliché: 'But that's the thing about people. If you give them half a chance, they'll come through' (p. 79). Suskind's book is, nonetheless, a highly compelling piece of contemporary history.

Richard Briand

Political economy, economics and development

The shape of the world to come: charting the geopolitics of a new century. By Laurent Cohen-Tanugi. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. 152pp. Index. £17.95. ISBN 978 0 231 14600 5.

In the rapidly expanding globalization literature, commentators fall into roughly three camps: hyper-globalists, who see global interconnectedness as a great blessing for humankind; sceptics, who challenge the premises underlying globalization on political, moral or theoretical grounds; and middle-grounders, who seek to understand globalizing processes without necessarily embracing them. Cohen-Tanugi is tentatively in the third camp, but with one foot planted among the sceptics, and thus he provides a somewhat dispassionate survey of the current state of the world. In fine traditional International Relations form, the author employs three widely neglected tools of the scholarly trade: logic, reasoning, and clear writing (which shines through the translation from French). He shows that globalization cannot exist apart from the international system, and that geopolitics and international political economy still coexist in our time. The author is also an unapologetic proponent of western democracy, international openness and diversity.

Cohen-Tanugi corrects conventional wisdom on the nature of the post-Cold War era. The 1990s did not herald the triumph of American-style capitalism, democracy or a 'new international order', he argues; instead, this period constituted an 'illusory parenthesis' before 9/11, while the current decade has been shaped by three converging forces: the 'emergence of radical Islam as a destabilizing force', the 'spectacular entry of China onto the international stage' (both p. 2), and the relative weakening of America and Europe, all of which is creating a multipolar world.

Contradicting Thomas Friedman (*The world is flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century*, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), Cohen-Tanugi insists that the world is not becoming flatter, but is rather increasingly fragmented. More realist than globalist, he believes that the future depends on the use of power: while China and India are likely to gain power in the coming decades, western countries will have to fight to hold onto their economic and technological leadership. Nation-states must now function on two levels simultaneously: coping with economic integration and multilateralism, while

surviving in the traditional arena of national and regional competition. At both levels, they operate against an increasingly complicated background of terrorism, wars fought over ethnic and religious identity, and nuclear proliferation.

Cohen-Tanugi's arguments are aimed as much at the West as at the rest of the world. Like many western intellectuals, he is genuinely bothered by US actions in Iraq because of the damage they have done to the western alliance. He feels that the West is not necessarily declining, but that the 'Atlantic era', in which Europe and the US dominated world affairs, is coming to an end. This is due to a number of converging factors: a demographic reversal of fortune between Europe and Asia; the rise of Asia as a new economic power centre; and America's misadventures abroad. More fundamentally, Cohen-Tanugi argues that the western alliance lost its way after the end of the Cold War, and that the European integration project stagnated as the European Union expanded. The multilateral institutional structure, created and dominated by the West throughout the post-Second World War era, has broken down as developing nations formed the G20 to challenge it. Western democracy, trapped in the nation-state, is unable to cope with the demands of the complex global economy and has lost much of its appeal to the rest of the world. Meanwhile, world brain power is inexorably shifting to Asia, especially to 'Chindia'. Despite its declining political influence, America paradoxically remains the only industrialized country likely to maintain economic vitality to mid-century. Thus, America and Europe face distinctly different challenges in the decades ahead: the US needs to reorient its foreign policy and better understand political globalization, whereas Europeans have to readjust their 'atypical' integration project to reflect realities elsewhere in the world.

The book has a few deficiencies. At only 152 pages, the text is a bit short, and reads more like an eighteenth-century political pamphlet or a twentieth-century briefing paper than a fully developed work. Its conclusions are similarly underdeveloped, and its references are quite thin, with most chapters yielding only about three to five endnotes. Cohen-Tanugi neglects much of the globalization literature of the past two decades. Criticizing the hyper-globalist school would allow him to show his conclusions in starker relief, and he could use some of the sceptics to bolster his arguments. Any self-respecting book on globalization ought to discuss pro-globalization writers such as Jagdish Bhagwati, sceptics such as David Held or John Cavanaugh, and middle-grounders including Joseph Stiglitz, Martin Wolf, Amartya Sen or Dani Rodrik. The title is also a bit misleading, since the book does not address the future in any depth. The concluding chapter provides a brief treatment of some of the more significant recent international issues, but it appears to be merely a tacked-on survey of the headlines of 2008, for example rising food prices and the subprime loan explosion (undoubtedly written before the market collapse in September 2008).

Cohen-Tanugi's focus is perhaps too narrow, may not capture many of the economic and social dynamics at work today, and reflects a French elite bias in favour of state power. In endorsing high politics over low politics in international affairs and embracing a diffuse realism, his work is distinctly backward looking.

Joel R. Campbell, Kansai Gaidai University, Japan

Globalization, regionalization and business: conflict, convergence and influence. By Marc Schelhase. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. 224pp. Index. £50.00. ISBN 978 0 23057 329 1.

Regional integration is one of the most important political economic phenomena of the past half century. Europe has led the way, but the rest of the world is rapidly catching up. Mercosur, Latin America's major effort, has so far been little studied, so Schelhase's study of business as a driver of integration is a timely addition to literature in the field. His focus on business is both well chosen and insightful. The book is well organized, with pithy introductions and conclusions, simply stated arguments, and well-argued cases. Schelhase makes a strong pitch for bridging of sub-fields, in this case international political economy (IPE) and comparative economy (CPE), as well as the fields of international relations and comparative politics.

Like a diligent political science postgraduate student, Schelhase begins with supposed shortcomings of theory, notably a failure of both IPE and CPE to explain elementary Latin American region-

alization processes. While the former focuses on governments as main actors in regional integration projects, the latter concentrates on interest group activity. In emphasizing the activities of business groups over those of government organs, the author clearly leans towards the latter. Schelhase asserts that the emergence of Mercosur and the economic crises of the 1990s led to much greater trans-regional activity by business interest groups. Specifically, greater outside investment in the region, privatization and structural reforms from the 1980s onwards, alongside activities of transnational corporations (TNCs), proved a direct stimulus to greater political action. When Mercosur decided to become a customs union in 1995, business interest group activity really gathered steam. During the subsequent economic crises of 1998 to 2002, business interests fought to keep the regional cooperation project alive.

Schelhase focuses on such new organizations as the Consejo Empresario de América Latina (Congress of Latin American Businessmen, or CEAL) and the Consejo Industrial de Mercosur (Industrial Congress of Mercosur, or CIM), as well as established associations such as the Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producción (Inter-American Congress of Commerce and Production, or CICYP) and the Council of the Chemical Industry of the Mercosur (CIQUIM).

CEAL serves as a regional policy forum, pushes for both greater Latin integration and the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) linking North and South America, and 'brings together leading managers' and top executives of domestic and regional companies and TNCs (p. 97). CIQUIM attempts to speak for the South American chemical industry as a whole in international forums. Both CIQUIM and the Mercosur–EU Business Forum (MEBF) have tried to influence policy formation across Mercosur countries and at the regional level, while MEBF has made a major push to craft an EU–Mercosur free trade agreement.

Schelhase concludes that the 'sheer complexity and multitude of interests' makes it difficult to separate domestic, regional and international interest group activities (p. 142). Nonetheless, he feels that globalization has been the most important factor prodding interest group formation and activity in the region. He also suggests that strong economic growth in the Southern Cone has carried the FTAA process forward.

The book's weaknesses are basic. First, the title is misleading, since the work is not a general examination of regional integration, but entirely a study of Mercosur. Second, the book often reads like an edited doctoral dissertation and, while heavy attention to the matter of political economy theories and their apparent deficiencies might be interesting within the academic realm, is it really that important outside this sphere? Third, instead of gathering his major theoretical arguments into introductory and concluding chapters, he spreads them seemingly at random throughout the book. Fourth, attempting to explain Latin American regionalization, Schelhase ironically yields a major chicken-and-egg puzzle: was it regionalization or just economic changes at the national level during the 1980s and 1990s that most stimulated regional business organization? Similarly, did the multitude of interests create conditions favourable to region-wide interest groups or, as Schelhase suggests, did globalization spur formation of many competing interests? The reader deserves a fuller examination of these conundrums.

The study also suffers from sins of omission. Other aspects of regional integration are just as important as business activity, but Schelhase gives them a light treatment or ignores them altogether. We need more discussion of the milieu in which Latin American business operates. This would include political and social dynamics in the major Mercosur members, the ongoing macroeconomic integration in the Southern Cone of Latin America, regional economic trends or cycles, and political economic leadership of the region. The latter has been especially prominent in recent years, as presidents Chavez, Morales, Lula da Silva and Kirchner I and II, along with the leftward 'pink tide', have propelled Mercosur in more explicitly political directions.

Schelhase's work could also have benefited from at least one comparative chapter. Business has also been a driver of South-East Asian, East Asian and North American integration (and has been at least an important factor in Europe), so it would be useful to see how events played out in those regions, and how they have differed from South America.

Joel R. Campbell, Kansai Gaidai University, Japan

Energy and environment

The end of food. By Paul Roberts. London: Bloomsbury. 2009. 416pp. Pb.: £8.99. ISBN 978 0 747 59642 4.

The End of food is not the first book to tackle the problems facing the global food system, but it deserves a place near the top of the list for any reader interested in these issues who is hoping for insight rather than the blend of anecdote and indignation that marks some other tours of this topic.

There is a depressingly long list of interwoven dysfunctions and frailties, yet Roberts manages to maintain momentum and interest as he works through them. A lot of ground is covered, and it is perhaps inevitable that the depth of the analysis varies. The book has a particular focus on the United States (Roberts is American) and the discussion of the US situation is stronger than some of the global coverage. However, overall the book's strengths more than outweigh the weaknesses.

The author's core message—that the current food system is unsustainable in most respects—is clear, but there is a deliberate approach and balance to the analysis: rather than simply recite a litany of impacts and injustices, Roberts tells the story of how we got to where we are, and who benefited en route. This makes for a satisfying, informative and self-reflective experience—not least because the principal beneficiary has, as often as not, been 'us', the consumers.

The opening chapter describes the evolution of the modern food system. At one level, this is a story of successive advances in agriculture and transport, which have helped to sustain progressively larger populations, and to relieve threats of the food insecurity and famine that have been a near permanent feature of the human condition. But, as the ensuing chapters show, this history is also a cautionary tale on the fickle nature of power. At a global level, power over the terms of trade in food has been held for a century or more by the US and the other wealthy nations. Yet today the established balance between those that produce and those who consume the products of the global food market seems set for challenge from China, Brazil and a cohort of emerging economies.

A chapter on agricultural development and food security in the developing world is built around a case-study of Kenya, facilitating a discussion of the arguments for and against export-orientated horticulture and self-sufficiency. The history of donor involvement in African agriculture and the injustices of the global food trade are covered here too but, though this chapter serves its purpose, it is not the book's strongest.

Roberts lays out the environmental and resource impacts of today's agri-food industry: greenhouse gas emissions, pollution from livestock waste, over-exploitation of water supplies and erosion of soils, conversion of forest to farmland, over-fishing, and animal welfare issues. The end-to-end dependency of the modern food chain on fossil fuels looks more like a vulnerability than a strength, given that the decades ahead are expected to see a tightening of oil supplies and a need to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The reliance of modern farming on nitrogen fertilizer—which is produced with natural gas—to inflate yields is flagged as a particular problem.

Roberts goes to some lengths to demonstrate that the levels of meat consumption seen today in the developed world could not be sustained for the global population as a whole. The meat industry is also the focus of much of the book's discussion of food safety. Despite focusing on the US, the core arguments about the potential for intensive poultry production to incubate avian flu and the chronic microbial contamination of many meat supply chains have global currency.

So the paradox is that at a time when, in historical terms, food has never been more plentiful or affordable, the sustainability of the food system has never looked so much in doubt. The real price of cheap food is becoming ever more apparent. 'Blame' cannot be pinned clearly on any particular group, but the system as a whole is clearly in need of change. Yet to what, and by whom? The final section of this book considers those questions. The innovation challenge, especially in agriculture and aquaculture, is discussed in detail. The book's discussion of GM technologies and organic farming is well constructed, providing a positive but cautious verdict on the potential of both. Roberts's recipe also includes fixing distorted markets, efficient pricing of resources, enlightened and educated consumers, a rebuilding of regional food chains and the wealthier world choosing (though he does not express much confidence here) to eat less meat. But with the sum total of the solutions available

looking inadequate to the task, he ends with an appeal for all to get involved in food politics and create something better.

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History

Great Britain and the creation of Yugoslavia: negotiating Balkan nationality and identity. By James Evans. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. 2008. 288pp. Index. £59.50. ISBN 978 1 8451 1488 6.

Rather surprisingly, Britain played a significant part in the formation of the first, royalist Yugoslavia in 1918 and a hugely important, not to say crucial, role in the formation of the second, communist-ruled Yugoslavia in 1944–5, as well as afterwards. This is surprising because, until the start of the twentieth century, little was known in Britain about the Balkans—certainly much less than, for example, about many regions of Africa. The region of South-Eastern Europe hardly figured in British imperial policy and only very occasionally engaged the attention of the British public. All of this changed following the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne in Sarajevo in June 1914, an event which triggered a war that engulfed the whole world, led to the breakup of old empires—including the German, the Russian, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires and thus entailed the creation of a number of successor-states including Yugoslavia (initially called Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes).

This important, conceptually well-defined and thoroughly researched study focuses on British attitudes towards the emergence of the Yugoslav state in 1918, and the subsequent unrest and controversy preceding its first, centralist constitutional settlement in 1921. James Evans describes in fascinating detail how the concept of the single Yugoslav nation, which formed the ideological underpinning for the disastrous 1921 Vidovdan (St Vitus' Day) constitutional settlement, gradually came to be accepted in Britain during the First World War on the basis of a number of diverse and often confusing and contradictory historical, linguistic and religious arguments presented in the public debate.

During the 1914–18 war, as Britain became involved in the affairs of South-Eastern Europe, a small group of individuals from a variety of backgrounds first tried to raise the profile of the Slavs of South-Eastern Europe and other national groups from the region, and ended up actively—and with considerable success—campaigning for the setting up of a new state to house them. The most prominent among the campaigners were historian and political commentator R. W. Seton-Watson and foreign editor of *The Times* Henry Wickham Steed. Thanks to those campaigners' forceful—and often misleading—pleading, the few warning, dissenting voices like that of the respected anthropologist Edith Durham, were drowned out. Thus even the initially sceptical British officialdom came to accept the proposition that various groups with apparently distinct identities—Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes and others—formed a single ethnic South Slav ('Yugo-Slav') nation.

The acceptance of this view had important consequences for British policy towards the region, both in the final stages of the First World War and afterwards, but also during the war itself, once it had become clear that the overriding objective of defeating the Central Powers could be supported by actively encouraging the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, which had previously never been a British foreign policy interest.

However, as the author rightly stresses, contrary to the sometimes still occasionally heard view, the Council of Four (Britain, France, Italy and the United States) did not 'create' Yugoslavia at the Versailles peace conference in 1919: Yugoslavia had already emerged from the wartime chaos months before, and the Great Powers—including Britain—could, even if they had wanted to, do little to alter this fact. What they did was to 'approve of the new state's existence, accord it legal recognition and cast judgement on the controversial fine-tuning of its borders' (p. 1). These borders, as elsewhere in post-1918 Europe, in many cases departed from the solemnly proclaimed principle that boundaries of political authority and ethnic identity should be aligned.

None of these new states presented a more complex picture and none proved more difficult to govern than Yugoslavia. Not surprisingly, British observers rapidly became disillusioned with their

belief in a single, existing Yugoslav nationality. 'Within thirty months which separated the state's initial formation and the ratification of its first constitution', Evans writes in his conclusion, 'the image of Yugoslavia in Britain shifted fundamentally, from being that of a new national state among the several which succeeded to the lands of the old, multinational Habsburg Monarchy, to being that of another multinational conglomeration (albeit one with strong linguistic and cultural ties) which suffered the same acute difficulties in managing its antagonistic national elements as had the Empire which preceded it. Under Serb dominance Yugoslavia came, as Austria–Hungary before it, to seem effectively a "prison of the peoples"' (p. 223). This excellent book teaches an important lesson: once formed, erroneous perceptions can and do acquire a lasting nature, with damaging consequences, as was amply illustrated by the lamentable western policy towards the demise of the second Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Christopher Cviic

The voices of the dead: Stalin's great terror in the 1930s. By Hiroaki Kuromiya. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. 2008. 295pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 0 30012 389 0.

This new book by Hiroaki Kuromiya, Professor of History at Indiana University, and leading specialist on the history of Soviet Ukraine, aims to 'recover the voices' (p. 1) of the victims of the Great Terror of 1937–38, and by attending to their testimonies—overt, hidden or suppressed—to reconstruct an account of their lives and to understand the circumstances of their deaths.

Kuromiya argues that Stalin's core rationale in initiating the mass purges was to launch 'a pre-emptive strike to prepare for war' (p. 3). As even Stalin and his lieutenants conceded, blameless people were trapped in this process. Sacrifice of innocents, even in their hundreds of thousands, was evidently a price the Soviet regime was willing to pay in order to secure the state against the potential threat from real spies and saboteurs. The author emphasizes that the mass killings were initiated by Stalin himself and implemented by the central political authorities, even though regional and local police chiefs sought to outdo each other in over-fulfilling their quotas (p. 4). Most of this story is already well known, but Kuromiya synthesizes the existing scholarship with discernment, skill and elegance to contextualize his own research.

This work's originality lies in the author's meticulous readings of the case files of a number of prisoners of the Kiev political police, chosen to represent a cross-section of nearly one million ordinary citizens who were executed during the mass purges. Careful study of records and reports of the police inquisitors, their witness statements and the coerced confessions of the accused enables Kuromiya to offer compelling insights into individual victims' biographies, the social contexts of their lives and their experiences of false imprisonment and brutal interrogation. He delves deep into the evidence contained in these files, revealing the investigators' modes and mechanisms of fabrication through a subtle deconstruction of inconsistencies, contradictions, silences, omissions, false logic and generic formulas that he identifies in the documentation, stripping away the layers of faked and fictive testimony to proffer glimpses of underlying historical truths or, in the many cases where data remain partial, the range of plausible realities.

We read, for example, about the love affair of a young Ukrainian dancer with a Polish diplomat; whether she was aware that he was in fact a spy remains unknown, as does her own possible association with the secret police before her arrest. A number of files concern police informers, whose collaboration—probably coerced—was insufficient to save them from execution, and in many cases clearly rendered them more vulnerable. Most of the individuals discussed fell into one or more of the categories most commonly targeted in the repressions: peasants who had fled dekulakization or illegally crossed the state border, priests, former nobles, folk musicians (accused of nationalism), wives of arrested husbands, foreign-born citizens, ethnic minorities (especially those belonging to national groups with foreign homelands considered hostile to the Soviet Union), and those who had connections with family or friends abroad. While some of the individuals whose case files are examined here might have been privately critical of the Soviet regime before their arrest, none were guilty of the charges of espionage, subversion, agitation, conspiracy or rebellion for which all but a handful were

ultimately executed. Kuromiya supplements his analysis of the case files with wide-ranging explorations outside the police archives in search of additional detail on the personal lives and careers of his subjects. The footnotes only hint at the thoroughness of his research: for every fragment of information that the historian discovered, he would inevitably have encountered innumerable dead-ends and false trails.

This work is exemplary historical scholarship: ingenious, imaginative, sensitive, intriguing, insightful and compassionate. It meshes carefully reconstructed and compelling narratives of individual terror, tragedy and resilience with engaging, dispassionate and cogent analysis of the broader political and social contexts. Written in a lucid, graceful and jargon-free style, this book will hold great fascination for anyone interested in Stalinism and its ruinous impact on the private lives of Soviet citizens, as well as in the social histories and everyday experiences of twentieth-century dictatorships. It deserves to be studied by the widest readership.

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Europe

Explaining institutional change in Europe. By Adrienne Héritier. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007. 263pp. Index. £49.00. ISBN 978 0 19929 812 9.

Adrienne Héritier is one of the leading figures in the field of political science. Her conceptual work on multilevel governance has substantially changed our understanding of the internal workings of European institutions and the integration process as a whole. We now understand that a proper grasp of political processes in Europe can no longer be achieved by a simplistic model of politics on the European and the national level. In that sense, Héritier's thinking has great merit in offering a serious critique of neo-realist and neo-intergovernmental theories, which, at the extreme, see nations poised against 'Europe' in an open bargaining process in which each party competes to win advantage at the others' expense. Instead, Héritier argues convincingly that EU governance is an intertwined process with policy contributions from quite a wide range of levels: European, national, regional and local.

This book is the latest in Héritier's research canon. It sets out to provide a theory of institutional change, that is to say how European institutions adapt to changing requirements and to the changing political environment in general. At the outset, she provides the reader with the highly complex theoretical underpinning for this book—in places one wonders if it is not too complicated to remain fully meaningful. With that comes a genuinely wide-ranging referencing to other theoretical approaches. This is common practice in current academic writing, and Héritier excels in the field, but there are limits to its usefulness. My judgement is clearly a matter of taste, but it does seem to me that lucidity is being compromised if the lines of argument and references become too long, as they do on occasion in this book.

Héritier proceeds by reference to empirical cases under the following headings: the European Parliament's role in legislation; the presidency of the Council; the Parliament and the investiture of the Commission; the composition of the Commission; and finally, controlling the implementation powers of the Commission (*comitology*). In these empirical cases, Héritier develops formulas that model institutional change according to the specific environment of each institution, using noteworthy examples where such institutional change has occurred. The format of such formulas has something of a mathematical expression of complex political processes, for instance '*H: Formalisation of the informal institutional rules* "The outcome of the formal negotiations that at t2 will reflect informal institutions bargained if all designing actors agreed to accept the informal change"' (p. 143). One is almost tempted to add 'QED' to this kind of exposition.

And do they really help to further illuminate our understanding of European political processes? In all their detail, they do, but at the same time the big picture is often lost due to a number of reasons: because of the welter of detail; because Héritier considers almost every possible eventuality, however remote; because of the resulting complexity of the argument; because the language used and the prose mirror that complexity and are therefore very hard to understand in places; and because, finally,

Héritier loses the reader in her labyrinth of thought. To draw a parallel, she writes on a similar level as Jürgen Habermas in his communication theory, where in the German original, sentences wander over half a page—at the end of the sentence some effort is required to recall what was at the beginning. Habermas had the great benefit that the translations of his work into English are usually shorter, simpler and hence much clearer for the reader. This would be no bad thing in the case of Héritier's writing, too, both in the interest of greater clarity and meaningfulness in academic writing, not least in European Studies. Since this is not the case in this book, it will remain accessible only to absolute experts in the field.

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European defence policy: beyond the nation state. By Frédéric Mérand. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008. 184pp. Index. £40.00. ISBN 978 0 19953 324 4.

If one follows the line of reasoning pursued by Frédéric Mérand in his book, *European defence policy: beyond the nation state*, 'we are witnessing a transformation of the European state, one in which "Dying for the European Union" can begin to make sense' (p. 12). Drawing on theoretical concepts from the discipline of political sociology, he further elaborates that at the heart of this transformation has been the genesis of a transgovernmental European security and defence field: 'a structured and hierarchical social space in which state actors from different countries look to each other, know their place *vis-à-vis* each other, share and sometimes clash over social representations, and struggle for influence over policy outcomes, domestic and supranational' (p. 13). According to Mérand, this transgovernmental field has been instrumental in advancing a denationalization of defence policies across the European Union. Indeed, he claims that since the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990s, European diplomats and defence officials have increasingly put the formulation of national defence postures into the service of furthering the European integration process. As a result, defence policy's traditional role as a source of national identity and a means to ensure territorial self-defence has become diluted.

In line with the theoretical premises established in the introduction, Mérand's first chapter depicts the institutions and civil–military missions associated with ESDP as social spaces in which the divergent views of national officials on the role of armed forces, the nature of threats and ways to address them constantly clash, while at the same time 'a common understanding of what ESDP is *about*' (p. 42) gradually emerges.

The author moves on to discuss three distinct post-Second World War developments, which he considers to have been the necessary preconditions for the emergence of ESDP. First, he claims that due to the highly institutionalized cooperation in multinational defence arrangements, such as the Western European Union, Eurocorps and most importantly, NATO, EU member states' militaries have reached an unprecedented degree of internationalization. This has prompted defence officials to replace their adherence to national strategic cultures with a professional ethos that revolves around a common pan-European ideal of the 'culturally interoperable professional soldier' (p. 68). Second, Mérand argues that since the introduction of European political cooperation in the 1970s, diplomats from EU member states have increasingly come to share a set of norms which converge around common 'EU rules' and strongly determine their professional activity and diplomatic practices. Finally, the author illustrates how the occurrence of several 'external shocks' in the 1990s, namely the need to cut national defence expenditures in the face of fiscal and economic pressures, a general post-Cold War legitimacy crisis of the military, and the failure of EU diplomacy to alleviate the conflicts in the Balkans, forced European foreign policy and military officials to jointly embrace European security and defence integration as their new *raison d'être*.

Departing from this historical narrative, Mérand argues that ESDP is both a product and an image of the European cooperation practices that have been established over the last 50 years within the framework of NATO and European foreign policy coordination, and that it thus reproduces long-standing social representations and power structures. Mérand concludes that it is precisely the reproduction of deeply entrenched social representations and power structures in the formation and

development of ESDP that will—even in the absence of any major political impetus from European political leaders—ensure a continued unfolding of European security and defence integration.

Arguably, it is the latter claim that most clearly reveals the main shortcoming of Mérand's book. While the author predicts further integration within the framework of ESDP, he remains surprisingly silent on the question of the purpose of European security and defence integration. The potential implications for the future of EU defence policy, which derive from the clashing social representations and diverging powers of state actors when it comes to defining ESDP, remain largely underexplored.

Moreover, the author's elaborate discussion of the preconditions that were necessary for the creation of ESDP clearly neglects a number of developments, which have also added important impetus to European security and defence integration, such as the reunification of Germany or the changing face of transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. Finally, some of the claims and arguments presented in the book would have been considerably strengthened by a more rigid use of primary and secondary sources.

Nevertheless, Mérand has succeeded in providing an accessible introduction to both the history and the current state of European security and defence integration. Even more importantly, he has made an innovative and highly sophisticated contribution to theorizing European security and defence integration.

That said, Mérand cannot disguise the fact that one of his key claims, namely that '"Dying for the European Union" can begin to make sense' for ever more people in Europe, primarily serves as a means to attract attention. After all, as the author concedes himself, the ideas of politico-military elites and citizens on the role of armed forces, the nature of threats and ways to address them still strongly diverge across national boundaries—even when these boundaries lie within Europe.

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Turkish accession to the EU: satisfying the Copenhagen criteria. By Eric Faucompret and Jozef Konings. London: Routledge. 2008. 221pp. Index. £70.00. ISBN 978 0 41545 713 2.

Unlike most recent books on relations between Turkey and the European Union, which usually focus on the policy implications of the EU's enlargement strategy towards Turkey, *Turkish accession to the EU* explores the details of the Copenhagen criteria. This fulfils a much needed area of study on how the implementation of the criteria is assessed in the European Commission's progress reports. Faucompret and Konings claim that their book's uniqueness lies in their efforts to address cultural and historical as well as political and economic constraints on Turkey's EU accession process. What is puzzling about this claim, however, is that while the Copenhagen criteria include economic and political benchmarks, they do not incorporate cultural and historical ones. Furthermore, what the authors do not answer is the paradox that no other EU candidate country has been scrutinized on cultural and historical criteria. In this context, it is hard to see the relevance of their research question—'Is Turkey comparable to the Ottoman Empire?'—to Turkey's present EU accession process. The introduction is followed by a brief historical chapter rife with errors. To dismiss Abdülhamit II as a mere 'tyrant', who tried to press on with reforms under the banner of Islam as a uniting factor, is evidence of the authors' lack of knowledge of the complexities of the late Ottoman reform period. A bizarre comparison is made between the Young Ottomans on one side and the Iranian *émigrés* in Paris who overthrew the regime of the shah in 1979 on the other. The only common ground between these two very different groups in very different periods of history was that they both resided in Paris at one point. Faucompret and Konings also miss the point that it was the leaders of the Union and Progress Committee who championed the alliance with Germany and the subsequent entry into the First World War, and not Wilhelm II's influence on Abdülhamit II.

The over-reliance of the authors on two secondary sources—Zürcher and Karpat—is a major shortcoming for writing a historical survey of any country, no matter how succinct. Perhaps this could have been alleviated by consulting other volumes regarded as essential reading relevant to this period, such as Stanford Shaw, Şükrü Hanioğlu, Niyazi Berkes and Naim Tufan.

If a single thread of argument could be woven between the cultural and historical background of Turkey and the Copenhagen criteria, it would have to be the evolution and development of westernization in Turkey. One evident piece of missing analysis that could have provided this link is the contrast between Atatürk's vision of westernization and that of the current AKP government, which is set within the context of globalization and economic integration.

For the AKP, a competing free market economy can supersede cultural manifestations of westernization, championed by Atatürk's reforms, when defining the success and scale of modernization. What could have been a fascinating discussion is how the economic criteria have become crucial for the AKP to reset the goals of westernization in today's Turkey.

The most interesting area of enquiry in this book is the relationship between the annual Commission progress reports and the Copenhagen criteria, which is thoroughly explored in the third and fourth chapters. The progress reports are the interpretation of the European Commission on the successful fulfilment of the Copenhagen and other criteria. Therefore, the benchmarks set by the criteria are superseded by the opinion of the Commission in the progress reports, as these determine the pace and priorities of the negotiations in the following year. However, the authors base their analysis of this very interesting line of enquiry on the 2006 progress report for Turkey, which, methodologically, limits their empirical material. Progress reports have been issued on Turkey since 1998, with the 2006 report being the first to be published after the formal opening of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey. A contrast between the 2006 report and previous ones would have shown the significance of the different measurements of the EU's conditionality in the periods before and after accession negotiations.

Overall, the strength of this book lies in these two chapters, where the reader is taken through the intricate details of the economic and political criteria and their interpretation in the EU Commission's 2006 report on Turkey. Any student or policy-maker interested in the mechanisms of EU enlargement would find this section of the book valuable. However, it is difficult to see that the authors have successfully strung together a coherent argument which runs through the entire length of the book.

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Serbia in the shadow of Milošević: the legacy of conflict in the Balkans. By Janine N. Clark. London: I. B. Tauris. 2008. 288pp. £52.50. ISBN 978 1 84511 767 2.

Serbia in the shadow of Milošević is a timely and well-thought-out work. Clark begins by explaining the rationale of her book, which is broadly based on the notion that, while vast amounts of writing have been produced *vis-à-vis* the former Yugoslavia, virtually no work deals with the people affected by its conflicts. The author's aim, therefore, is to uncover some of those hidden narratives, specifically with regard to what the people of Serbia have thought of Slobodan Milošević since his fall from power.

To this end, Clark provides an excellent chapter on daily life under the Milošević regime, before going on to discuss 'Milošević through the eyes of the Serbs'. Key episodes, such as his death, are also considered. After four revelatory chapters, Clark turns her attention to sections dedicated to 'Serbian collective denial and collective guilt', the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the effect of Milošević's legacy on retributive justice and peace-building. The book is detailed, clearly structured and well researched, and takes into account a vast amount of secondary literature. However, it is not without shortcomings. The main problem is that Clark's work is firmly positioned within the discipline of political science, and yet deals with a topic that is deeply dependent upon cultural and social analysis: people's perceptions, beliefs and ideas about their former leader. This is not a problem in itself, but it does mean that some of the subtler issues are left out, or not fully considered.

One important issue not taken into consideration—mainly due to the disciplinary framework—is that perceptions and beliefs, especially those about former tyrant leaders, are multiple, and that individuals often hold contradictory views on one issue, with all such views being contextual. Clark, on the other hand, looks for singular answers, that is views of Milošević which can be compartmen-

talized and categorized. To this end, she often lumps together all answers from different types of interviewees—NGO activists, intellectuals and ordinary people—in order to back up a specific point, rather than exploring the actual ideas presented by each individual.

Furthermore, Clark tries to legitimize the view of Milošević that emerges from her empirical study by attempting to de-legitimize the dominant view of Milošević as a criminal and ineffective leader. Similarly, Clark presents most western views of Milošević as views that need to be challenged, especially those which present him as a criminal leader, which, she suggests is not entirely resonant with the Serbian view.

The book contains some misguided assumptions about existing western perceptions of Milošević. What makes this dangerous is that Clark herself positions her work as 'quintessentially revisionist which goes against the grain of conventional thinking about Milošević' (p. 9). She treads dangerous ground by attacking 'liberal ideology', which she sees as responsible for Milošević's framing as a criminal leader within the western liberal framework. Undoubtedly, this only stems from Clark's critical take on current literature, rather than on sympathy for Milošević, but at times it makes for uncomfortable reading.

At times, such shortcomings tend to overshadow Clark's empirical analysis, in which interviewees paint a very detailed portrait of Milošević, with many insights into his character: he is described not only as arrogant, but 'unable to recognize his own limitations' and 'out of touch with reality' (p. 53). The author also records many interesting differences of opinion regarding Milošević before and after his death (pp. 66–7).

The final parts of the book deal with the problems of collective guilt, the ICTY and its mission of justice and peace-building in the region. Clark claims, correctly, that perceptions of Milošević by ordinary people can help us understand his legacy regarding issues such as collective guilt and denial. However, she does not establish these links clearly, and discussions on collective amnesia, for instance, suffer somewhat since these perceptions, as described by the author, are isolated from any context, such as war. To this end, the second part of the title—*The legacy of conflict in the Balkans*—is slightly misleading, as this book is more about the legacy of Milošević than that of conflict. The latter is an entirely different conceptual matter that is rarely broached here.

However, as a political analysis the book is very good, especially in places where it discusses the effects of western pressure and the prospect of EU accession on Serbian politics, resulting, for instance, in increased support for the right-wing Serbian Radical Party. The book will be most useful to political scientists and those interested in foreign policy, or political scientists who wish to have a concise exploration of the Serbian 'view from below'.

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Spanish politics: democracy after dictatorship. By Omar G. Encarnación. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2008. 192 pp. Index. £15.99. ISBN 978 0 74563 992 5.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature, complementing José Magone's *Contemporary Spanish Politics* (Routledge, 2004) and Sebastian Balfour's edited collection, *The Politics of Contemporary Spain* (Routledge, 2005).

Encarnación is initially concerned with the dynamics of Spain's post-transition settlement, exploring how such a settlement became possible after nearly four decades of Franco's authoritarian rule. He then goes on to consider the long-term impact of the settlement on the actual quality of Spanish democracy, stressing the latter's capacity to adapt to change, a trait which stemmed from the same post-transition settlement. The author ends by suggesting that the conservative strategies which lay at the heart of the democratic transition produced a political maturity which facilitated the series of radical reforms implemented by Rodríguez Zapatero's current Socialist government.

The book's nine chapters comprise a series of linked analyses of key components of contemporary Spanish democracy. These include a succinct historical overview, which emphasizes how previous attempts at democratization—most notably the Second Republic (1931–6)—were hindered by a chronic incapacity to achieve consensus among competing political forces. The need to prevent

a repetition of such confrontation lay therefore at the heart of the transition from dictatorship to democracy after Franco's death, ensuring major political parties' acceptance of the need to embrace pragmatism, rather than any defence of ideological purity. On this basis, even Franco's *bête noire*, the Spanish Communist Party, was able to gain an influential seat at the negotiating table during the transition. The importance of agency is therefore stressed, although structural factors, such as the key contribution made by Spain's relatively advanced level of social and economic development to the transition, also receive appropriate coverage.

The development of the party political system and the weakness of civil society are also covered. With respect to the latter point, the author interestingly contrasts Spaniards' apparent lack of interest in political and other social organization with the existence of a strong culture of popular protest and public demonstrations. The fact that one in four Spaniards took part in street protests following the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 stands as the most prominent example of this indication of social capital, contrasting with the relative apathy of the UK population after the London bus and tube bombings the following year.

The complex process whereby power has been devolved from Madrid to the regions also receives an admirably clear treatment. While the tensions inherent in Spain's *sui generis*—if not sometimes chaotic—process of devolution are not ignored, the author rightly acknowledges the scale of the achievements made in this area. The resulting asymmetrical nature of regional governance in Spain now undoubtedly serves as a model for other countries.

An overview of the political economy since Franco charts how the Spanish economy—the world's eighth largest—has established itself as a credible candidate for inclusion in the G8. The role played by European integration in Spain's economic transformation receives prominent attention, as do the challenges inherent in the country's status as a net contributor to EU funds from 2013.

The decision by Rodríguez Zapatero's government to introduce legislation on the investigation of all claims of human rights violations by victims and survivors of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime—The Law of Historical Memory—is examined in the penultimate chapter. Throughout the transition to democracy and beyond, a tacit agreement existed across the political spectrum, in accordance with which past political crimes were put to one side so as not to derail democracy. The emphasis was on looking forward, rather than towards the past. Encarnación describes the breakdown of this so-called 'Agreement to Forget' under the current Socialist government as being 'the most controversial component of the post-transition settlement' (p. 11). The author rejects the claims of opponents to the initiative, who have criticized Rodríguez Zapatero for unnecessarily reopening old wounds. Rather, he judges that Spanish democracy has now reached a sufficient level of maturity to ensure that the renegotiation and even the abandonment of political agreements are possible when these have outlived their usefulness.

The book concludes with a consideration of the most prominent policies introduced by Rodríguez Zapatero since the Socialist Party's general election victory in 2004. Social legislation, including the legalization of gay marriage, the attempt to reach a negotiated end to violence with the terrorist arm of the Basque nationalist movement, ETA, and the prominent role played by the question of immigration within political debate in Spain receive detailed consideration.

Drawing on a wealth of sources, the author provides a convincing, original and readable analysis of the contemporary political scene in Spain. He succeeds in his stated intention of providing the reader with a general text on contemporary Spanish politics. While I am confident that the book will prove useful to those studying Spanish politics, I would also recommend it to readers with little previous knowledge of the country, who wish to draw on the lessons provided by Spain in its remarkable transformation into a mature democracy.

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Russia and Eurasia

Oilopoly: Putin, power and the new Russia. By Marshall Goldman. Oxford: Oneworld. 2008. 256pp. Pb.: £10.99. ISBN 978 1 85168 646 9.

Oilopoly tracks the history of Russia's energy sector from its early beginnings in Baku—including a fascinating section on the Rockefellers' involvement in oil prospecting in the Russian Empire—to the dismemberment of the Yukos oil company and the formation of state-owned national 'energy champions' which have become one of the key pillars of Russia's economic, domestic and—most notoriously—foreign policy. This is the story of the growth of two dependencies: Europe's dependence on Russia's oil and gas exports, and Russia's reliance on the revenues from these exports, which have propelled the country's economic recovery since 1998. The bulk of Goldman's book is devoted to the post-Soviet period, and here the narrative is a familiar one. After privatizing the oil industry in the early 1990s, the Russian state has reasserted control of the energy sector, forced out foreign investors, and, as Goldman argues, transformed the oil and gas industries into formidable instruments of state power.

The 2008/2009 gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine would appear to vindicate Goldman's thesis that Russia is willing to use its energy resources as a source of political control and great power projection. With its natural gas and oil pipelines, Goldman argues, 'Russia has unchecked powers and influence that in a real sense exceed the military power and influence it had in the Cold War.' However, the author fails to show the political dividends of the so-called energy weapon. If profit is not the primary motivation, what are the political dividends which Russia wishes to reap from manipulating its energy supplies? Goldman is strong on capabilities, but not on intentions—and the intentions of the two national 'energy champions', Rosneft and Gazprom, are murky, ambivalent and contradictory.

At times, Goldman shines a welcome light on some of them. The book provides excellent detail of the state's attack on Yukos, the biggest private oil company, and of the failed attempt by one group of senior government officials to merge Rosneft and Gazprom into a single national energy giant. The failure to create a single state energy company suggests that the two enterprises are perhaps better seen as 'meta-state companies', rather than directly subordinated sub-departments of the state. In its recent conflict with Ukraine, Russia has shown that it is willing to lose export sales and money to put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership. However, Gazprom is also a joint-stock company with substantial debts and expectant shareholders; in analysing Gazprom's actions the profit motive cannot be totally discounted. To unpick the dense web of personal, bureaucratic and ideological interests which underpin Russia's energy policy, the book would have needed to set the history of the oil and gas sectors within the context of Russia's domestic politics, the conflicting and shared interests of its elites, and the state's overall foreign policy goals.

Goldman provides only aspects of this. He argues that energy is not merely a political and diplomatic tool, but the key to the return of Russia's great power status. The book's historical approach provides an important reminder that Russia's energy resources are not new—the major energy reserves and pipelines that drive Russia's petro-economy were all developed in the Soviet period. It is disappointing, therefore, that Goldman does not also examine the history of how the discursive underpinning of Moscow's self-image as a great power has shifted from the Soviet emphasis on industrial production and military parity with the US, to hydrocarbon reserves and the control of energy supplies. This is far from self-evident. As Pavel K. Baev from the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo pointed out in a recent study, the Soviet Union regarded its dependence on energy exports for hard currency as a weakness, not an asset, and the Soviet Union's oil and gas resources (far larger than contemporary Russia's) played no role in state ideology. Goldman, like Putin, sees Russia as an 'energy superpower', but one could also regard it as a rent-seeking petro-state. If the discursive practice of what Russians call *derzhavnost*—'greatpowerness'—could be unpacked, we would go a long way to understanding how and why Russia exploits its energy resources as it does.

The book also suffers from repetition and technical and stylistic weaknesses. Important events are at times glossed in a manner which distorts more than it reveals. Incomplete footnoting and the

absence of a bibliography are continual irritants. Goldman refers to claims that the Russian apartment bombings in 1999 may have been an inside act of provocation to furnish the pretext for the second Chechen War. These allegations have been circulated widely, but surely require a supporting reference.

Goldman has written a readable overview of Soviet/Russian oil and gas, and provides an entertaining account of the machinations and insider dealing which characterized the privatization of the oil industry, and its recapture by the state. What is lacking is an examination of the nature of power and politics in Russia, and the role of energy within this. At a time when Russia is turning off the lights across Europe, many readers, and especially policy-makers, would welcome such insights.

Alex Nice, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, UK

Russian civil–military relations: Putin's legacy. By Thomas Gomart. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2008. 126pp. Index. Pb.: $19.95, ISBN 978 0 87003 241 7.

Russian civil–military relations is a very thoughtful and intelligent analysis of a difficult and challenging subject, written by a leading specialist on Russia and its relations with the West. Thomas Gomart is director of the Russia/NIS Centre at the French Institute for International Relations in Paris and a lecturer on international affairs and geopolitics at the military school of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan. He has extensive international experience working as a visiting fellow in French, British and Russian think tanks, including the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Gomart's new book is a solid academic work based on impressive empirical material, including a large set of interviews with politicians, officers and officials, conducted in Moscow during Vladimir Putin's second presidential term.

The author manages to apply the contemporary theory of civil–military relations to the realities of today's Russia, and to produce a multidimensional analysis of Russian society. Despite concentrating on Putin's contribution to and influence on the pattern of civil–military relations, Gomart highlights the heritage of civil–military relations and attempts to reveal Russia's governing tradition and culture. The book ambitiously investigates three pivotal aspects of the relationship between Russia's civil and military spheres: first, it touches on the functional aspect of civil–military relations, in other words the chain of command or the sociology of power at the highest level; second, the work looks at political issues and decision-making methods resulting in the use of force. Finally, the work demonstrates how the division of responsibilities has affected the evolution of Russian foreign policy, Moscow's international ambitions and the country's ability to deploy force beyond its borders. Gomart associates the evolution of civil–military relations and military reform with a threat analysis, which in the case of Russia is mainly based on 'international terrorism' and NATO enlargement. The book leaves the reader with a sense of understanding the roots of the strategic culture that motivates Russia's specificity.

Gomart argues that civil–military relations affect the decision-making process within the ruling elite, as well as the links between the presidential leadership and government; the security and business communities; and society as a whole. The book focuses on the domestic angle of civil–military relations by revealing the limitations and ambitions of state institutions and individuals trying to apply civilian control over the military and security services. By introducing analysis of the security services within the paradigm of civil–military relations, Gomart expands the traditional approach beyond the Kremlin–military dualism, making his study unique among the numerous books on similar subjects. He looks with a magnifying glass into the *siloviki* (politicians from the old Soviet and post-Soviet military and security services) phenomenon, demonstrating that they do not form a corporate, homogeneous or structural group. This approach differs from the way the group has traditionally been pictured, for instance by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White in their study 'Putin's militocracy' (*Post-Soviet Affairs* 19: 4, October–December 2003, pp. 289–306), which had a tremendous impact on the assessment of the nature of Putin's regime by the experts' community. Instead, Gomart focuses on the nature of individual motivations of some key figures in the *siloviki* community around Putin and President Medvedev.

The author portraits Russia's civil–military relations as key in both anticipating the government's future developments and shaping the attitudes that should be adopted by Russia's main international partners. As international organizations, governments and NGOs are searching for the most appropriate forms and ways for cooperation in international stabilization missions, the understanding of symmetry or asymmetry of civil–military relations becomes essential in planning Russia's participation in future operations. This is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the current dynamics in Russia's political elite and Russian society in general.

Irina Isakova

Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the new geopolitics. By Bobo Lo. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2008. £18.99. ISBN 978 0 81575 340 7.

The expanded strategic partnership of Russia and China is one of the most striking features of present-day Eurasian diplomacy. Touted by Moscow and Beijing as a noticeable success in its own right and a model for a new 'global multipolar order', this partnership has inspired warnings of a full-fledged alliance aimed against Washington. *Axis of convenience* patiently sifts through the facts, examines the balance sheet, and persuasively argues that what the two powers have constructed instead is an 'axis of convenience', a limited but substantial structure of cooperation. As Bobo Lo suggests, however, this axis will become increasingly vulnerable to internal and external pressures likely to limit its scope.

Axis of convenience is a comprehensive and clearly written survey of the Sino-Russian relationship, including chapters devoted to the historical background, mutual perceptions and aims of the two parties, and the key issues that define their relationship. These issues include: the internal weakness of the Russian Far East; the shifting Sino-Russian economic and military balance; Central and East Asia; and energy. The book concludes with an examination of the partnership in light of shifting trends, concluding with a range of scenarios for future development of this alliance.

Lo carefully balances an appreciation for the accomplishments of Russian and Chinese leaders with a concern for the underlying tensions and obstacles. The two countries present their partnership as a united front, and they have real achievements to reflect their efforts: a comprehensive border agreement; a sustained structure of bilateral consultation; expanded trade; security ties; successful bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation; and some success in representing the cause of a multipolar global order in major Asian and international forums.

Yet the author argues that these ties entail a partnership that is likely to remain limited—or even erode—as China becomes a true Great Power with global capacities and interests that will necessarily confine relations with Moscow to a regional playing field. Though Russia also has major power ambitions, it has continued vulnerabilities, especially in the Far East of the country, where bad government, devastating economic changes and emigration put these resource-rich lands in a tenuous position *vis-à-vis* its larger and more dynamic neighbour.

Axis of convenience details other challenges: China's rise has inspired Russia to act as a status quo power in Asia. Moscow failed to consult Beijing before supporting the introduction of American troops into Central Asia after 9/11, and downplayed the significance of Washington's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia has flirted with Japan as an alternative to China in the plans for its Asian pipeline. Its commercial and geopolitical interests in Europe remain a priority, and Moscow's ambitions make it hard to imagine it as Beijing's junior partner. China has largely overlooked or papered over these problems, reflecting—in the author's view—the country's confidence in its own expanding power and its limited expectations from the partnership with Russia. On the all-important energy issue, Lo argues that China has approached issues of gas and oil as a consumer, while Russia sees things from the perspective of a producer and has sought to use its energy resources for geopolitical leverage.

Axis of convenience concludes by speculating on the future of an increasingly complex and potentially unstable Eurasia, examining five possible scenarios for the Sino-Russian relationship, ranging from a comprehensive strategic convergence to confrontation. Lo argues that 'strategic tension'—a withering of the partnership—is the most probable outcome. While the accomplishments achieved to

date would not wholly unravel under this scenario, the axis of convenience would be likely to come to an end. This work provides a comprehensive portrait of an important bilateral relationship under the uncertain conditions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In focusing attention squarely on the promises and challenges of Russia, China and Eurasia as a whole in the coming decade, this is a book that scholars and policy-makers should read as a way of getting beyond exaggerated hopes or fears.

Sherman Garnett, Michigan State University, USA

Middle East and North Africa

Harmonizing foreign policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East. By Mesut Özcan. Aldershot: Ashgate. 193pp. Index. £55. ISBN 978 0 75467 370 5.

In *Harmonizing foreign policy,* Mesut Özcan gives a detailed history of Turkish foreign policy with a particular focus on Ankara's policies towards the Middle East. The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of bipolarity confronted Turkey, like many other states, with the question of finding an adequate place within a new world order in the making, a question all the more crucial for Turkey due to its sensitive geostrategic position. In the 1990s, the Turkish state elite found themselves searching for a role between Europe and the Middle East, having since then gained more self-confidence in adopting an active and constructive role in the Middle East. Turkey's current Middle East policy is not just important for its regional vision and security needs, but also extremely relevant in terms of the country's relations with the West in general and the European Union in particular. *Harmonizing foreign policy* analyses Ankara's foreign policy towards the Middle East and the changes this policy has undergone as a result of Turkey's EU candidature, as well as the question of to what extent Turkish and EU policies towards the region are harmonized.

The change in Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has generated debates, with some seeing Turkey's involvement in the Middle East since the 1990s primarily as a result of security concerns. Özcan argues that Turkey's foreign policy towards the region changed dramatically after 1999, parallel to the decrease in security threats against Turkey and its candidature to the EU. In order to analyse the extent of harmonization between the policies of Turkey and the EU towards the Middle East, Özcan reviews theories of integration and the arguments and concepts regarding the Europeanization of Turkey's foreign policy. The book provides a very detailed coverage of theoretical issues regarding Europeanization, yet only one relatively short chapter is dedicated to its analysis. While the first two chapters give the integration of the theoretical and conceptual framework, the reader has to wait until chapter eight for the actual analysis. Here, the change in Turkey's Middle East policy is discussed within the context of different schemes of Europeanization such as adaptation and socialization. However, the empirical background chapters only briefly discuss domestic factors, which are among the most significant issues that effected the dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Overall, *Harmonizing foreign policy* is a comprehensive and illuminating assessment of Turkey's foreign policy, which investigates the impact of Europeanization on the substance and making of Turkish policy towards the Middle East. Özcan's book provides a good case-study, and an extensive review of the development of the EU's common foreign policy-making and its impact on both EU member and membership candidate states' policies.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa: altered states, ordinary miracles. By Richard Dowden. London: Portobello Books. 2008. 448pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84627 154 0.

Given the number of books written on Africa, there ought to be but one criterion for potential readers: how much does it tell me that I do not already know? On that score, a great number of volumes produced by journalists do not add much to what they have written in the press already, but are mere compilations of previously published articles. When they first appeared in newspapers or magazines they had the freshness of current events. When they are reprinted as books they are no better than reheated food served cold. The news is old, the focus is narrow and the insight minimal. Richard Dowden, by common consent one of Britain's best Africa journalists, avoids this trap. His book is based not so much on the pieces he wrote during his career but rather on the experience behind the investigative work that informed those articles. Therefore, the book is not just a selection of some of his pieces. It is a reflection on what he thought, and felt, when he wrote these articles. And that reflection is informed by a solid reading of the scholarly work on Africa that has appeared in the past two decades.

One of the hallmarks of *Africa: altered states, ordinary miracles* is that it is set within the context of the author's personal trajectory into, and involvement with, Africa. Indeed, the book is framed by personal recollections of the time spent on the continent and of the people who have marked his encounter with it. This approach, which ran the risk of turning the book into a personal journey, instead turns out to be a way of making overt the personal and the subjective in order to better illuminate the analytical. The volume opens with Dowden's first work experience as a teacher in Uganda, and ends with his attendance at the funeral of the headmaster of the school in which he worked. The story has come full circle: the young idealist volunteer turned seasoned journalist ponders on the complex ways in which Africa connects its past with its possible futures.

Africa: altered states, ordinary miracles is divided into country chapters, each one linked to a visit made by the author. Every chapter is constructed similarly: a part that reproduces the journalism underlying that particular journey and a further series of reflections based on the analysis triggered by that original piece. At best, as in the pieces on the countries the author knows best (like Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe or Nigeria), there is an immediacy to the information and a sharpness to the insights offered. Where the author does not know a country so well (like Angola), the chapter is a somewhat more stilted patchwork of basic history, journalistic accounts of key incidents and a somewhat restricted personal experience. Of course, since no one could claim to know all of Africa equally well this is to be expected, and the effort to provide the reader with a broad vision of all parts of the continent is to be applauded. Still, it makes for a fairly disjointed panorama. The book is perhaps better read as a collection of country experiences than as an analysis of Africa's post-colonial socio-economic and political dynamics.

The great strength of this volume is its lively prose that combines empathy and hard-nosed investigation, and casts a sympathetic but critical gaze upon what has happened in Africa since independence. Dowden has achieved that most difficult of tasks, which consists of making us simultaneously see, feel and understand settings very different from ours. There are few better books around when it comes to providing the interested reader with a sense of what today's Africa is like. And perhaps that is the greatest service that can be rendered today, when clichés about Africa are no less numerous than they were a hundred years ago.

However, for those who would like to understand better the processes that account for the continent's dynamics, this book is somewhat frustrating. Although the author does occasionally discuss in greater depth some of the key issues, there is no clear analytical account of some of the most puzzling aspects of contemporary African realities. Why is there so much violence? Why is there no development? Why is ethnicity used so brutally by the political elites? Why is there so much poverty in a continent blessed with natural and mineral resources? What, if any, is the connection between all these questions? There may not be a single, or simple, explanation for all of these, but there ought at least to be some indication of what the key explanatory factors might be. Perhaps a thematic chapter

and an analytical conclusion might have helped connect the country chapters in a more coherent and systematic fashion.

Patrick Chabal, King's College London, UK

Crouching tiger, hidden dragon?: Africa and China. Edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 2008. 480pp. Pb.: £34.95. ISBN 978 1 8691 4150 9.

China and Africa have been acquainted for centuries, but their relationship has seen the glare of the international spotlight only in the last decade. This new, and not entirely welcome, international attention reflects the recent scope and dynamism of China–Africa ties, which now extend across the continent's diverse regions and involve a growing range of dimensions—many once dominated by the West.

Setting aside the book's unfortunate (and indeed perplexing) title, *Crouching tiger, hidden dragon?: Africa and China* is an important addition to the growing body of work seeking to make sense of the implications of this development for Africa and China, as well as for other international relationships and issues. Edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, experts at the University of Leeds and Stellenbosch University respectively, the volume includes chapters from these distinguished scholars and more than a dozen others, many of whom write from Africa. If, as Ampiah and Naidu argue, most recent work on China in Africa has pursued one of two lines of enquiry—asking either if the costs of China's growing footprint will outweigh its benefits for Africa, or to which extent China's Africa policy has a geopolitical impetus towards displacing western interests on the continent— they assign themselves and their contributors a different task. The question they ask is how can Africa 'build a relationship with China that can promote mutual economic benefits and development' (p. 5).

South African scholar, Garth Le Pere, provides a foundation for the book's answer to this question, putting forward a number of recommendations in his chapter. For one, he urges improved multilateral cooperation among African states, China and other key actors on the continent in such areas as development aid and transparency in extractive industries. Further, he argues for developing the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) into a leading coordinating mechanism for managing Sino-African relations. Finally, he sees advantages in the rapid expansion of China's economic influence as an added source of pressure on African governments to improve their countries' regulatory and governance capacity, particularly in strategic sectors targeted by external investors, such as energy, fisheries and mining.

An idea of what might be required to achieve these goals is found in chapters describing the history and direction of China's evolving relationships with nine African countries across four African sub-regions. Though these case-studies offer ample evidence for the appeal of doing business with China, potential pitfalls also loom large; African leaders from Joseph Kabila to Omar Bongo have embraced Chinese investment and find political utility in paying tribute to the Chinese development model. Without institutional reforms as urged by Le Pere, however, the analyses suggest that China's economic role risks engendering new dependencies and inequities in these countries. Western donors have of course raised concerns abou the implications of debt sustainability of Congo's minerals-for-infrastructure deal with China, concerns heightened by recent falls in mineral prices. Furthermore, while some suggest that revenues from exports to China may speed diversification of some economies, this cannot be achieved where governments sustain predatory and non-transparent practices. Even where strong governance capacity exists, China's growing influence can have mixed economic and policy outcomes. With China's involvement in Nigeria's oil and gas sectors, for example, domestic energy delivery may improve, but the flood of Chinese investment risks political and economic corrosion.

Given the institutional weaknesses and other challenges to African countries' ability to define and assert their interests *vis-à-vis* China, a continent-wide approach that would pool the collective experiences and needs of African countries seems to make sense. But, as this book's analyses show, this is a tall order. FOCAC could be made a more permanent forum—through the creation of a FOCAC

Secretariat. However, even with improved Africa-wide coordination it seems unlikely that China, with its preference for using bilateral ties as the fulcrum of its foreign relationships, would allow a multilateral structure to become its leading interlocutor on the continent. Moreover, as Suisheng Zhao from the University of Denver points out in his chapter, since China's global economic role has grown, Chinese foreign policy now involves many stakeholders. The plurality of interests on the Chinese side certainly adds complexity to any coordinated approach to Sino-African relations. In addition, it is unclear whether a country like Sudan, with which China has an important economic relationship reinforced by Beijing's rhetoric of sovereignty and non-interference, would cooperate with such an effort. These and other issues suggest that bilateral relations will continue to drive Sino-African relations and that it will be up to individual African governments to 'ensure that the national interests of their countries are not subordinated to those of China' (p. 335).

This book goes some way towards addressing the issue of how Africa's relationship can be 'win-win', as the Chinese themselves declare they would have it. More extensive analysis of the opportunities African countries have to leverage their assets in promoting their national interests in their relationships with China, including how they may have done so in the past, would have made the volume even stronger. Although the book shows that Africa need not be 'a passive agent in [the China–Africa] relationship' (p. 5), it is China and its role in Africa that still dominate the story it tells.

Carla Freeman, Johns Hopkins University, USA

China returns to Africa: a rising power and a continent embrace. Edited by Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. London: Hurst. 2008. 382pp. Index. Pb.: £25.00. ISBN 978 1 85065 886 3.

China into Africa: trade, aid and influence. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2008. 338pp. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 978 0 81577 561 4.

As global commodity prices peaked in early 2008, so did the output of books, papers and journal articles from conferences and seminars on China and Africa, which was the fashionable Africa-related topic until recently. These two books both draw from such conferences. *China returns to Africa* draws originally from papers presented at a July 2006 conference at the University of Cambridge that was partly funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Africa Research Analysts; *China into Africa* from a conference almost a year later (June 2007) at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Both books conclude that China's re-engagement in Africa since the late 1990s has been impelled firstly by China's need to obtain African oil and other mineral resources to sustain its expanding economy.

China returns to Africa suffers from a serious time lag between when the draft papers were presented at the University of Cambridge, the writing of the foreword in September 2007 and publication in mid-2008. Many of the chapters have already dated and were anyhow updated versions of earlier work (Andrea Goldstein's, Dennis Tull's and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira's to name a few). This book is really a bridge between much of this first wave of impressionistic literature drawing heavily on secondary sources and the results of some more recent field work that has not been repackaged. The chapters that stick out in this book are by authors who really have been on the ground, such as Deborah Bräutigam on Chinese business and African industrial development (looking at Nigeria and Mauritius); Gregor Dobler on Chinese businesses in Namibia; Daniel Large on China's evolving relations with Sudan; and Jørgen Carling and Heidi Østbø Haugen on Chinese migrants in Cape Verde. These chapters illustrate just how complex the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa is becoming. Daniel Large charts the evolution of China's Sudan policy including the context for the Chinese opening a liaison office in Juba in southern Sudan in late 2008 (which happened after this book was published) in case the South decides in a referendum to secede and become an independent state. To me, this book illustrates why over-simplified generalities on China in Africa are counter-productive and Chinese engagement is never static.

China into Africa was published in late 2008 and so has dated less. It is a better-edited book, although it lacks the depth of some of the chapters in *China returns to Africa* and was edited with an

eye on drawing out lessons for a new US administration in 2009. It is also relevant in pointing out challenges for China as it prepares for its fourth Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Cairo in November 2009. In *China into Africa*, Deborah Bräutigam's chapter on Chinese foreign aid shows that there are no official figures for the aid and that only a tiny proportion of it would qualify as what Americans define as 'foreign aid'. Under such terms, Chinese aid commitments to Africa are small compared with those of OECD countries. As in *China returns to Africa*, it is the chapters by the experts on Chinese involvement in Africa that attract attention. Deborah Bräutigam's work once more stands out, but there is also an unusual chapter by Joshua Eisenman—'China's political outreach to Africa'—that examines the Communist Party of China's (CPC) International Department (ID) and its affiliated organizations, and how they engage African political parties. Despite its outreach, the CPC-ID remains among the least understood organs of China's foreign policy system and Eisenman throws some light on how it works. Christopher Clapham in *China returns to Africa* reminds us that the reason 'why China's involvement in Africa has been so widely welcomed and readily accommodated has been [that] it fits so neatly into the familiar patterns of rentier statehood and politics with which Africa's rulers have been accustomed to maintain themselves' (p. 364). Clapham may be partly correct but Rotberg is also right in *China returns to Africa* in concluding that 'China is transforming Africa, for good or ill' (p. 18).

Alex Vines, Chatham House, UK

Gulliver's troubles: Nigeria's foreign policy after the Cold War. Edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 2008. Pb.: £38.50. ISBN 978 1 86914 148 6.

This book is a rich collection of 16 essays on Nigeria's foreign policy written by internationally acclaimed academics and distinguished Nigerian diplomats. The metaphor in the title is apt, with Nigeria as Gulliver the giant, constrained by domestic weaknesses and challenges. Indeed, the book is premised on the argument that an effective post-Cold War foreign policy must be built on a sound domestic base, which promotes both effective economic development and democratic stability. This innovative approach leads the contributors to argue for a redefinition of Nigeria's foreign policy and a new strategic vision, so that Nigeria can achieve the middle power status to which it aspires.

This underlying theme is supported by a detailed analysis of the key elements of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. *Gulliver's troubles* documents the successes and failures of this policy, describing its continuity and how it is built on concentric circles of interest and influence—starting with the immediate neighbourhood, West Africa, spreading outward to encompass the whole African continent, and finally reaching out to the rest of the world. The book follows this structure with chapters discussing Nigeria's involvement in conflict resolution in West Africa, and Nigeria's role on the wider African stage, outlining the country's particular contribution to the construction of the new pan-African institutions, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development. There are also useful chapters on key bilateral relationships—with the UK, the US, France and China—as well as Nigeria's role in the wider international world, focusing on its relations with the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the European Union.

Building on the expert contributions, the editorial line in the book is persuasive. It argues that Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions have been constrained thus far by a shoestring budget and a legion of unresolved internal problems—not least the challenges of building a democratic state and tackling 'dysfunctional inequalities' in society and the economy. Consequently, the editors assert that Nigeria is 'punching below its weight'. But, paradoxically, the book demonstrates that Nigeria has conducted a fairly robust foreign policy in the past.

The weakness of the book is that it fails to offer detailed suggestions on the form and content of the new foreign policy architecture which it argues for—apart from the need for a more professional diplomatic service. The new government, elected in 2007, has redefined the philosophical basis of its foreign policy as one to be built on 'citizen diplomacy'. It remains to be seen what that might mean in practice and whether it will fulfil the new strategic vision which this book calls for.

That one weakness aside, this is a strong book and a welcome addition to the literature. It is meaty, readable, thoroughly researched and provides real insight into how Nigeria has conducted its external relations. It deserves to be read by all students of international relations, not only observers of Nigeria or Africa specialists. Diplomats and international policy-makers will also find this book worthwhile and enlightening. Collectively, the essays provide a valuable contribution to the understanding not only of Nigeria's foreign policy, but of Nigeria itself and its self-image as a leading power in Africa and beyond.

Lillian Wong, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Becoming Somaliland. By Mark Bradbury. London: James Currey. 2008. 271pp. Index. Pb.: £12.95. ISBN 978 1 84701 310 1.

Becoming Somaliland is not just a book devoted to the unrecognized north-west Somali regional entity of Somaliland and its political history over more than a decade of existence, it is also an avowedly pro-Somaliland work arguing the case for the region's international recognition. As such, it automatically opens itself to a pro and con critique. Bradbury factors in the unending elusiveness of achieving region-wide stability along the Somali coast, and how Somaliland may offer an alternative modality to years of failure spent trying to put a Mogadishu-based Somalia back together again. However, there is a certain uniqueness to the Somaliland 'success story', which may demonstrate its limitations both as a panacea for the rest of the region's problems and as a model to be pursued. For example, Somaliland is a kinship state narrowly based on the Isaaq clan, rendering it a distinct political community within the greater Somali region. This is its strength in terms of its 'national' cohesion and staying power as an unrecognized republic. It is simultaneously its weakness, given the multi-clan kinship dynamics at the core of the Somali region's violently fragmented statelessness, resulting, for example, in the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime.

Nevertheless, Somaliland is a fact on the ground. It represents a zone of stability in an otherwise destabilized region crying out for something different beyond the wasteful repetition of trying to rebuild a Mogadishu-based Somalia. Moreover, this challenge is further complicated by the Islamist ascendancy within southern Somalia, sucking Somalis into the interregional vortex of America's 'war on terror' to the detriment of attempts to stabilize the south. Somaliland's relative stability, therefore, cannot be simply ignored, especially if there is an assumption that eventually, a newly rebuilt Somali state should be inclusive of Somaliland. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of internationally recognized Somaliland sovereignty and independence, it would seem as if a role for Somaliland in nurturing regional stability would have to be factored into the greater Somali equation. In any case, since the African Union state system is predicated on regionalized continental integration, the people of Somaliland will eventually have to come to terms with these larger integrationist imperatives. Therefore, if Bradbury's comprehensive history does nothing other than liberate Somaliland from the counterproductive oblivion of being ignored in the greater Somali equation, he has rendered a useful service to those concerned with this troubled region of Africa.

The greater regional context of Somaliland is provided in the first chapter, focusing on the people of the Somali region and their culture, followed by an account of the rise and fall of the Somali state—a critical dimension inasmuch as Somalia was an amalgamation of a briefly independent former British Somaliland protectorate prior to its union with the former Italian colonial south. In spite of what is considered a historical technicality within the conventional African political imagination about territorial integrity, the notion that Somaliland does not in fact represent a secession has thus far not gained much traction within the rest of Africa. The fact that this amalgamation never really gelled partly underlies the inter-Somali regional politics, which ultimately led to the birth of the Somali National Movement (SNM) as the insurgent vanguard precursor to Somaliland. Given the singular nature of the brutal repression visited upon the north and the unpromising prospects for north-westerners in a regionally reconciled, reconstituted Somalia, the SNM's constituency chose to opt out of Somalia, an expression of popular sovereignty in a bottom-up groundswell that the SNM could not ignore. Isaaq clan dominance is a strength of Somaliland in terms of the homogeneity it

brings to the foundations of the state, while reflecting the wider Somali regional challenge in accommodating clan diversity, in view of tensions in Somaliland's non-Isaaq eastern region and border with Puntland.

The consolidation of Somaliland was by no means without its own violent power struggles as the republic grappled with a transition from reliance on traditional approaches to governance and conflict resolution to democratized modernity. Bradbury covers this comprehensively in several chapters, ranging from 'The political foundations of Somaliland' to the contemporary 'Practice of government', concluding with 'Rethinking the future'. Clearly, given the most recent collapse of the Transitional Federal Government amid the Islamist re-ascendancy of the Islamic Courts Union and the Al-Shabaab insurgents, major rethinking is long overdue in Africa and in the international community about how to stabilize the Somali region. Bradbury is very clear on the need to recognize Somaliland. The question is whether and to what degree recognition should occur within a context of wider regional stability. Biased though Bradbury is, the release of *Becoming Somaliland* could not have been better timed to stimulate this rethink.

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Crude continent: the struggle for Africa's oil prize. By Duncan Clarke. London: Profile Books. 2008. 562pp. £35.00. ISBN 9 781 84668 097 7.

Most literature on African oil has come from academics or journalists. Now, at last, an industry insider, Rhodesian-born Duncan Clarke, with three decades' experience in the industry, has written a 562-page panorama, *Crude continent*. This, and his flat rejection of the 'resource curse' thesis, which states that natural resources like oil tend to (or can) harm countries that produce them, are welcome—the thesis needs a challenge from a fresh angle.

Clarke points out that not enough work has been done in linking African corporate history and broader African historiography: he aims to make good this deficiency by providing critical industry details—who did what, when and where, among the 500-odd oil companies involved in the game (he expects there to be 750 by 2020). Clarke provides a wealth of detail, and an overview of the modern oil scramble from around 1957 and its antecedents.

The wealth of company history he gives is certainly useful—but it is little more than long series of lists turned into prose: lists of deals, companies, licensing rounds, statistics and so on. Even though much of this information is free on the internet, there is merit in collecting it, thematically and geographically. Unfortunately, the facts are rarely joined with new insights: Clarke's short, potted political histories of oil-rich countries contain little that is new. What we really need is an oil insider's insights: what drives the real African oil elites, and how do they interact? What is the role and relevance of national oil companies in Africa, in their varying political contexts? How does the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation mesh with Nigerian politics? What are the politics of Angola's state-owned oil company Sonangol's recent role as a de facto sovereign wealth fund? And so on. Clarke avoids such questions, and provides no interviews with key players. He has worked with Samuel Dossou, Gabonese President Omar Bongo's oil adviser, named in the profoundly important Elf Affair. Yet he fails to probe Dossou's Geneva-based Petrolin group. He notes, interestingly, that the state's share in oilfields is being farmed out to a private company, Tulipe, whose shareholders are 'said to be local businessmen'. But why? Who are the businessmen? To say Gabon 'appears implicated in the Elf scandals' (p. 162) is not good enough. For an industry player to hold back juicy facts is understandable—but then why write a book?

Clarke says the 'oil curse' thesis is 'ultra-fashionable … sexy, tabloid-driven and vacuous (p. 540) … shallow and misplaced, devoid of historical perspective' (p. 524). Unfortunately, he fails to make a solid case, instead setting up a series of straw men. For example, he says problems stemming from oil are not all the oil companies' fault, and poverty in African oil states is closely related to embedded African realities. Correct—but few analysts 'skirt around' these issues as Clarke says they do. 'Few seem aware of the many past remedies that have failed', he adds (p. 47). Not so. To argue that Ricardo Soares's 'successful failed states' analysis of Africa's petro-states (*Oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea*,

Hurst, 2007) 'finds state companies almost redundant' (p. 537) is to misrepresent Soares. The oil chapter in Tony Hodges's *Angola: the anatomy of an oil state* (Indiana University Press, 2003) is, Clarke says, 'mostly' about mismanagement of oil funds drawn from Global Witness exposés (p. 39). False: Clarke misrepresents Hodges's fine book.

He plays down the enclave nature of oil industries: the enclave problem is 'a management problem in state formation, not an inherent characteristic of oil itself' (p. 529). Partly true, but he gives us no new insights into possible alternative solutions. Clarke rightly argues that the phenomenon of the 'Dutch disease' might be fixed with good policies—but does not ask why these policies are rarely applied successfully. Similarly, he notes that malformed tax rights—a central part of 'oil curse' theories—are present not only in the oil states, which is true but does not explain why oil cannot make things worse.

Facts given in the book are suspect. Clarke says Nigeria's territorial claims on Equatorial Guinea, on a border that runs through ExxonMobil's giant Zafiro field, have been 'brushed aside' (p. 144). False: the two countries settled this part of their border, and divide Zafiro's revenues. Nigeria's giant billion-barrel 'Bongo' field (pp. 418 and 426) should be 'Bonga'. He credits a Croatian firm, INA-Naftaplin, with holding a stake in Angola's deep-water 'golden' block 17. It never did. These are big errors; there are plenty more.

Near the end, Clarke says we must now properly identify 'the entire range of direct and indirect economic and social benefits' (p. 540) that flow from oil: the capital inflows, foreign exchange inputs, employment creation, indirect supply chain effects, local asset growth, technology transfers, regional benefits, fiscal funding, multiplier effects. Few if any of these, he says, come into the predominant accounting balances on the 'oil curse'. But why should they? The important question is whether, and to what extent, the 'oil curse' exists. Clarke's one-sided labour-intensive exercise would not answer that. Cross-country statistical analyses and their like, backed up with specific analyses from the real world, are better approaches. More often than not, the analyses find evidence of an oil curse. Not all do, but we know that already. The world still awaits the definitive insider's account of Africa's oil.

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Asia and Pacific

Descent into chaos: how the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. By Ahmed Rashid. London: Allen Lane. 2008. 484pp. Index. ISBN 978 0 7139 9843 6.

No visitor to Pakistan and Afghanistan today can ignore the depth of public hostility to the presence of western troops in the region or the insistent claim that these troops are all that stand in the way of restoring order to these troubled lands. Yet no visitor is likely either to escape the angry charge that it was the hasty decision by the West, and especially America, to 'walk away' from the region after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 which is chiefly to blame for the chaos that now engulfs it.

Such contradictions rarely mar the thinking of Ahmed Rashid, the veteran Pakistani journalist and unrivalled expert on the regional politics of South and Central Asia. In his latest analysis of the US-led war against militant Islam since 9/11, Rashid makes a strong and unequivocal case in favour of more, rather than less, international intervention, but only on condition that such intervention is supported by a 'new global compact'—involving the United States, the European Union, NATO and the United Nations—dedicated to settling key regional disputes between neighbouring states and to a sustained programme of education and job creation aimed at strengthening national institutions. Indeed, he argues, it was precisely the lack of such commitment that accounts for the 'social stagnation and state failure', which now imperil the region.

For Rashid, such neglect was far from inadvertent. On the contrary, the author marshals strong evidence to suggest that, in fact, it was deliberately fostered by US neo-conservative policy-makers

under former US President George W. Bush. The neo-conservatives' aim, the author declares, was to actively manipulate international sympathy in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States to justify the invasion of Iraq, an obsession with catastrophic consequences. Not only did it undermine the process of rebuilding Afghanistan, it also rekindled the Taleban insurgency across South and Central Asia and has triggered worldwide Muslim anger against America for its perceived 'crusade' against Islam. Together, these developments promise to unleash a crisis that Rashid warns could be far graver and wider than any provoked by the attacks of 2001.

Rashid's damning indictment of western strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is supported by a staggering wealth of detail, much of which rests on his privileged access to key players and on first-hand reporting. This material points conclusively to the colossal damage that flowed from the preferences of a group of conservative policy-makers in Washington, who legalized the authority of local warlords in Afghanistan and subcontracted the fight against Islamic extremism to a double-dealing military-dominated regime in Pakistan. According to Rashid, these decisions were governed primarily by calculations judged at the time to be the most cost-effective for the United States, but which have since exacted a heavy price most directly borne by the peoples of a region traumatized long before 9/11.

Rashid is well placed to make these judgements. In a coruscating account of the rise of the 'one-billion-dollar warlords' in Afghanistan he brings to bear his vast knowledge of a country on which he has reported since 1979 to show how US policy-makers, aided and abetted by 'inefficient, ineffective, and self-defeating' US intelligence officials (p. 131), doled out cash to unaccountable military commanders in return for their agreement to go after Al-Qaeda. By doing so, he argues, the United States effectively reneged on its promise to liberate Afghanistan and rebuild its institutions. Instead, it turned to its real objective—the hunt for Al-Qaeda—and relied on warlords as 'a cheap and beneficial way' to secure it. The cost to Afghanistan was, however, incalculable. The national government led by President Hamid Karzai was terminally crippled and its ministries riddled with corruption. Security was comprehensively undermined and the country's reconstruction gravely compromised. Before long these conditions proved ideal for the Taleban, who regrouped across the border in Pakistan, to make a fresh bid for power.

The United States' short-sighted policies were replicated in Pakistan, where cash was directed into the coffers of the military leadership under President Pervez Musharraf in exchange for his cooperation. Confident of the Bush administration's lack of interest in nation-building or political reform, Pakistan's military establishment set about implementing a carefully crafted policy of duplicity, which involved surrendering high-value Al-Qaeda suspects to meet the United States' core objective, while ensuring maximum protection for local pro-Taleban groups that had long served the army as strategic assets against India.

Although Rashid devotes relatively less attention to the states of Central Asia than to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the thrust of his argument is clear: nothing short of a genuinely holistic approach will contain Islamic extremism in the region. As he amply demonstrates, just as the failure of policies in Afghanistan had hastened the momentum of the Taleban insurgency in Pakistan, any delay in reforming Pakistan's militarized state and curbing its Islamist bias is bound to embolden extremist groups intent on exploiting the political vacuum created by despotic regimes in Central Asia.

Given Rashid's unusual prescience in highlighting the dangers presented by the Taleban regime a decade ago, his warnings should be treated with the utmost urgency.

Farzana Shaikh, Chatham House

Korea. By Christoph Bluth. Cambridge: Polity. 2008. 204 pp. Index. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 978 0 74563 357 2.

In rhetoric venomous even by Pyongyang's famously hyperbolic standards, *Rodong Sinmun*, daily paper of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, on 19 January 2009 warned 'the Lee Myung-bak group'—better known as the duly elected government of South Korea—that 'our guns and bayonets … are aimed at their throats'. Two days earlier, a spokesman of the general staff of the Korean People's Army

appeared on North Korean television to declare that 'a war … can neither be averted nor avoided'. Korea thus seems a natural candidate for a short book in Polity's series 'Hot Spots in Global Politics', which has covered Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel/Palestine, all currently a lot hotter than Korea; and Northern Ireland, at last mercifully cool. Korea is an oddly back-burner sort of a crisis: armed to the teeth, with the North forever breathing fire—and yet at peace for over half a century since the 1950–53 Korean War, barring the odd skirmish and anxious moment. But complacency is unwise. Even if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) might just be seeking Barack Obama's attention, its pointedly informing the US scholar Selig S. Harrison that it has weaponized 30.8 kilograms of plutonium is a stark reminder that risk remains very real on the peninsula.

From a background in European security issues, Christoph Bluth has in recent years added a Korean string to his bow. With this book, he offers an 'analytical history' (p. 6). After looking at partition and war, two chapters trace the divergent postwar internal developments: North Korea's 'long march to ruin' versus the South's progress from dictatorship to democracy. Shifting to security aspects, three chapters cover US–DPRK relations and the first nuclear crisis; Seoul's 'sunshine' policy (1998–2007); and the ongoing second nuclear crisis. A tally of military confrontation follows: conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles. The final chapter uses IR theory to discuss *inter alia* the paradox whereby Kim Jong-Il has managed to parlay his quasi-failed state's weakness into great bargaining strength.

All this will be familiar to specialists, but for the neophyte, Bluth gives a good introduction to current Korean security issues. Yet the tang of *kimchi* is missing. Adrian Buzo's *The making of modern Korea* (Routledge, 2007) conveys a richer sense of the Korean question in all its historical-political complexity; as does Charles Armstrong's more sociological *The Koreas* (Routledge, 2007). This may be unfair, for Bluth's remit is avowedly narrower. Yet to grasp Korean textures in all their specific intricacy, a wider optic is advisable.

This book is best read alongside other recent works. One useful supplement, though on its own a far from balanced diet, is Glyn Ford's *North Korea on the brink* (Pluto, 2008), which explores Pyongyang's perspective. In International Relations literature, Hazel Smith's edited *Reconstituting Korean security* (United Nations University Press, 2007) should also be read by anyone wanting to savour the full ferment of current debates over North Korea.

A glossary would help Bluth's book; a term such as LWR (light water reactor) appears without explication in the otherwise useful chronology. Page 33 reports the North's 'completion of privatization' in 1958, which should, of course, be collectivization.

Students in particular will welcome this timely book. Though untempted by dove delusions, Bluth accepts that engagement is the only way to go. But neither stick nor carrot seems to work with North Korea, which continues to elude and defy 20 years after most such regimes bit the dust. Given Kim Jong-il's recent illness, the question of how or whether this rogue state will ever come in from the cold may soon be of more than academic interest.

Aidan Foster-Carter

Butcher and bolt. By David Loyn. London: Hutchinson. 2008. 352pp. Index. £18.99. ISBN 9 780 09192 140 8.

Butcher and bolt puts the current Afghan war into a 200-year historical perspective and comes close to demonstrating that wars fought by foreign invaders in Afghanistan are destined to be lost. The historical evidence presented here suggests that a combination of the clan and tribal loyalties of Afghans, their fighting spirit and the country's remorseless terrain lay behind the earlier foreign defeats.

Taking its title from what its author, David Loyn, tells us was British India's crude strategy at the time, the book retells the stories of three Anglo-Afghan wars fought between the 1830s and 1890s, relying on published works rather than fresh research. Loyn juxtaposes these nineteenth-century engagements with more recent ones: between the Soviet army and Afghan *mujahedin* in the 1980s; the intra-*mujahedin* battles in the early 1990s that followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces; the Taleban–*mujahedin* conflict of the mid-1990s; and the US-led engagement against Taleban forces which followed

the 9/11 attacks and which continues today under NATO's umbrella. In doing so, Loyn draws on his own first-hand experience as a BBC reporter covering several of the key battles.

There may no direct comparison between battles in which British soldiers rode horseback while camels and elephants bore their supplies, and contemporary debates about whether NATO forces are equipped with the best armoured vehicles or have enough helicopters for their needs. Yet both nineteenth- and twenty-first-century episodes lead to the conclusions that Afghanistan's terrain demands very particular transport and weaponry, and that the war being fought today is no less challenging than the earlier wars. Almost 12,000 camels died of food and water shortages in the assault by 45,000 British soldiers on Kandahar in 1878, which gives some idea of the scale of the second Anglo-Afghan war, while Loyn calls the war of 1839–42 'the worst disaster suffered by the British during the whole period of the Empire in Asia' (p. 51).

The nineteenth-century wars arose from Britain's determination to defend its Indian colony from invasion, notably by an expansionist Russia, though an even earlier objective had been to thwart Napoleon, who at one time was expected to attempt an invasion of India via Herat and Kandahar. A particularly interesting section of the book tells how Afghanistan's borders were drawn as a consequence of the 'great game' played out between British India and the Russian Empire. In 1873, Britain and Russia agreed to keep out of Afghanistan, effectively defining it as a buffer state and condemning it to be the scene of a late twentieth-century proxy war when Soviet forces, in breach of the 1873 deal, entered the country in 1979.

'As usual Afghanistan was not consulted about its fate' (p. 96), writes Loyn of the 1873 accord and he could have said the same about later episodes in Afghanistan's history when the country was 'a pawn in someone else's game' (p. 261). Place names familiar from the news today, like Helmand and Sangin, had been scenes of British battles against Afghan defenders in the 1840s and 1870s, and there are many other parallels over the 200 years of conflict that the book covers. Loyn tells us that it was nineteenth-century Islamic fundamentalists, or Wahhabists, who 'prepared to die for a cause bigger than Afghan nationalism' (p. 47) and committed to 'the duty of fighting a holy war against unbelievers' (p. 91) who led resistance to foreign incursions. They operated from camps not unlike those later set up by Al-Qaeda and were, for all intents and purposes, an earlier incarnation of Al-Qaeda.

As early as the 1860s, Russia's southern commander urged Britain to make common cause with Russia against Islamism, which, in his opinion, was the only real threat to British rule of India. Demonstrating how influential the British were in determining who ruled Afghanistan, Loyn tells us that many Afghan leaders—or warlords in twenty-first-century terminology—ended up living in India as pensioners of the British when they no longer served imperial interests.

When, more than a century later, it was the Russians' turn to try to subdue the Afghans, they fared little better than the British. For Mikhail Gorbachev, Afghanistan was a 'bleeding wound'; others called it 'Russia's Vietnam'. Loyn suggests Afghanistan was a crucible for three of the world's 'big ideas': 'Communism and Islamism had clearly failed, now Democracy has its turn' (p. 271), though not helped by the extent of corruption and the fact that both Afghan sides in the current war are fuelled by a trade in narcotics.

It could be argued that little is served by calling on history to inform present-day strategy. This reviewer believes there is plenty to be gained from studying past successes and failures and recommends Loyn's well-researched digest as an aid to a greater understanding of contemporary Afghanistan.

Nicholas Nugent

North America

The American civilizing process. By Stephen Mennell. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2007. 388pp. Index. £19.99. ISBN 978 0 74563 209 4.

This work of immense scope, insight and erudition by a major figure in sociology is modelled on Norbert Elias's study of 'the civilizing process'—the interweaving of the rise of state monopolies on violence and taxation, domestic pacification, growing economic interconnectedness, and closer identi-

fication with others in the same society, which led Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to regard themselves as more civilized than previous generations and others around them. The organization of Mennell's argument is indebted to that earlier account. Popular meanings of civilization are discussed in the opening two chapters. Four chapters follow that are devoted, in turn, to the evolution of manners, 'American aristocracies', attitudes to violence, and market society. State formation, territorial expansion and internal integration are considered in chapters seven, eight and nine. The last three chapters deal respectively with social inequalities, religiosity and America's global role.

American exceptionalism is a recurrent theme in the discussion. Unlike the European states, the US did not come up against equally powerful states in its initial phase of expansion—nor did circumstances change fundamentally in the period after national territory had been consolidated. This peculiar trajectory of development shaped initial perceptions of its place in the world that remain influential today. In more recent times, disparities of power and wealth have not made it easy for large sections of the American public to understand different cultures, or indeed to see themselves as distant strangers often see them. High levels of inequality have created immense social distance between 'the established and the outsiders'. America's global role has been scarred by the rampant lack of interest in the 'wider ethical considerations regarding the consequences of … actions', whether their authors are individuals, governments or business corporations, perhaps most evident in successive policy stances on global environmental degradation. A relatively weak sense of the public interest explains the unusual influence of sectional economic interests on foreign policy, which has long been combined with patriotic symbols that secure a 'we feeling' and 'collective self-satisfaction' in the face of sharp regional diversities and growing economic inequalities.

The dangers of exaggerating the differences between the US and European societies are also emphasized. Increasing levels of interconnectedness between different strata in American society have created similar tensions and conflicts to those found in Europe. Individuals and groups have displayed familiar patterns of resentment at being forced to live together but, as elsewhere, the formation of central institutions has been a dominant trend, and there has been a parallel to the long-term decline of violent crime rates that Elias observed in Europe.

Elias gave 'domestic' and 'international' factors more or less equal emphasis in his account of European state formation. A central theme in his writings was that struggles between warring rivals led to the distinction between the world 'inside' and 'outside' the modern state. The emergence of monopoly powers made more extensive forms of interconnectedness possible, presenting later societies with the challenge of how far they can control processes that have come to affect humanity as a whole. Mennell proceeds along similar lines. He emphasizes the absence of an American equivalent to Europe's court society that fostered 'we feeling' in the initial stages of development. Strong support is extended to the thesis that 'democracy came to America too early'. State monopoly powers were first established in much of Europe, and only later democratized. In the United States, centralized powers were not firmly embedded prior to democratization. High levels of violence, particularly in the South and West, are traced to this phenomenon. But the study also shows how the character of the US civilizing process has been shaped by US aspirations to regional hegemony in the nineteenth century, and by later protestations of 'manifest destiny', entanglements in 'foreign wars', Cold War rivalries, and the current phase of unipolarity. Inevitably, the discussion turns to how far the US can be a positive force in the struggle to bring modern forms of global interconnectedness under control, so that humans can live together more harmoniously.

Although Mennell is more concerned with explaining than with moralizing, he does not conceal robust social-democratic views about the shortcomings of American society and about its conception of its role in world politics. His pessimism or exasperation is centred on the excesses of 'market fundamentalism', the absence of a strong restraining influence on American military power, the lack of detachment from immediate concerns, and low levels of foresight regarding interlocking global challenges. The work recognizes that hegemonic powers have the greatest ability to shape the principles and practices that affect humanity as a whole, and it implicitly recognizes the need for 'great responsibles' in an age of escalating global interconnectedness.

It remains to be seen how far the new administration will substantially alter course or disappoint public expectations—and it remains to be seen whether US responses to current global problems will

embrace higher levels of restraint, detachment and foresight—key concepts in the Eliasian lexicon. How will the hegemon use its extraordinary powers in the years ahead? How will it respond to inevitable challenges to its influence and authority? How will it adapt to the compulsions of global interconnectedness? Answering those questions requires a deeper understanding of the character of the American civilizing process. Interested parties should start with this outstanding sociological study of the complex forces that have shaped the development of US society.

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Latin America and Caribbean

US presidents and Latin American interventions: pursuing regime change in the Cold War. By Michael Grow. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 2008. 304pp. Index. $34.95. ISBN 978 0 70061 586 5.

In this tightly argued, fast-paced and remarkably self-assured book, Michael Grow seeks to reconfigure our understanding of the root causes of US intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold War. He mounts a pointed challenge to a historiographical consensus that has laid stress on a variable mix of economic and national security imperatives. He does this by privileging hitherto underemphasized factors: the underlying need to maintain US global credibility; domestic political calculation; and Latin American agency. To this end, the author undertakes a brisk re-examination of prominent cases of overt military intervention (in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989), intervention through proxies (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, and Nicaragua in 1981), and by covert means (British Guiana in 1963 and Chile in 1970).

The implications for US global credibility stemming from a perception that the United States was not prepared to act to defend its position of paramountcy in the western hemisphere, it is argued, constituted a much more powerful stimulus to intervention than any direct national security threat posed at different times by the ostensibly anti-American regimes in these countries. If the United States was to allow the consolidation of a 'communist' regime in Guatemala, it would be regarded as a sign of weakness; US credibility would also be impaired by the potential unravelling of the carefully constructed inter-American system, as other countries might attempt to emulate Guatemala's growing Cold War neutralism. In the case of Cuba, Eisenhower became convinced of the need for intervention by the indications that Castro's 'aggressively neutralist' foreign policy—prior to Havana's overt turn to the Soviet Union—was jeopardizing 'hemispheric solidarity' and posing the danger of a non-aligned bloc of states that would be detrimental to the US position in the Cold War. The Johnson administration 'saw a direct connection between the Dominican crisis and the credibility of US policy in Vietnam' (p. 89). The Nixon administration, in turn, saw the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 as representing 'a dangerous challenge to its international credibility and strategic goals' (p. 108). Moreover, the example of a viable 'democratic road to socialism' would lend encouragement to communist parties in Western Europe, with serious consequences for NATO. A failure by the Reagan administration to deal with Sandinista Nicaragua would send a signal to friend and foe alike in other parts of the world, while the unexpected opportunity to intervene in Grenada would show that the US once again had the willpower and capacity to project its military power in the wake of the debilitating 'Vietnam syndrome'. Finally, the invasion of Panama was a needed 'demonstration of US power' that 'would reassure the world that the United States was still the superpower it claimed to be' (p. 180). If the US could not oust a petty regional dictator like Noriega, the credibility of its willingness to act elsewhere in the world would be much diminished.

Domestic political considerations, according to Grow, also need to be given greater salience as factors propelling the US decision to intervene in these particular cases. For Eisenhower, Arbenz's Guatemala 'tested the new administration's leadership capabilities and its commitment to recent campaign promises' (p. 25). His successor painted himself into a corner on the question of intervention by talking tougher on Cuba than Nixon had done during the 1960 presidential election. The

Kennedy White House also saw British Guiana mainly in domestic political terms: a 'second Cuba' in the hemisphere would increase its vulnerability to the Republican charge that it was 'soft on communism', thus endangering the President's chances for re-election in 1964. By intervening in the Dominican Republic, Johnson hoped to win conservative acceptance of his domestic reform agenda. As with his two predecessors, Nixon's actions were in part prompted by his desire to secure a second term in office. Reagan's decision to intervene in Grenada was motivated by concern at the political risks of a potential hostage crisis, such as had undermined Carter's hopes for re-election in 1980. George Bush, like Kennedy before him, had allowed himself little other option than outright military intervention by sounding so uncompromising on the Noriega question during the 1988 election campaign; furthermore, his feeble response to the abortive October 1989 coup in Panama gave the unwelcome impression of a weak president.

The final strand in Grow's explanatory model is the question of Latin American agency. This is the least developed part of the author's overall argument, since it is clearly difficult to assess the determinative weight of outside influences on the US decision-making process. For instance, we simply do not have enough hard evidence at present on how significant an input visiting Chilean businessman Agustín Edwards had in crystallizing Nixon's decision to attempt to block Allende's accession to the presidency. Grow is at his most convincing in his extended treatment of the campaign by Noriega's political opponents to turn US congressional and public opinion against a regime that the Reagan administration had done its best to accommodate.

Grow's attempt to reorder the hierarchy of motives behind US intervention in Latin America is certain to provoke vigorous debate. The author's case-studies comprise well-known instances of US intervention; little is said, however, about other lesser, more covert, cases of interference: in Ecuador in the early 1960s; using foreign aid to Brazil during the same period to buttress conservative state governors against President Goulart; and the brazen meddling in the Chilean electoral process in 1964 to prevent an even earlier electoral victory by Allende, to cite but a few examples. Such cases are much less amenable to the author's overall thesis.

The author discounts the centrality of economic motivations perhaps too readily. Although most historians no longer view Eisenhower administration officials as acting solely at the behest of the United Fruit Company, with whom they had so many personal connections, they were influenced by strategic economic arguments. In the endnotes (p. 199), he cites a National Security Council document rationalizing the decision to defer an anti-trust suit against the banana company because of the wider ramifications of proceeding with it: if Guatemala was allowed to get away with expropriating United Fruit land, this would only encourage other Latin American nationalists to turn against US investments. It also should not be forgotten that following the fall of Arbenz, United Fruit received back the land that had been expropriated under the agrarian reform. Apropos Cuba, officials were 'disturbed by the broader regional implications of Castro's property seizures' (p. 40). In Chile, US economic interests worked assiduously with the Nixon administration to undermine Allende's government following his installation in La Moneda.

Perhaps the least satisfactory part of Grow's book is his summary, almost antipathetic portrayal of the affected regimes. For example, Guatemala under Arbenz is described as a 'nationalistic, yanquiphobic, proto-Marxist state' (p. 11)—a decidedly contentious characterization. On Chile, he cites the opinions of writers fundamentally hostile to Unidad Popular—the coalition of political parties that stood behind Allende's candidacy—such as Robert Moss, who published an apologia for Pinochet's coup.

In sum, this is an ambitious and stimulating work, which at times seems to strive too hard for yet another overarching explanatory model. Nevertheless, it should be required reading among students of US intervention in Latin America.

Philip Chrimes

Other books received

Human rights and ethics

KOENIG, Matthias and DE GUCHTENEIRE, Paul, eds: Democracy and human rights in multicultural Societies. Aldershot: Ashgate. Index. Pb.: £25.00. ISBN 9789231040504.

LINDEN, Ian: Global catholicism: diversity and change since Vatican II. London: Hurst. Index. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 9781850659471.

Foreign policy

CIMBALA, Stephen J.: Shield of dreams: missile defense and US–Russian nuclear strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Index. Pb.: $21.60. ISBN 9781591141174.

SERFATY, Simon: Architects of delusion: Europe, America, and the Iraq war. Philadelphia, PA: Penn State University Press. Index. £29.50. ISBN 9780822240603.

VEDRINE, Hubert: History strikes back: how states, nations, and conflicts are shaping in the 21st century. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Index. £13.99. ISBN 9780815789840.

Conflict, security and armed forces

BERMAN, William C., KRAUSE, Keith and LEBRUN, Emile, eds: Small arms survey 2008: risk and resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 9780521706551.

EDELSTEIN, Jillian: Occupational hazards: success and failure in military occupation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Index. £17.95. ISBN 9780801446153.

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JARVIS, Lee, eds: From war to democracy: dilemmas of peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 9780521713276.

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MARSTON, Daniel and MALKASIAN, Carter: Counterinsurgency in modern warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Index. £17.99. ISBN 9781846032813.

MISKEL, James F.: Disaster response and homeland security: what works and what doesn't. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Index. Pb.: £17.95. ISBN 9780804759724.

THOMAS, Andrew R., ed.: Aviation security management. London: Praeger. Index. £210.00. ISBN 9780313346521.

Politics, democracy and social affairs

SADIQ, Kamal: Paper citizens: how illegal immigrants acquire citizenship in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Index. £15.99. ISBN 9780195371222.

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ACKERMAN, Bruce: Can we afford the future? The economics of a warming world. London: Zed. Index. Pb.: £12.99. ISBN 9781848130388.

CHO, Young Nam: Local people's congress in China: development and transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. $80.00. ISBN 9780521515627.

DE HAAN, Jakob, OOSTERLOO, Sander and SCHOENMAKER, Dirk: European financial markets and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. Pb.: £27.99. ISBN 9780521709521.

FISMAN, Raymond and MIGUEL, Edward: Economic gangsters: corruption, violence, and the poverty of nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Index. $24.95. ISBN 9780691134543.

GOLDSTEIN, Andrea: Multinational companies from emerging economies. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Index. Pb.: £19.99. ISBN 9780230577947.

POP-ELECHES, Grigore: From economic crisis to reform: IMF programs in Latin America and eastern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Index. Pb.: £19.95. ISBN 9780691113952.

RUGMAN, Alan: Rugman review international business. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Index. Pb.: £28.99. ISBN 9780230221253.

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History

BENVENUTI, Andrea: Anglo–Australian relations and the 'turn to Europe' 1961–1972. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. Index. £50.00. ISBN 9789861932955.

CHASTEEN, John Charles: Americanos: Latin America's struggle for independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Index. $28.00. ISBN 9780195178814.

DIAMOND, John: The CIA and the culture of failure: US intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the invasion of Iraq. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Index. £26.50. ISBN 9780804756013.

ENGEL, Jeffrey A., ed.: The China diary of George H. W. Bush: the making of a global president. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Index. $29.95. ISBN 9780691130064.

FRAMPTON, Martyn: The long march: the political strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981–2007. Palgrave: Palgrave. 286pp. Index. £55.00. ISBN 9780230202177.

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KEEFER, Edward C.: Soviet–American relations: the détente years, 1969–1972. Washington DC: United States Government Printing. Index. $82.50. ISBN 9780160790652.

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STAFFORD, David: The European Union explained: institutions, actors, global impact. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Index. Pb.: $19.95. ISBN 9780253220189.

WEIL, Patrick: How to be French: nationality in the making since 1789. London: Duke University Press. 286pp. Index. Pb.: £24.95. ISBN 97808223433318.

Middle East and North Africa

AARON, David: In their own words: voices of Jihad. Washington DC: RAND. Index. Pb.: $35.00. ISBN 9780833033020.

DUNBAR, Robin: Pens and swords: how the American mainstream media report the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Index. Pb.: £19.50. ISBN 9780231133494.

EARLE, Robert: Nights in the pink motel: an American strategists pursuit of pace in Iraq. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Index. $31.46. ISBN 9781591142256.

PHILLIPS, David L.: From bullets to ballots: violent Muslim movements in transition. London: Transaction Publishers. Index. £44.50. ISBN 9781412807951.

Sub-Saharan Africa

GLENNIE, Jonathan: The trouble with aid: why less could mean more for Africa. London: Zed. Index. Pb.: £12.99. ISBN 9781848130395.

Asia and Pacific

BEESON, Mark, ed.: Contemporary Southeast Asia: Basingstoke. Palgrave. Index. Pb.: £21.99. ISBN 9780230202924.

CHA, Victor D.: Beyond the final score: the politics of sport in Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. Index. £16.50. ISBN 9780231115490.

FORBES, Ian: North Korea on the brink: struggle for survival. London: Pluto. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 9780745325989.

North America

EDWARDS III, George C.: The strategic president: persuasion and opportunity in presidential leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Index. $29.95. ISBN 9780691139470.

HESS, Stephen: What do we do now? A workbook for the president-elect. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Index. Pb.: £9.99. ISBN 9780815736554.

STONECASH, Jeffrey M.: Reassessing the incumbency effect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. Pb.: $24.99. ISBN 9780521733229.

THERIAULT, Sean M.: Party polarization in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Index. Pb.: $24.99. ISBN 9780521717687.

Latin America and Caribbean

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