6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

Chapter 6 Contents

A. Topics and Tools 2
B. Growth Accounting 2
Methodology of growth accounting 2
Denison's estimates for the United States 3
Maddison's evidence for six major industrial countries 5
Evidence for Asian and Latin American countries 5
Recent revival of U.S. productivity growth 6
Growth accounting and the Solow model 9
C. The Convergence Question 10
Graphical evidence on convergence 11
A digression on the econometrics of linear regression 12
Applying linear regression to analyze convergence 15
Regression studies of absolute convergence across countries 17
Tests of absolute β-convergence using sub-national data 19
Testing conditional β-convergence 23
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil: Taking Solow seriously 25
D. Non-Regression Approaches to Convergence 26
The concept of σ-convergence 26
Tests of convergence in the cross-country distribution of incomes 27
Pritchett's test of plausibility of convergence 29
E. Cross-Country Correlates of Growth 30
Barro and Lee's cross-country evidence on human capital 30
Robustness in cross-country growth studies 33
Cross-country vs. panel data estimation 35
Institutions and economic growth 37
Inequality and growth 41
Studies of cross-country income differences 43
Empirical evidence on rent seeking and growth 44
F. Empirical Studies of Endogenous Growth 46
Evidence on returns to scale 46

Evidence on growth vs. level effects of economic changes *47*
Evidence on the effects of private human capital vs. public knowledge *48*
G. Suggestions for Further Reading **49**
Overviews of growth and empirical results *49*
Selected growth accounting studies *49*
H. Studies Referenced in Text **50**

A. Topics and Tools

This chapter concludes our examination of economic growth by reviewing the empirical evidence about growth. Because growth is a long-run phenomenon and observed macroeconomic time series are lamentably short, most empirical studies of growth tend to rely on cross-sectional samples. While this avoids many of the typical time-series macroeconometric pitfalls, it raises other problems. Notably, it is difficult when comparing growth rates across countries to measure and include all of the institutional characteristics that are relevant to international differences in growth behavior. If these omitted characteristics are also correlated with the growth determinants we have included in the equation, their effects will be "picked up" by the included variables, leading to biased estimates of the impact of the variables in the equation.

The voluminous literature surveyed selectively here has explored many alternative strategies for interpreting the growth evidence. However, the absence of clear-cut resolution of some important issues suggests that our empirical knowledge of economic growth may grow as future decades add to our data samples.

B. Growth Accounting

Methodology of growth accounting

One of the earliest attempts to quantify economic growth empirically was the direct attempt to determine how much of economic growth can be explained by increases in various inputs. This exercise is called ***growth accounting.*** Since it does not require comparisons across countries, growth accounting can be performed on an individual basis for any economy with relevant data on output and inputs. This kind of analysis emerged quite naturally from efforts in the 1940s to construct current and historical national account statistics for major economies.

As discussed by Romer on pages 29–31, growth accounting attempts to break down total real-output growth into components attributable to growth in capital input, growth in labor input, and growth in total factor productivity—the so-called *So-*

low residual that measures the increase in output that can't be explained by input growth. Using Romer's equation (1.34), growth accountants estimate the share attributable to growth capital input as $\alpha_K\left(\dot{K}/K\right)$, the share due to labor as $\alpha_L\left(\dot{L}/L\right)$, and the part resulting from growth in total factor productivity (TFP) as $\left(\dot{Y}/Y\right)-\alpha_K\left(\dot{K}/K\right)-\alpha_L\left(\dot{L}/L\right)$.[1]

Romer gives citations to many of the major authors in the growth accounting literature. In this section, we will survey the results of three major works: Edward Denison's work for the United States, Angus Maddison's long-term measures for several advanced countries, and the results summarized by Robert Barro from work of Victor Elias and of Alwyn Young for selected countries in the post World War II period.

Denison's estimates for the United States

One of the most detailed growth accounting studies of the United States was the life work of Edward Denison of the Brookings Institution, culminating in Denison (1985). Although this work is now quite out of date, it is a remarkably clear example of the paradigm of growth accounting. Denison combines available data with a few heroic assumptions to achieve a remarkably detailed breakdown of the sources of U.S. economic growth over various periods.

Table 1 is taken from Denison's Table 8.2, describing the contributions of various factors to growth in potential output in selected periods. The top row of Table 1 shows that growth of potential national income averaged 3.20% per year over the entire period he studied but that growth was considerably higher from 1948–1973 than either before or after.

The bold rows below the top row show Denison's estimates of how much of the growth in each period was due to increases in the quantity and quality of factors of production (2.03% for the entire period, of which 1.49% was due to labor input and 0.54% to capital input) and how much was due to increases in TFP (output per unit of input, or 1.17% over the full sample). Denison's results suggest that growth in inputs accounted for about two-thirds of U.S. growth and that productivity growth of about 1% per year accounted for the other third.

The most striking finding, which has been corroborated by many other studies, is that total factor productivity hardly grew at all from 1973 to 1982. In fact, after accounting for economies of scale and other factors, Denison estimates that the residual due to advances in knowledge actually fell rather than growing during this pe-

[1] One must be very careful not to confuse the accounting allocations here with the steady-state conclusions of the Solow growth model. This issue is discussed in more detail at the conclusion of the growth accounting section.

riod. Evidence such as this led to widespread concern in the 1980s about a "productivity crisis" in the United States.

Table 1. Denison's sources of U.S. economic growth.

Item	1929–1982	1929–1948	1948–1973	1973–1982
National income	**3.20**	**2.57**	**3.89**	**2.61**
Total factor input	**2.03**	**1.56**	**2.23**	**2.53**
Labor	1.49	1.45	1.46	1.86
Employment	1.29	1.05	1.28	1.90
Hours	–0.25	–0.21	–0.24	–0.33
Average hours	–0.50	–0.68	–0.37	–0.46
Efficiency offset	0.17	0.39	0.04	0.10
Intergroup shift offset	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.03
Age-sex composition	–0.11	0.00	–0.15	–0.24
Education	0.40	0.38	0.40	0.44
Unallocated	0.16	0.23	0.17	0.09
Capital	0.54	0.11	0.77	0.67
Inventories	0.09	0.06	0.13	0.05
Nonres. structures and equipment	0.21	0.00	0.33	0.31
Dwellings	0.18	0.04	0.24	0.24
International assets	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.07
Land	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Output per unit of input	**1.17**	**1.01**	**1.66**	**0.08**
Advances in knowledge & n.e.c.	0.68	0.49	1.09	–0.05
Improved resource allocation	0.25	0.29	0.30	0.07
Farm	0.20	0.27	0.21	0.06
Nonfarm self-employment	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.01
Legal and human environment	–0.04	0.00	–0.04	–0.17
Pollution abatement	–0.02	0.00	–0.02	–0.09
Worker safety and health	–0.01	0.00	–0.01	–0.03
Dishonesty and crime	–0.01	0.00	–0.01	–0.05
Dwellings occupancy ratio	0.01	0.02	–0.01	0.01
Economies of scale	0.27	0.22	0.32	0.21
Irregular factors	0.00	–0.01	0.00	0.01
Weather in farming	0.00	–0.01	0.00	0.01
Labor disputes	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

More recent evidence suggests that TFP growth recovered after 1990. In fact, during the second half of the 1990s, productivity growth was extremely rapid, which most analysts have attributed to the cumulative impact of several decades of advances in information technology. This recent surge in productivity growth is discussed below.

The causes (and indeed the validity) of this slowdown have been a source of great controversy among growth economists since the 1980s. Some have argued that the slowdown was a mirage that occurred because of mismeasurement of productivity,

especially in the increasingly important service sector. Others have claimed that inefficient management is to blame. Still others have cited aging capital or failure to adopt modern production techniques. Whatever the interpretation, the slowdown in growth in the 1970s and 1980s and the surge in productivity growth in the United States in the 1990s has pushed the issue out of policy debates and into the realm of economic history.

Maddison's evidence for six major industrial countries

Angus Maddison (1991) describes the long-term growth of currently advanced countries.[2] His Table 5.19 presents a growth accounting exercise for France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States for three sub-periods within the 1913–1987 interval. The right-hand column of Table 2 summarizes his results.

Table 2 tells a largely similar story of acceleration and slowdown in the rate of TFP growth for all countries except the United Kingdom (the only oil exporter in the group). With some variations, Denison's U.S. ratio of two-thirds of growth attributable to input growth and one-third to productivity is not far off for the other countries in Maddison's sample.

Another striking feature of Maddison's results is his growth accounting for Japan. Although popular opinion attributes much of Japan's tremendous 9.27% GDP growth from 1950 to 1973 to improving productivity, Maddison shows that the vast majority of this growth can be explained by increases in factor inputs and with other "explained" sources of growth such as structural changes, technological diffusion, and economies of scale. Japan's residual (unexplained) TFP growth was considerably lower throughout the sample than France's or Germany's. Moreover, Japan's productivity growth declined after 1973 just as it did in the other countries shown.

Evidence for Asian and Latin American countries

Broadening the sample of countries still further, we consider some of the evidence reported in Table 10.1 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). These data are taken from two studies. Data for the set of Latin American countries are taken from Elias (1992) as updated in subsequent unpublished work; the data for the Asian countries come from Young (1995).

The top part of Table 3 shows that TFP growth has varied enormously in Latin America. Mexico has led the way with Brazil and Chile also generating quite rapid productivity advance. At the bottom have been oil-dependent Venezuela and politically unstable Peru, with, respectively, little increase and a decrease in TFP during the 40-year period.

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[2] See also Maddison (2001) for a much less detailed but more global discussion of the sources of growth.

Table 2. Maddison's growth decomposition for six countries.

	GDP growth	Augmented factor input contribution	Est. contributions of other sources	Total explained growth	Unexplained growth residual
France					
1913–1950	1.15	0.48	0.10	0.58	0.57
1950–1973	5.04	2.02	1.17	3.19	1.79
1973–1987	2.16	1.24	0.30	1.54	0.61
Germany					
1913–1950	1.28	1.00	0.11	1.11	0.17
1950–1973	5.92	2.42	1.27	3.69	2.14
1973–1987	1.80	0.79	0.50	1.29	0.50
Japan					
1913–1950	2.24	1.57	0.53	2.10	0.14
1950–1973	9.27	5.44	2.53	7.97	1.20
1973–1987	3.73	2.95	0.55	3.50	0.23
Netherlands					
1913–1950	2.43	2.09	0.22	2.31	0.12
1950–1973	4.74	2.32	1.56	3.88	0.83
1973–1987	1.78	1.30	–0.06	1.24	0.54
United Kingdom					
1913–1950	1.29	0.94	0.01	0.95	0.35
1950–1973	3.03	1.76	0.52	2.28	0.73
1973–1987	1.75	0.93	0.08	1.01	0.73
United States					
1913–1950	2.79	1.53	0.41	1.94	0.83
1950–1973	3.65	2.54	0.32	2.86	0.77
1973–1987	2.51	2.55	–0.14	2.41	0.10

Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 3 is Young's finding that the extremely rapid growth in the "four tigers" of East Asia was almost entirely due to rapid factor accumulation. In Singapore, Young estimates that total factor productivity actually declined from 1966 to 1990, despite 8.5% per year GDP growth.[3]

Recent revival of U.S. productivity growth

The slow growth of productivity was particularly surprising because of the rapid advancement in microelectronic technologies. Hardware efficiency in computing and telecommunications multiplied rapidly, as reflected in "Moore's Law," an observation by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore that microprocessor speed seemed to double about every 18 months. Yet despite this rapid advance in a key and pervasive tech-

[3] This finding has not gone unchallenged in the literature. Hsieh (2002) argues that traditional estimates of the capital stock in Singapore are too high. Since the productivity effect is measured as a residual, lower estimates of the contribution of capital imply higher estimates of TFP growth. Using alternative capital-stock measures, Hsieh estimates that total-factor productivity in Singapore grew at 2.2 percent from 1972 to 1990.

nology, overall productivity growth grew only slowly through the 1970s and 1980s. Robert Solow once quipped that "computers are everywhere, except in the productivity statistics."

Table 3. Growth accounting estimates for Asia and Latin America.

Country	Period	GDP growth	Contribution of capital	Contribution of labor	TFP growth
Elias (updated in Barro and Sala-i-Martin)					
Argentina	1940–1990	2.79	1.28	0.97	0.54
Brazil	1940–1990	5.58	2.94	1.50	1.14
Chile	1940–1990	3.62	1.20	1.03	1.38
Colombia	1940–1990	4.54	2.19	1.52	0.84
Mexico	1940–1990	5.22	2.59	1.50	1.13
Peru	1940–1990	3.23	2.52	1.34	−0.62
Venezuela	1940–1990	4.43	2.54	1.79	0.11
Young					
Hong Kong	1966–1990	7.30	3.09	2.00	2.20
Singapore	1966–1990	8.50	6.20	2.68	–0.40
South Korea	1966–1990	10.32	4.77	4.35	1.20
Taiwan	1966–1990	9.10	3.68	3.62	1.80

However, historians of technology have always known that new technologies often require years or decades to develop complementary technologies that allow them to have a wide-spread positive effect on productivity.[4] Electricity could not have a major economic effect until power grids were in place and efficient electric light bulbs and motors were affordable. The laser was invented in 1958 but had little economic impact until it was incorporated in measuring, cutting, communication, and printing technologies twenty years later. True to form, productivity began to surge in the 1990s and there is considerable evidence that advances in information technology (IT) are the main reason. Indeed, in a popular book, journalist Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that we have only seen the very beginnings of the productivity effects of the convergence of modern information technologies.

In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Reed alumnus Dale Jorgenson (2001) presented estimates of the growth contribution of both IT and other technologies.

Table 4 shows Jorgenson's estimates of the contributions of various information technologies and other technological growth to U.S. productivity over various subperiods.

From 1948 to 1973, total factor productivity grew rapidly, but information technology played a negligible role. The contribution of IT increased in the 1973–90 period, but its effect was swamped by the near disappearance of any contribution from non-information technology. The first half of the 1990s accentuated this trend, with

[4] See, for example, Mokyr (1990) and the essays in Rosenberg (1982).

non-IT growth estimated as slightly negative while IT contributed a positive quarter of a point. This IT contribution doubles in the last half of the 1990s and, equally importantly, it is accompanied by the resumption of growth attributed to non-IT sources.

Table 4. Jorgenson's estimates of the impact of IT on U.S. TFP growth.

		1948–1973	1973–1990	1990–1995	1995–1999
Overall TFP Growth		**0.92**	**0.25**	**0.24**	**0.75**
Attributable to:	**Information Technology**	**0.06**	**0.19**	**0.25**	**0.50**
	Computers	0.02	0.12	0.15	0.32
	Software	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.09
	Communications equipment	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.08
	Non-information technology	**0.86**	**0.06**	**−0.01**	**0.25**

Source: Jorgenson (2001), Table 7.

The Jorgenson results may be questioned because his last period of analysis is only four years long and includes much of the period of the "dot-com bubble" in which the economy was in a strong cyclical boom. However, later analyses confirm that productivity growth remained strong despite the bursting of the bubble in the prices of technology stocks and the minor recession of 2001. Oliner and Sichel (2002) add two years to the Jorgenson sample and find a slight deceleration in productivity growth with the 2001 recession, but that there was no significant reduction in the contribution of IT to growth. However, in later work Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2008) find that the role of IT in productivity growth, while still strong, diminished in the 2000s.

Moreover, labor productivity growth as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (nonfarm business output per hour worked) accelerated since 2001 from an average of 2.52% for 1995–2001 to 2.97% from 2002 through 2006, before fluctuating strongly in 2007 and 2008.[5] Figure 1 shows that growth in U.S. labor productivity has been consistently strong since 1995, although there is some evidence of decline after the early 2000s.

[5] Data series number PRS84006092 obtained from bls.gov as of January 2009. Series shown is quarterly growth rates since one year previous. Be careful in comparing the growth rates in Figure 1, which is growth in labor productivity (output per worker) with Jorgenson's results, which pertain to total-factor productivity (output per unit of labor *and capital* input.



Figure 1. U.S. Labor Productivity Growth since 1947

Growth accounting and the Solow model

It might appear that there is a contradiction in growth causality between the Solow model and the empirical growth-accounting exercises. The Solow model asserts that the economy's GDP growth rate is the sum of *two* growth rates— those of labor and total-factor productivity—whereas growth accounting breaks down the effects of growth into *three* components: labor, productivity, *and capital*. This apparent discrepancy is easily resolved.

The difference arises because capital growth is endogenous in the Solow model, so it is not considered an ultimate exogenous "cause" of output growth but rather a jointly endogenous variable whose growth is explained alongside the growth in output. The Solow model explains both output and capital growth in terms of exogenous increases in labor input and productivity. If capital were to stop growing in the Solow model, then output growth at rate $n + g$ could not be sustained, so growth in capital input is surely an ongoing contributor to Solovian growth. In contrast, growth accountants treat inputs of *both* capital and labor as essentially exogenous factors, so output growth is divided three ways. Neither way of thinking of growth is wrong, they are just different approaches that hold a different set of factors constant.

To see more clearly the connection between growth accounting and the Solow model, consider an economy that is growing along a Solovian steady-state balanced-growth path with the labor force growing at 2% and Harrod-neutral productivity growth of 1% (*i.e.,* $n = 0.02$ and $g = 0.01$), and with an output-capital elasticity α_K of 0.3 output-labor elasticity α_L of 0.7. GDP and the capital stock in this economy would grow at 3% in the steady state. Growth accountants would attribute $\alpha_K\left(\dot{K}/K\right) = 0.3 \times 3\% = 0.9\%$ of this to capital growth, $\alpha_L\left(\dot{L}/L\right) = 0.7 \times 2\% = 1.4\%$ to labor growth, and the remaining 0.7% to growth in total factor productivity.

Why does growth accounting seem to undervalue the impact of $\dot{A}/A$, reducing its measured effect on GDP growth from 1.0% to 0.7%? The answer lies in the discussion above of what is held constant in each case. Recall that Harrod-neutral technical progress of the kind used in the Solow model brackets the technology term in with labor input in the production function. For example, a Cobb-Douglas production for the economy in our example would be written

$$Y = K^{0.3}\left(AL\right)^{0.7}. \tag{1}$$

The direct effect of a 1% increase in A in equation (1) is a 0.7% increase in Y. This is what growth accounting measures. However, we know that on a Solow balanced-growth path, the increase of 1% in A would lead to a 1% increase in K, which would in turn increase Y by an additional 0.3%. Thus, the direct impact of productivity growth is only 0.7% per year, but if that increase induces an additional increase in the capital stock (as is the case on a Solow balanced-growth path), there would be an additional indirect effect that would lead to a full 1% increase in GDP.

C. The Convergence Question

While growth accounting can be performed on individual economies without making international comparisons of income or growth, some of the important implications of the Solow model, such as convergence, require comparable data for a cross section of economies. The late Irving Kravis along with Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and other economists based at the University of Pennsylvania, devoted several decades to the development of an international database in which major economic aggregates were measured on a comparable basis using purchasing-power parity rather than exchange rates to convert among currencies.[6] In the early 1990s, their

[6] Purchasing power parities are conversion rates between currencies at which the currencies will buy equivalent amounts of some market basket of goods in their respective countries.

Penn World Table (PWT) became the standard data set for international comparisons of growth rates.[7]

The PWT enabled economists to try a new approach to testing the implications of the Solow growth model. If growth rates, income levels, investment rates, and other macroeconomic variables can be compared across countries, then it is possible to perform a cross-sectional study of how growth rates or income levels are affected by the characteristics of economies. A voluminous literature continues to grow examining the determinants of growth across countries, testing for the effects of everything from climate to political stability to religion.

One important implication of the Solow model that has been examined repeatedly in this literature is ***convergence***. As Romer discusses in detail, the Solow model implies that the per-capita income levels of countries with similar production functions, saving rates, and growth rates of population and technology will converge over time to the same level. This implies that countries that have low initial levels of income should, other things being equal, grow more rapidly than richer countries, allowing them gradually to close the income gap. Romer's equation (1.36) on page 32 expresses the growth rate as a function of the level of initial per capita income. The left-hand side is the country's rate of growth over a period (from 1870 to 1979, in this case), while the expression after b on the right is the log of its level of per-capita income at the beginning of that period. Equation (1.36) expresses the left-hand or dependent variable as a linear function of the right-hand or independent variable. The line expressing the functional relationship has a slope of b and intercepts the vertical axis at a. If $b < 0$, then the line slopes downward and richer countries grow more slowly than poorer ones, so some degree of convergence occurs.[8] This b coefficient is closely related to the speed of convergence represented by λ in Romer's "speed of convergence" discussion on pages 24 and 25. If the growth rate on the left-hand side is expressed in percent per year (as is usual), then $-b = \lambda$.

Graphical evidence on convergence

The simplest way to examine the convergence question is just to plot growth rates of countries against their initial levels of per-capita income. Romer's Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 on pages 33–35 show such plots for several groups of countries. In Figure 1.7, covering a sample of currently industrial countries using data from 1870–1979, a negative relationship is apparent. This is less true in Figure 1.8, where other

[7] The latest version of the Penn World Table is available for download on the Internet at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. Summers and Heston (1991) provide a detailed description of the data.

[8] This concept of convergence is often called β-convergence. A related concept, σ-convergence, examines whether the cross-sectional variance of per-capita income among countries or regions declines over time.

countries that were at comparable levels of income in 1870 are added. The evidence is especially chaotic in Figure 1.9, which includes most countries of the non-Communist world over the 1960–89 period. It is difficult to discern visually any evidence of a downward-sloping relationship between initial income and growth in Figure 1.9 and, in fact, the best-fit regression line in such samples sometimes slopes slightly upward.

Although it is very useful in gaining an appreciation for the overall patterns in the data, the visual method of analysis cannot answer specific questions about the slope of the best-fit relationship between the variables. It is also difficult to extend the visual framework to more than one explanatory variable. In order to be more precise about the statistical relationship between the variables, we use the method of ***linear regression analysis*** to estimate a best-fit line using the data points of a scatter plot such as Figures 1.7 through 1.9. Before examining the growth data further, we digress to consider how this method works.

A digression on the econometrics of linear regression

To use data on many countries to estimate the value of b and to test whether it is negative, we use a statistical technique called ***linear regression***. The basic idea of linear regression is to fit a straight line to the collection of data points that we observe for our two variables. For simplicity of exposition, let the independent variable be called x and the dependent variable y. Using notation similar to Romer's, the linear relationship between the variables can then be written $y_i = a + bx_i$, where i is an index that ranges over all the countries in the sample. Finding the best-fit line amounts to estimating the values of the unknown parameters a and b. We now digress at some length to introduce the concept of linear regression as a method of estimating the parameters of economic relationships. After this digression we shall return to the examination of some regressions involving economic growth rates and tests of the convergence hypothesis.

Suppose first that we have data for only two ***observations*** (countries) for y and x. In other words, we observe two independently generated pairs of values for the variables from different countries. Let us call these two observations (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2), where observation 1 is a measure of the two variables in country 1 and observation 2 is a measure of the variables in country 2.



Figure 2. Best-fit line for two points

If we plot these two "data points" on a graph with x on the horizontal axis and y on the vertical axis, we might get a diagram similar to the one in Figure 2, where the data points are labeled p_1 and p_2. As you can see, there is exactly one straight line that passes through the two data points. The slope of this line is our empirical estimate of b, which we will call b^*, while the value of y where the best-fit line intercepts the y-axis is our estimate of a, which we call a^*. Notice that the slope of the best-fit line in Figure 2 is negative, which is why the vertical segment of the triangle measuring the slope is labeled $-b^*$. The line defined algebraically by $y_t = a^* + b^* x_t$ is a "perfect fit" for the data, in the sense that both data points lie exactly on the line. In mathematical terms, $y_1 = a^* + b^* x_1$ and $y_2 = a^* + b^* x_2$. In the case of only two data points, fitting the best straight line to the data is easy!

Suppose now that we obtain a third data point (x_3, y_3) by observing a third country. Should we expect that this data point would lie exactly on the line connecting the first two points? If the relationship of Figure 2 holds precisely for all three observations, then all three should obey the same linear relationship. However, measured economic relationships are never that precise. Variables are observed with error and the relationship between any two variables is usually subject to disturbances by additional variables that are not included in the equation (and often by variables whose values cannot be observed at all). Consequently, econometricians usually interpret the hypothesis of a linear relationship to assert that all of the data points should lie *close* to a straight line. It would be very unusual for the added data point to lie *exactly* on the line that passed through the first two.

In order to allow for this "imperfection" in our two-variable linear relationship, we add a ***disturbance term*** or ***error term*** to the equation. The resulting equation looks like

$$y_i = a + bx_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where ε_t is the disturbance term, which is usually modeled as a ***random variable*** whose value for each observation are assumed to be drawn from a given probability distribution.



Figure 3. Best-fit line with three points

Suppose that the three data points are as shown in Figure 3, so that they do not line up on the same straight line. Now there is no single line that fits all three data points exactly. What criterion should we use to select which line best fits the three data points? In order to answer that question, we must first choose a method to measure "how close" any particular line lies to the collection of three points, and then find and choose the line that lies "closest" to the points according to that measure. The measure most often chosen is that of ***least-squares***, and the line that is chosen as the best-fit line is the one that minimizes the squares of the vertical distances of the three points from the line.

In Figure 3, the short vertical line segments signify the ***residuals***—the vertical deviations of the observed points from the best-fit line. If we again denote the values of a and b for the best-fit line by a^* and b^*, then the residual for observation i is $e_i = y_i - a^*$

$- b^* x_i$.[9] Since some of the residuals are positive—those for observations where the actual value of y_i lies above the best-fit line such as observation 2 in Figure 3—and some are negative (observation 3 in Figure 3, where the point lies below the line), we cannot simply minimize the sum of the residuals.[10] If we worked with the sum of the residuals, the positive and negative residuals would cancel out. In order to avoid this canceling, we square each of the residuals (since the square is positive whether the residual is positive or negative) and choose as our best-fit line the one that minimizes the sum of the *squares* of the residuals.

The best-fit line we determine by this criterion is called the ***ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression line***. The estimates a^* and b^* are statistics that we can calculate (based on formulas that you need not learn) in order to estimate the unknown parameters of the true relationship (the population or data-generating-process parameters) a and b. These estimates/statistics have probability distributions that (under some assumptions about the data-generating process) allow us to make inferences and test hypotheses about the population parameters. For example, we might test the null hypothesis that $b = 0$ in order to determine whether x has a statistically significant effect on y. If we are able to reject that null hypothesis, then we conclude that the relationship between x and y in our sample is so strong that it is unlikely to have occurred in a sample where x and y were truly unrelated.

Applying linear regression to analyze convergence

We now return to our discussion of cross-country growth regressions and tests of β-convergence. Recall that "absolute convergence" only occurs in the Solow model if everything else is held equal. Countries that have different technologies, different saving rates, or different rates of growth of population and productivity *should* converge to different steady states. So we would not expect to get a "clean" convergence result unless we either restrict our sample to countries that are homogeneous in these characteristics or control for these other factors by including measures of them as additional explanatory variables in the regression equation (*i.e.,* test "conditional convergence"). Both of these strategies have been followed in a large empirical literature examining convergence. In the next two sections, we consider first a few studies that have tried to use homogeneous economies to examine absolute convergence,

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[9] Be careful to notice the difference between the error term ε_i and the residual e_i. The error term is the deviation of observation i from the line representing the *true* relationship between the variables: $y_i = a + bx_i$, while the residual is the deviation of observation i from the *estimated* best-fit line $y_i = a^* + b^*x_i$.

[10] We do set the sum of the residuals to zero in linear regression analysis, but this condition fixes the intercept term, not the slope, of the regression line.

then we look at studies of "conditional convergence" that correct for differences in steady states among countries.

The basis for regression analyses of convergence lies in the off-the-balanced-growth-path properties of the Solow model. In equation (1.29) on page 24, Romer shows that the convergence process of a Solow economy can be approximated as $\dot{k}(t) \cong -\lambda\left[k(t) - k^*\right]$, or

$$\frac{\dot{k}(t)}{k(t)} = -\lambda\left[1 - \frac{k^*}{k(t)}\right]. \tag{2}$$

If the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale and capital elasticity α, then

$$\frac{\dot{y}(t)}{y(t)} = \alpha\frac{\dot{k}(t)}{k(t)} = -\lambda\alpha\left[1 - \frac{k^*}{k(t)}\right] = -\lambda\alpha\left[1 - \left(\frac{y^*}{y(t)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\right].$$

Applying the standard formulas for growth rates of products, total output should grow at rate

$$\frac{\dot{Y}(t)}{Y(t)} = \frac{\dot{y}(t)}{y(t)} + \frac{\dot{A}(t)}{A(t)} + \frac{\dot{L}(t)}{L(t)} = -\lambda\alpha\left[1 - \left(\frac{y^*}{y(t)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\right] + g + n$$

and per-capita output should grow at rate

$$\frac{\dot{Y}(t)}{Y(t)} - \frac{\dot{L}(t)}{L(t)} = -\lambda\alpha\left[1 - \left(\frac{y^*}{y(t)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\right] + g. \tag{3}$$

Equation (3) shows that per-capita GDP growth in a Solow economy depends on three factors: (1) the steady-state growth rate g, (2) the steady-state level of y^*, and (3) the current level of $y(t)$. If the economies in the sample can be assumed to be converging to the same steady-state growth path, then y^* and g will be the same and the only factor affecting growth should be the initial level of income $y(t)$. This leads to a regression specification similar to Romer's equation (1.36).

Regression studies of absolute convergence across countries

What set of economies can we reasonably assume to converge to the same steady-state growth path? Barriers to capital and technology mobility and international differences in saving behavior and legal environments could make such an assumption unreasonable for highly diverse samples of countries. In this section and the next, we examine two sets of studies that have tested absolute convergence. First, we discuss the evidence of an early study of advanced industrial countries by William Baumol (1986) and a follow-up study by Bradford De Long (1988). In the next section, we consider a series of studies by Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin that examines absolute convergence among sub-national regions among which many of these differences may be less important.

Romer equation (1.37) presents Baumol's OLS best-fit line for the regression equation described in (1.36). As you can see, Baumol's estimate of b is negative and very close to –1. This suggests strong confirmation of the convergence hypothesis. Since both the dependent and independent variables are expressed in logs, the coefficient b has the dimension of an elasticity. Recall that when the log of a variable changes by 0.01, this is approximately equivalent to a 1% change in the variable's level because when the log of the variable increases by 0.01, the level of the variable increases by a factor of $e^{0.01} \approx 1.01$. Thus, Baumol's results suggest that a 1% higher level of a country's income in 1870 is associated with a 1% smaller amount of growth between 1870 and 1979, implying near perfect convergence.[11]

Before we accept an estimate such as Baumol's estimated b, we should worry about how likely it is that this negative estimate could have resulted just from random variation in a sample where there was no true relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For example, we would not be too surprised to find a negatively sloped regression line for a sample of only two or three countries even if there was no true negative relationship. Even with sixteen countries, we might be quite skeptical of the evidence for a negative relationship if the scatter of points did not conform closely to the estimated line—in other words, if the residuals were very large in absolute value.

We can quantify the confidence that we may place in an estimate such as Baumol's by performing a statistical test of the hypothesis that $b = 0$. We can feel more confident that convergence actually occurs if we are able to reject, at a chosen level of significance, the hypothesis that this result would occur with random sampling from a true data-generating process in which there was no relationship (*i.e.*, one in which $b = 0$).

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[11] In terms of the λ parameter we have used in earlier discussions of convergence, Baumol's estimate of 0.995 implies that 99.5% of the initial income differentials were eliminated in one "period," which in this case is 109 years.

The number (0.094) that is shown in parentheses below the estimated slope coefficient in Romer's equation (1.37) is called the ***standard error*** of the estimated coefficient. It is an estimate of the standard deviation of the coefficient estimate. To test the hypothesis that $b = 0$, we divide the coefficient value by its standard error. The quotient that results (–10.6) is referred to as the ***t-statistic*** of the coefficient. Although the exact critical value for choosing whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient depends on the level of significance that you choose and on the size of the sample, a common rule of thumb is that you can usually reject the hypothesis of no relationship between the variables with 95% confidence if the t-statistic exceeds 2 in absolute value. Since the absolute value of Baumol's coefficient is greater than 10, it seems extremely unlikely that his β-convergence result occurred due to random variation. This is confirmed by the scatter diagram shown in Romer's Figure 1.7, which shows that the sample conforms very closely to a downward-sloping regression line.

On the line below the regression equation on page 32, Romer reports the R^2 statistic for the regression. The R^2 measures the overall ***goodness of fit*** of the regression. It is the share of the variation in the dependent variable (growth) that is explained by variation in the independent variable (initial income level). Thus, in Baumol's regression, the variations in the initial level of per capita income explain 87% of the variation across the sample of countries in growth rates.

However, Baumol's evidence in favor of convergence may not be as convincing as a first reading would suggest. The argument made by Bradford De Long in criticism of Baumol's paper (described by Romer beginning on page 32) illustrates one of the pitfalls of econometrics. De Long argues that Baumol's sample was not randomly drawn, but rather included precisely the small group of countries of the world that *had* converged. Thus, De Long claims that Baumol had (unintentionally) stacked the deck in favor of finding convergence through his choice of sample countries.[12] As you can see from Romer's Figures 1.8 and 1.9, the case for convergence is much weaker for larger groups of countries, casting doubt on the generality of Baumol's result.

Baumol and De Long wrote the preamble for what has become a voluminous literature using cross-country growth regressions to evaluate convergence. Much of the subsequent work has tested conditional rather than absolute convergence, including variables in the regression to account for differences among countries that might lead them to different steady-state growth paths. Before we examine these conditional-convergence studies, we consider a second set of studies of absolute convergence.

[12] Baumol's choice of countries was natural: he chose the countries for which good macroeconomic data were available, which, for obvious reasons, were the richest countries.

Tests of absolute β-convergence using sub-national data

Absolute convergence is plausible only when it is reasonable to assume that the economies in the sample share the same parameters. This may be more reasonable among sub-national regions within a relatively homogeneous country or area than across broader samples. Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin performed absolute convergence studies for three kinds of sub-national samples: U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, and regions within the European Union (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)). They summarize their results in Chapter 11 of their growth text, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), from which the following figures are drawn.



Figure 4. Growth and initial income of 47 states

Figure 4 shows a diagram similar to Romer's Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 for 47 states.[13] The vertical axis is the annual growth rate of personal income per person from 1880 to 1990. The horizontal axis measures 1880 income. The close negative association shown in Figure 4 leads us to expect a strongly negative estimate for *b* in a corresponding regression equation. Indeed, Barro and Sala-i-Martin's basic regres-

[13] Reproduced from Figure 11.2 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin's *Economic Growth*. Oklahoma, Alaska, and Hawaii are excluded because they were not states in 1880.

sion yields an estimated coefficient of –0.0174 with a standard error of 0.0026, so the *t*-statistic of –6.7 is larger than 2 in absolute value and allows us to reject the hypothesis that this association occurred due to random chance. These results are relatively robust to changes in the time period and to the separation of the sample into Midwest, South, East, and West regions.[14]

A similar analysis of Japanese prefectures over the 1930–1990 period yields slightly faster convergence. The scatter diagram is shown in Figure 5. The convergence coefficient in the basic regression is –0.0279 and once again we can easily reject the hypothesis that it is zero.



Figure 5. Convergence among Japanese prefectures

Barro and Sala-i-Martin also apply regression analysis of β-convergence to subnational regions of eight countries in Western Europe (see Figure 7) for 1950–90. One might expect that, despite the unifying influences of the European Union, national differences might mitigate convergence to some degree relative to U.S. states or Japanese prefectures. Indeed, Barro and Sala-i-Martin add "dummy variables" for each of the countries to allow the steady-state growth rate of regions to differ across

[14] Higgins, Levy, and Young (2006) go one step further and look at convergence at the county level since 1970. They also find convergence, though the rates differ across regions and the prevalence of certain industries seem to enhance growth more than others.

countries.[15] Even with these dummy variables to allow for cross-national variation in growth rates, the convergence story is slightly less strong than in the previous cases.[16]



Figure 6. Initial income and growth in European regions

Figure 6 shows the scatter diagram for the European regions. The observations are less tightly concentrated along the downward-sloping convergence line. Nonetheless, the estimated *b* coefficient of –0.019 is highly significant and slightly larger than the one estimated for the United States.

The convergence coefficients that Barro and Sala-i-Martin estimate range from 1.7% to 2.8% per year. In contrast, Romer's thumbnail calculation of the convergence rate λ predicted by the Solow model (page 25) is in the neighborhood of 4% per year—roughly twice the estimated actual rate. The apparent conclusion that con-

[15] A dummy variable takes only the values zero and one. For example, a dummy variable for France would have the value one for French regions and zero for others. The estimated coefficient of the France dummy variable can be interpreted as the difference in the value of the constant term *a* between the French regions and the default region where all dummy variables are zero.

[16] Barro and Sala-i-Martin also estimated versions of their convergence equations for the United States and Japan with dummies for major regions of the countries. These results were not strongly affected by including dummy variables.

vergence is—even where it seems to exist—much slower in practice than predicted by the Solow model has been a source of further empirical analysis.

Note that one of the crucial determinants of the convergence rate in the Solow model is α, the share of capital in GDP. If we consider capital to be the traditional, plant and equipment measure, then capital's share is around 1/3. However, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) demonstrate that including returns to human capital in the measure of capital's share raises the ratio to about 2/3, which in turn cuts the predicted rate of convergence in half—making it much closer to the rates estimated by Barro and others. The Mankiw, Romer, and Weil explanation of the apparently slow rate of convergence has been highly influential, though somewhat controversial.



Figure 7. Regions used in European convergence studies

Testing conditional β-convergence

Although it is plausible that conditions and behavior are sufficiently similar across states, prefectures, and regions within Western Europe that we might expect that they would converge to a common steady-state growth path, it seems unlikely that the same homogeneity applies across all countries of the world. For example, Romer's Figure 1.9 reveals little evidence of negative correlation between initial income and growth across a large sample of countries.[17] Convergence tests among less homogeneous economies usually add other "control" variables in the growth regression alongside initial per-capita income. Including the other variables that affect the steady-state growth rate allows the effect of initial income to be examined even when steady-state growth rates differ.

To see how a conditional-convergence regression might work, consider four countries that obey the Solow growth model. The countries differ in two ways: two have a high saving rate and two have low saving rates. Two have relatively low initial endowments of capital per worker and two have relatively high initial capital. Call these countries HSLK, HSHK, LSLK, and LSHK, respectively, according to the definitions in Table 5. We assume that all other aspects of the countries (production function, level and rate of technological progress, population growth rate) are identical.

Table 5. Definitions of four example countries

		Initial Capital/Worker	
		Low	High
Saving Rate	Low	LSLK	LSHK
	High	HSLK	HSHK

The Solow model tells us that per-capita income in the two countries with high saving rates will converge to a higher balanced-growth path than those with low saving rates. The initial level of per-capita income depends only on capital per worker, so the two LK countries begin at low per-capita income and the HK countries start out higher. Figure 8 shows the convergence paths of the four countries to their respective balanced-growth paths.

Notice that the most rapid growth over the t_0 to t_1 time interval occurs in HSLK. Its high saving rate means that this country will move to the higher steady state, while its low initial capital implies that it starts from a lower level. LSHK has the lowest growth rate from t_0 to t_1 because it starts from high per-capita income and moves to the lower path due to its low saving rate. HSHK and LSLK have similar, intermediate rates of growth, despite their large differences in initial income.

[17] For a non-regression approach that demonstrates the implausibility of convergence among the broad sample of countries, see the discussion of Pritchett (1997) in the next section.



Figure 8. Conditional convergence of four countries

A conditional-convergence regression would capture the behavior of the countries in Figure 8 with an equation such as

$$g_i = \alpha + \beta\, y_i(0) + \gamma\, s_i + \varepsilon_i, \tag{4}$$

with g_i representing per-capita income growth in country i, $y_i(0)$ is initial per-capita income in i, s_i is the saving rate in i, and ε_i is a disturbance term that picks up other unmeasured effects on the growth rate. The coefficients α, β, and γ are estimated in the regression.

Figure 8 shows that the Solow model predicts $\beta < 0$ (as in the absolute-convergence regressions) and $\gamma > 0$. The highest growth rate is achieved by HSLK, where the high s_i multiplied by the positive γ coefficient is added to the low $y_i(0)$ value multiplied by the negative β coefficient to assure high growth. Contrast HSLK with LSHK, where the low saving rate is multiplied by positive γ and the high initial income is multiplied by negative β, both of which give a lower growth rate.

A vast number of cross-country growth regressions have been performed in the last two decades using various combinations of control variables playing the role of s_i in equation (4).[18] Prominent among the variables that are often assumed to affect the

[18] An extensive compilation of the variables used in various studies in given in Table 2 of Durlauf and Quah (1999). This table (which is now ten years out of date) spans five pages!

steady-state path are saving and investment rates, education variables, population growth, government budget variables, measures of openness to trade, and various measures of governmental efficiency such as corruption indexes, frequency of revolutions, existence of black markets, or indicators of civil liberties.

Mankiw, Romer, and Weil: Taking Solow seriously

In an influential paper, N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil attempted to "take Robert Solow seriously" (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)). They calculated (as you might in a homework assignment) what the steady-state level of output per person would be in the Solow model with a Cobb-Douglas production function:

$$y^* = \left(\frac{s}{n + g + \delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}. \tag{5}$$

In log terms, equation (5) implies

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y(t)}{L(t)} \right) = \ln A(0) + gt + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \ln s - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \ln(n + g + \delta). \tag{6}$$

Mankiw, Romer, and Weil collected data on the values of n and Y/L for a large number of countries and ran a regression based on equation (6), assuming that $g + \delta = 0.05$ for all countries. They found considerable support for the Solow model from the fact that the coefficients on $\ln s$ and $\ln(n + g + \delta)$ seemed to be equal in absolute value and of opposite sign. However, the implied value of α was around 0.6—much larger than the conventional value of 1/3.

Mankiw, Romer, and Weil then estimated an augmented model that included human capital. The results of this model suggested an α for physical capital of about 0.3 and a corresponding coefficient β on human capital of the same magnitude. Both of these values correspond plausibly to the factor shares of physical and human capital, so the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil model was interpreted as supporting the Solow model's prediction that cross-country income differences were largely a result of differences in the amount of (physical and human) capital they had accumulated.[19]

Studies of conditional convergence abound in the literature. A few of these are examined in a later section on cross-country correlates of growth.

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[19] This conclusion was challenged by, among others, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), who use more refined measures of human capital investment and arrive at a different conclusion. This paper is discussed below.

D. Non-Regression Approaches to Convergence

The concept of σ-convergence

An alternative approach to the analysis of convergence is to examine the cross-sectional variation in per-capita income levels at different points in time. If the degree of variation, measured by the standard deviation σ, declines over time, then σ-convergence is said to occur.

If all economies were converging to a common Solow balanced-growth path, then eventually σ should approach zero. However, there are at least two reasons why we would not expect to observe $\sigma \rightarrow 0$. First, as discussed above, there are good reasons for believing that some countries' balanced growth paths may lie above or below others'. This implies that even after complete convergence there will still be a non-degenerate distribution of per-capita income levels across countries. Second, a realistic application of convergence theory must recognize that convergence will be interrupted by shocks that move countries upward or downward relative to their balanced-growth paths. These shocks would generate a base level of cross-country variation even when the effects of initial differences in capital intensity were eliminated through convergence.

Thus, to interpret changes in measured standard deviation of per-capita incomes over time as a test of convergence, we need to make (at least) two important assumptions relating to the two issues above. First, we need to assume that the cross-country distribution of steady-state paths does not change over the sample period we examine. If changes (unrelated to Solovian convergence) in the world's economies caused growth paths of per-capita income to get closer to one another over time, then σ would decline for reasons other than traditional convergence. Similarly, if paths became more widely different, σ might not fall even if capital-based convergence were occurring.

Second, we need to assume that the shocks pushing countries away from their natural paths do not vary in intensity over the sample. If shocks were less pronounced in the later years of the sample, we would see σ falling even without Solovian convergence, whereas if there were many shocks that varied strongly across countries at the end of the sample, the resulting rise in σ might offset the effects of whatever Solow-type convergence was happening.

These considerations suggest that testing for σ convergence should, like the tests of absolute β convergence, restricted to economies that are likely to have a common balanced-growth path and similar shocks. Figure 9 shows that the standard deviation of per-capita income across Japanese prefectures has declined markedly since World

War II, though the shock associated with war preparations increased dispersion considerably between 1930 and 1940.[20]



Figure 9. σ-convergence across Japanese prefectures

Barro and Sala-i-Martin present evidence for U.S. states that shows a similar pattern of declining dispersion in per-capita incomes since 1880. For European regions, they report separate σ-convergence diagrams for regions within each country, which also show considerable decline in income dispersion.[21]

Tests of convergence in the cross-country distribution of incomes

Although changes in the standard deviation of income can be a useful measure of convergence, there is much more information in evolution of the cross-country distribution of income than can be represented by changes in a single measure. Several authors have used advanced statistical methods to examine how the entire distribution has changed over time.[22]

By looking at year-to-year changes in the relative cross-country income distribution, these authors have estimated the likelihood that countries in particular parts of the distribution (for example, between the 40th and 50th percentiles) will move upward or downward to other parts of the distribution in the following year. Applying these year-to-year "transition probabilities" repeatedly allows one to estimate the "entropy," or final steady state, of the distribution.

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[20] Figure 9 is reproduced from Figure 11.7 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).

[21] See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Figures 11.4 and 11.9.

[22] A summary of this literature can be found in section 5.6 of Durlauf and Quah (1999). Among the papers in this literature are Quah (1993) and Bianchi (1997).

Figure 10, which is taken from Durlauf and Quah (1999), shows a transition surface for 15 years of convergence, using data taken from year-to-year transitions of 105 countries over the 1960–88 period. The height of the surface at any point measures the likelihood of moving from the relative income position on the Period t axis to the position on the Period t+15 axis in 15 years. Two features of Figure 10 are noteworthy: the strong ridge along the diagonal and the twin peaks along that ridge. Both are common findings in the literature.



Figure 10. Estimated changes in distribution of world incomes after 15 years of convergence

The prominence of the ridge shows that countries tend to remain in the same part of the relative income distribution over time. Countries at the poorer (richer) end are more likely to still be poor (rich) fifteen years later than to have changed theory position markedly. The twin-peaked pattern shows a tendency for economies to bunch into two groups, richer and poorer, with countries in the middle tending to either move up or down toward one of the groups. These groupings have been dubbed "convergence clubs" and have been the subject of theoretical as well as empirical examination.[23]

[23] For example, see Basu and Weil (1998).

The idea of convergence clubs has been used to suggest the possibility of "poverty traps," in which poorer countries remain stuck in a low-income equilibrium. Graham and Temple (2006) find evidence consistent with the existence of such poverty traps. Sachs et al. (2004) argue that tropical Africa is stuck in a poverty trap and plead for a "big push" of development assistance to aid these countries in escaping it. However, Kraay and Raddatz (2007) find poverty-trap models to be inconsistent with the data for Africa.

Pritchett's test of plausibility of convergence

Not all tests of convergence rely on elaborate statistical methods. One of the simplest, but most convincing, tests of convergence is by Lant Pritchett (1997). He investigates absolute convergence or divergence among nations by a simple backward extrapolation procedure. The question he poses is "Given the dispersion in per-capita incomes across countries today and the growth that we can measure in the rich countries since 1870, is it plausible that income differentials were much *wider* in 1870 and that convergence has occurred since then?"

Pritchett uses evidence from the growth accounting studies of Angus Maddison (see section B above) to estimate that per-capita income in the advanced countries has grown at an average rate of about 1.5 percent per year since 1870. We do not know enough about historical income levels in other countries to assess directly whether or not they have grown more rapidly than this. We do however have reasonably good estimates of their current income levels.[24] Pritchett's method is to extrapolate a comparable 1.5 percent growth rate backward from the current income levels of poor countries, then to ask whether or not the computed 1870 income levels are plausible.

He finds that many currently poor countries would have to have had income levels of $100 per person or below (in today's terms) in 1870 if they have been growing at 1.5 percent since then. However, he estimates the minimum level of per-capita income that produces sufficient caloric intake to prevent starvation at about $250. Thus, he concludes that today's income distribution cannot represent "convergence" relative to 1870, because the people in currently poor countries could not have survived if their incomes had started out that low.

Perhaps Pritchett's finding is not surprising, given that we do not see strong evidence for absolute convergence in the broad sample of countries even over the shorter, postwar time period.[25] Nonetheless, his simple illustration makes a strong case for focusing attention on non-convergent models or on explaining why countries' balanced-growth paths differ.

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[24] Pritchett uses the Penn World Table data discussed above.

[25] Recall the evidence of Romer's Figure 1.9.

E. Cross-Country Correlates of Growth

The availability of detailed cross-country data for many countries in the postwar period in the Penn World Table and for a few countries back into the 19th century from Maddison has spawned a cottage industry running growth regressions. The typical such regression relates growth (or income level) to various economic, political, or social characteristics of the country. Growth regressions of this kind nearly always include a measure of initial per-capita income to capture the convergence effect. The author then adds other variables that he thinks might cause countries' growth paths to differ and tests whether they have an effect. We examine a few such studies below, beginning in the next section with one of the first studies to examine the effects of human capital on growth.

Barro and Lee's cross-country evidence on human capital

One of the most frequently cited cross-country growth studies is Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee's study, which was among the first to incorporate human capital variables. Barro and Lee (1994) report the results many alternative specifications; we focus here on the simplest.

Barro and Lee include the following variables that may affect countries' steady-state paths:

- Investment/GDP ratio. This is essentially the saving rate, as in (4).
- Government consumption/GDP ratio. Taxes to support government consumption reduce income available for private investment and consumption. These taxes are never lump-sum in practice, thus higher taxes are likely to discourage work and investment.
- Black-market premium on foreign exchange. This variable proxies for the extent to which governments distort prices away from equilibrium, presumably reducing efficiency.
- Revolutions (successful or unsuccessful) per year. More frequent revolutions are believed to reduce per-capita income by lowering the security of property rights and diverting resources from productive activities into protective and political ones.
- Human-capital variables: Male and female school attainment measure education; life expectancy measures health status.

One of the major obstacles to studying the macroeconomic effects of human capital is the difficulty of measuring it. International agencies and national governments collect data for many countries on school enrollment. However, this measures the

flow of education (investment in human capital), not the stock of educated people (human capital itself). In order to overcome this problem, Barro and Lee developed measures of "educational attainment" by combining data from many sources.

Barro and Lee measure educational attainment using the shares of the population at any time that have achieved four levels of schooling: (1) none, (2) at least some primary education, (3) at least some secondary education, and (4) at least some higher education. They use census data to estimate these shares at five-year intervals for over 100 countries. This procedure leaves many missing "cells," because not all of the countries have reliable census data at each date. However, by combining the relatively sparse available data on the general population's educational attainment with more regularly available measures of literacy and school enrollment, they are able to create satisfactory data for 85 countries for 1965–75 and for 95 countries for 1975–85.[26]

Barro and Lee present their main results in their Table 5. Because all of the 18 regressions in Table 5 tell a consistent story, we shall focus on a single one.[27] The dependent variable in their regression is the ten-year-average growth rate of real per capita GDP either over 1965–75 or 1975–85. They pool the two time periods together in their sample to get a total of 160 growth observations—85 and 95 for the two periods, respectively.[28]

Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients of this regression and their standard errors. Remember that we can get a sense of how strongly the data support the hypothesis that the coefficient is not zero by dividing the estimated coefficient by the standard error. If the resulting *t* statistic is larger than two in absolute value, then we can be pretty confident that the variable has a non-zero effect for this sample.

The negative coefficient on initial GDP gives strong support for the conditional convergence hypothesis. The convergence rate of 2.55% per year is in the range of estimates that we have seen above for states, prefectures, and regions, and is typical of the larger literature from which this study is drawn.

The other non-human-capital variables have the expected signs. Investment is good for growth, which implies that countries with higher saving/investment rates converge to higher balanced-growth paths. Government consumption seems to lower the growth path, consistent with greater disincentives from higher tax rates. Distorted markets and revolutions are both very bad for growth, as expected.

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[26] The original paper discussing the human-capital variables is Barro and Lee (1993). An updated version of the data, which are available at www.nber.com, is described in Barro and Lee (2000).

[27] We present detailed results for column (2) of Barro and Lee's Table 5.

[28] This kind of sample is called panel data and is discussed below.

Table 6. Barro and Lee's regression results.

Explanatory variable	Estimated effect (Standard error)
Log of initial GDP	–0.0255 (0.0035)
Investment/GDP	0.077 (0.027)
Government consumption/GDP	–0.155 (0.034)
Black-market premium	–0.0304 (0.0094)
Revolutions	–0.0178 (0.0089)
Male secondary school attainment	0.0138 (0.0042)
Female secondary school attainment	–0.0092 (0.0047)
Log of life expectancy	0.0801 (0.0139)

Barro and Lee emphasize the human-capital measures, which were the novelty of this particular paper. Since this is a topic of interest to us as well, we will consider them in more detail. The human-capital coefficients support the idea that male schooling and life expectancy increase growth. However, the coefficient on female secondary school attainment is estimated to be negative and achieves borderline statistical significance. The male schooling variable implies that giving all of the males in the population another year of high school education at the beginning of the period would raise growth during the 10-year period by 1.4 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in life expectancy of 10 years would increase growth by about 1.3 percentage points, presumably reflecting the productivity advantages of better health and nutrition.

The negative estimated coefficient on female school attainment is a puzzle, but one that is repeated consistently throughout their study. Barro and Lee (p. 18) speculate that "a high spread between male and female secondary attainment is a good measure of backwardness; hence, less female attainment [at the beginning of the period] signifies more backwardness and accordingly higher growth potential through the convergence mechanism." However, convergence effects should already be captured in the regression through the presence of the initial per capita GDP variable, so any convergence effects entering through the education variables are presumably of second order.

The estimated coefficient on the male educational attainment variable is larger in absolute value and more statistically significant than the negative female coefficient, so the general view from the Barro and Lee study is that human capital has an over-

all positive effect on growth. However, we must interpret the results of Barro and Lee's regression carefully.

Should a higher level of education have a growth effect or just a level effect? In the neoclassical model, an increase in the stock of human capital would lead to a higher level of per capita income, but not to a higher steady-state growth rate. Since Barro and Lee's explanatory variable is the beginning-of-period stock of human capital, not the accumulation of human capital through the period, a positive coefficient implies a growth effect. A higher *level* of human capital implies a higher *growth rate* for real output. Thus, Barro and Lee's results seem to suggest support for a model in which higher human capital leads to a higher rate of productivity growth, perhaps because educated workers are better able to adopt new technologies developed in more advanced economies.[29]

Robustness in cross-country growth studies

Empirical studies of growth rates face a serious econometric problem: the statistics that we use to test whether a variable has a statistically significant effect on growth are based on the assumption that *all* of the determinants of growth are included on the right-hand side of the regression equation. While a convincing case can be made for the variables that Barro and Lee have included, it is hard to imagine that there aren't dozens of other variables that affect growth. Indeed, the number of potential growth correlates is limited only by our imagination and the availability of suitable measures.

However, it is infeasible to put all of them in a regression equation at the same time. As discussed in an earlier section, we need lots of degrees of freedom for our statistical tests to be able to discriminate effectively between accidental correlations in the data and those that are too strong to have occurred randomly. That means that the number of observations must be much larger than the number of coefficients being estimated in the regression. A cross-country growth regression can have only about 100 country observations, so the number of variables that can be included on the right-hand side must be much lower than 100. Most econometricians would feel uncomfortable running such a regression with more than about 10 right-hand variables whose coefficients must be estimated.

Given our limited observations and the plethora of candidate regressors, we are almost certain to leave out something of relevance. This will bias the estimated coefficients of variables that are correlated with the omitted variables. For example, suppose that what really affects growth is the effective enforcement of property rights,

[29] Recall that Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) obtained good econometric results from a convergent model with human capital, which suggests level but not growth effects. Recently, Cohen and Soto (2007) have developed a new dataset on international human capital. Their results suggest a growth effect for increased schooling.

but that we do not include a variable measuring this in the equation. We do include a variable indicating whether or not the country has a democratic form of government. Because property rights are more often enforced effectively in democracies, these variables will be correlated. Leaving out the property-right variable will cause the democracy variable to "proxy" for the omitted variable. Because the coefficient on the democracy variable will measure *both* the effects of democracy and those of property rights, it will be a biased measure of the pure democracy effect. If we omit property rights from the equation, our results might suggest that democracy has a significant effect on growth even if it does not.

A related problem is that of ***multicollinearity***, which occurs when a set of explanatory variables is so highly correlated within itself that it is impossible to identify their individual effects. Suppose in the example above that we have measures of both democracy and or property rights, but that all countries that are democratic have good property-rights regimes and all autocratic countries have bad property rights. In this case, democracy and property rights are perfectly correlated (collinear) with one another. Our regression may detect that a change from autocracy *and* bad property rights to democracy *and* good property rights affects growth, but because we have no observations with democracy and bad property rights or autocracy and good rights, we cannot tell *which* variable it is that is important. Many sets of variables in growth regressions tend to be highly correlated, making it difficult to identify which individual variables within these sets are most important.

The omitted-variable and multicollinearity problems mean that we must be careful to test the ***robustness*** of our results. Variables that seem to affect growth for only a few specifications (collections of right-hand variables) but not for others are termed "fragile" while those whose strong effect is consistent for all or most choices of specifications are called "robust."

In an aptly titled paper, Sala-i-Martin (1997) tests the robustness of growth determinants by looking at about two million alternative specifications. He assumes that initial per-capita income (the convergence effect) and human capital (life expectancy and education) surely affect growth, so these variables are included in all specifications. He then includes various combinations of 59 additional variables that had been proposed as possible causes of growth differences in the pre-1997 literature. Of these 59, he finds 22 variables to have effects that are robust—statistically significant often enough to suggest that their effects are not due to a fortuitous choice of specifications.

He groups the robust variables into the categories shown in Table 7. Some of these variables can be easily interpreted in terms of growth theory. For example, higher rates of investment correspond to higher saving rates, which should elevate the growth path according to the Solow model. A positive growth effect from improvements in the rule of law is a direct implication of the predation theory discussed

at the end of Romer's Chapter 3. No one should be surprised that wars are bad for growth!

Table 7. Variables with robust effect on growth.

Regional variables: Sub-Saharan Africa (−), Latin America (−), Absolute value of latitude (+)
Political variables: Rule of law (+), Political rights (+), Civil liberties (+), Revolutions and coups (−), Wars (−)
Religious variables: Confucian (+), Buddhist (+), Muslim (+), Protestant (−), Catholic (−)
Market distortions and performance: Real-exchange rate distortions (−), Variation in black-market premium (−)
Investment: Equipment investment (+), Non-equipment investment (+)
Primary-sector production: Primary share in exports (−), Mining share of GDP (+)
Openness: Years of openness to trade (+)
Economic organization: Degree of capitalism (+)
Colonial heritage: Former Spanish colony (−)

Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997). See original paper and those cited therein for variable definitions.

However, other variables in Table 7 raise as many questions as they answer. The regional variables verify that growth has been lower than would be expected based on other variables for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and those lying nearer the equator. But these variables do not explain *why* these countries have had lower growth. To have a true explanation of growth, we need to know what it is about these countries that caused them to grow more slowly. Similarly, the religion and colonial heritage variables are probably proxying for characteristics of these societies that are not being measured directly. As economists are able to use more and better measures of social characteristics, an appropriate goal might be the elimination of the significant effects of these dummy variables.

Cross-country vs. panel data estimation

The limited number of countries we can observe limits our ability to identify factors that affect growth. One possible method of increasing the number of observations is to use multiple observations from each country corresponding to different time periods. Datasets with observations that track the same cross-sectional sample over time are called ***panel data***.

Using panel data has the advantage of allowing separate historical periods within a country to speak distinctly in the sample. For example, Vietnam, Germany, China, South Africa, Chile, and many other countries have had major changes in the structure of their economies in the last half century. In a purely cross-sectional sample, the growth rate and the values of the independent variables would be averaged over the

entire period, ignoring information about changes over time in growth and country characteristics. With panel data, the time periods that these countries were under different regimes can be entered as separate observations, potentially increasing the ability of the sample to identify the effects of changes in regimes.

However, there are some pitfalls associated with using panel data that often require the use of special econometric techniques. It is likely that many characteristics of a country remain unchanged over time. Those that can be measured (*e.g.,* geography) can be entered into the equation, but those that cannot (*e.g.,* culture) end up contributing to the error term. The desirable statistical properties of the ordinary least squares estimator depend on the assumption that the error term for each observation is an independent draw from a given probability distribution whose value does not depend on any of the other draws. If we have five decadal observations for Mexico and there are unmeasured characteristics of Mexico that contribute in a similar way in each decade, then the five Mexico observations will not be independent.

A similar problem occurs with observations from different countries for the same period of time. The oil shock of the 1970s affected all countries of the world at the same time, though perhaps not all in exactly the same way. If, say, France and Belgium were similarly affected by the rise in world oil prices (and if there is no variable in the equation to measure oil-price shocks), then the observations for the 1970s for France and Belgium would likewise not be truly independent.

The standard way of compensating for these common country factors and time events is by using a ***fixed-effects*** estimation model. This regression equation includes on the right-hand side, in addition to the desired explanatory variables, a dummy (zero-one) variable for each country and for each time period.[30] Any idiosyncratic characteristics that affect a country's growth in all periods are captured in the coefficient of that country's dummy variable. Any idiosyncratic effects occurring in all countries in a given time period are captured by the coefficient on that time period's dummy variable. What remains to be explained by the coefficients on the explanatory variables are the variations in growth not occurring strictly in one country or time period. Because the coefficients of interest are estimated based on *differences across countries* of the *differences (changes) over time*, this estimation model is sometimes called a ***differences-in-differences estimator***.

As noted above, Barro and Lee use a panel-data sample with two observations per country. Because they have so few observations per country, they use an alternative estimation method called a ***random-effects*** model that accounts for the correlation between the observations of a single country in the two time periods but does not add

[30] For example, a dummy variable for Mexico would have the value one for observations on Mexico and zero for all other observations. Its coefficient then measures (and controls for) any tendency for growth in Mexico to be higher or lower than the world average across all time periods.

a dummy variable for each country. Results from fixed-effects and random-effects models are often, but not always, similar.

Institutions and economic growth

A major theme among recent studies of cross-country growth has been attention to the effect of political and social institutions. By "institutions," economists usually mean man-made characteristics of social and political interaction such as the form of government, the number and kinds of political parties, the size and power of various economic groups (*e.g.,* labor unions and producer organizations), cultural customs, and the effectiveness of law enforcement and judicial systems. Economists hope to explain the differences in growth captured by the regional dummy variables discussed above by careful examination of these institutional characteristics. In Section 3.10, Romer summarizes some institutional growth literature on the effects of geography and colonization on income and growth.

An important strain of growth literature has looked at political institutions. Although Sala-i-Martin (1997) finds five political variables—rule of law, political rights, civil liberties, revolutions and coups, and wars—to be robust predictors of growth in a cross-country sample, some of these are more "outcomes" of policy than "political institutions."

How does one distinguish the effects of political institutions from those of the policies that those institutions promulgate? It is clear from Sala-i-Martin (1997) and the literature that he reviews is that the *combination* of good institutions and good policies *does* tend to be associated with high incomes and growth. But if countries with "good institutions" tend to have "good economic policies," then how can we know if it is the policies or the institutions that correlate with growth? Moreover, if it is institutions that are relevant, is it good political institutions that lead to high incomes or high incomes that cause countries to adopt good institutions? Economists and political scientists are still struggling with these problems.[31]

One related question that has attracted attention from both economists and political scientists is whether democratic countries tend to grow faster than autocratic ones. Clearly, much will depend on what else is held constant. It may be that democratic institutions affect growth only because democracies tend to enforce the rule of law and protect political rights and civil liberties more effectively and to face a reduced likelihood of war or revolution. If the only effect of democracy is through

[31] See Kurtz and Schrank (2007) for a discussion of the problems of the common measures of political institutions and an analysis suggesting that the causality runs from economic from high incomes to good institutions rather than the other way around.

these other variables, then a democracy variable added to an equation that already contains these variables would have no explanatory effect.[32]

Table 1 of Przeworski and Limongi (1993) summarizes 18 empirical studies by economists and political scientists looking at the effects of democracy on growth in samples from 1950 to the mid-1980s. These authors conclude that the evidence is almost equally mixed among results favoring democracy and those favoring autocracy, with some studies finding no difference. As noted above, it is likely that *policies* have a more direct effect on growth than the form of government. Either a democracy or a dictatorship can follow policies that are good for growth or policies that inhibit growth.

In terms of policies, economists are broadly in agreement that "economic liberalization" policies are likely to enhance growth. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) examine the combined effects of democracy and liberalization, taking careful consideration of the order in which changes occur. They use panel data for 1960–2000 for approximately 135 countries.[33] Their measure of economic liberalization is taken from Sachs and Warner (1995), based on the openness of the economy to trade. According to their definition, a country is open in a particular year if none of the following conditions applies:

- average import tariff rate exceeds 40%,
- more than 40% of imports are covered by nontariff barriers,
- the economic system is socialist,
- the black-market premium on the exchange rate exceeds 20%, and
- much of the country's exports are controlled by the state.

Liberalization consists of moving from a non-open regime to an open one.

Giavazzi and Tabellini's measure of democracy comes from a widely-used political database called Polity IV.[34] They simplify the variable into a zero-one dummy variable for democracy depending on whether a country's democratic characteristics in Polity IV outnumber its autocratic ones.

Using a fixed-effects estimation strategy but no other control variables, they estimate that a country's growth rate increases by 0.78 percentage points after a reform from autocracy to democracy. A reform that introduces economic liberalization (openness) increases the growth rate by 1.32 percentage points. Both of these esti-

[32] As noted above, the direction(s) of causality are debatable in these equations, so it may be more appropriate to model these political outcomes as dependent variables in their own equations with democracy as one of the explanatory variables.

[33] The exact number varies over time depending on the availability of data.

[34] This database is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.

mates measure growth relative to what would have happened had no reform occurred.

These effects suggest strong positive growth effects for both economic liberalization and democratization. However, further results suggest that the combination and sequencing of these two kinds of reforms also matter. Table 8 shows the estimated effects of economic and political reforms on growth in a 107-country sample, controlling for fixed effects and a lagged value of growth.

Table 8. Estimated effects of democratization and liberalization.

Event	Effect on subsequent growth
Democratization in countries that never liberalized	0.86 (0.60)
Democratization in countries that did liberalize	1.05** (0.47)
Liberalization in countries that never democratized	1.00** (0.51)
Liberalization in countries that did democratize	1.71*** (0.64)
Democratization occurring after liberalization	0.99 (0.92)
Liberalization occurring after democratization	−2.07** (0.85)

Asterisks indicate the statistical strength of the effect. ** (***) implies statistical significance at the 5% (1%) level.
Source: Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Table 5.

The estimates in Table 8 are a little tricky to interpret. Comparing the top two rows shows that democratization has a slightly larger effect in countries that liberalized (at some point in the sample) than in countries that did not. Similarly, the third and fourth rows show that liberalization had a considerably larger effect in countries that democratized (at some point in the sample). This result suggests complementarity between democratic reform and economic liberalization.

However, the large difference between the last two rows indicates that the order of reform matters greatly. To see this effect, consider three countries, all of which start out autocratic and economically unreformed. Country A is our control case, remaining in that state throughout the sample. Country B becomes a democracy, then later undertakes economic liberalization. Country C liberalizes its economy first, then becomes democratic later.

None of the coefficients in Table 8 applies to Country A.[35] Both Countries B and C eventually democratize and liberalize, so they get positive growth effects of 1.05%

[35] All of the dummy variables would have zero values in every period for A, so the coefficients shown in the table would be multiplied by zero and not affect A's growth.

and 1.71% (adding 2.76 percentage points to its growth rate relative to Country A) from these reforms based on the coefficients in rows two and four.[36] However, Country B liberalizes after becoming a democracy, giving it the –2.07% effect in the last row for a total net effect (relative to Country A) of 0.69%. Country C liberalizes before democratizing, giving it an additional 0.99% effect from row five and a total effect (relative to Country A) of 3.75 percentage points. This difference between the post-reform growth rates of B and C is very large both economically and statistically.

Clearly, Giavazzi and Tabellini's results suggest that countries that reformed their economies before becoming democratic (Chile, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example) had much better growth records than countries that became democratic first (such as Argentina, Brazil, and Romania). Some have theorized that economic reform, which is inevitably opposed by those whose interests are advanced or protected under the old regime, may be more difficult if political leaders must maintain popularity with the electorate during its early years. This may result in compromises that reduce the effectiveness of liberalization. In support of this hypothesis, Giavazzi and Tabellini find evidence that countries that liberalize after democratizing tend to have much larger government deficits than those reforming in the other order. This might result if elected leaders must "buy off" the opponents of reform with tax cuts or spending projects, whereas autocrats would not find such compensation necessary.

In a follow-up paper, Persson and Tabellini (2006) find evidence that the *kind* of democratic system may also be important for growth. They test the effects of two characteristics of democracies: parliamentary systems vs. presidential ones and majoritarian systems (in which each member of the legislative body is elected by a majority vote in a district) vs. proportional-representation systems (in which parties are allocated seats in proportion to their national or regional vote total).

Persson and Tabellini find no significant difference in growth outcomes between majoritarian and proportional systems, but they do estimate that the growth rate is 1.61 percentage points lower in parliamentary democracies than in presidential ones. Other results suggest that parliamentary systems are more likely to pursue economic liberalization than presidential ones (though these reforms, occurring after democratization, have small effects) and are more likely to increase government consumption (the buying-off-opponents effect). Persson and Tabellini argue that this "binge spending" associated with economic reform accompanied by a surge in government consumption spending may cause distortions that lower economic growth.

In another recent paper, Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006) examine the effects of political competition on growth, using evidence from the U.S. states. They develop a

[36] After both political and economic reform, the dummy variables in rows two and four would have the value one, effectively "activating" those coefficients for B and C.

theoretical model to show that greater competitiveness of political races might lead parties to nominate better candidates, who then enact better policies once elected.

They use the passage of the Voting Rights Act, which initiated the destruction of traditional Democratic dominance in the South, as a natural experiment to measure the effect of increased competition between parties on economic policies and growth. They find that greater political competition seems to lead to better governors, better economic policies, and higher state income growth.

While many authors have included political institutions such as democracy and rule of law in growth regressions, the causality is ambiguous. Do countries with "good" political institutions grow faster or do fast-growing countries develop better institutions, or both? In order to attempt to determine causality, we need to find a variable that affects institutions but that does not separately affect growth. Such a variable could be used as an ***instrumental variable*** in estimation. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show that European colonies located in parts of the world where the colonists had low mortality rates developed better institutions than other colonies. Where colonist mortality was low, they tended to settle in the countries and establish European-like institutions; where mortality rates were high, they did not settle and merely extracted resources from the colony and colonists. Because colonist mortality rates affect institutions but can be assumed to have no direct effect on current income and growth, they are suitable instrumental variables for use in disentangling the causality between institutions and growth. Using these methods, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson find strong causality running from political institutions to growth.

Inequality and growth

Another question that has been of great interest to economists and policymakers is the relationship between economic growth and income inequality within countries. Causal effects in either direction are possible: having more inequality may be good or bad for a country's growth prospects and, conversely, growing faster may increase or decrease inequality.

Persson and Tabellini (1994) provide evidence on the effects of inequality on growth. The theoretical growth models we have studied are all representative-agent models in which everyone is the same, so these models cannot tell us anything about possible effects of inequality. Persson and Tabellini build an overlapping-generations model in which newborn agents vary in their endowment of skills that can be sold in the labor market. Agents not only interact in the usual way in economic markets, but they also decide on a policy parameter analogous to a redistributive tax rate through

democratic political interaction. As is common in such models, it is the preferences of the median voter that determine the political outcome.[37]

The distribution of skills is assumed to have a long but thin tail at the top end (a few extremely high-skilled people) and a short but thick tail at the bottom (many people with skills below the mean, but not too far below). This implies that the median of the distribution lies below the mean, the latter being dragged upward by the disproportionate effect of averaging in the few extremely highly skilled people. A reduction in endowment inequality would push the median endowment upward toward the mean, which would reduce the preference of the median voter for tax-based redistribution of income.

Since high redistributive taxes discourage investment, they lower the equilibrium growth path. A reduction in (before-tax) income inequality thus lowers the public's (median voter's) demand for high taxes and raises the steady-state growth path.

Persson and Tabellini use two data samples to test the hypothesis that inequality lowers growth. The first is a historical sample of data since 1830 on nine now-developed countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Each country is observed (if data are available) over 20-year periods beginning with 1830–1850 and ending with 1970–1985. (The last period spans only 15 years because data through 1990 were not available at the time the paper was written.)

They measure income inequality as the share of income earned by households in the top 20 percent of the income distribution. They expect an increase in this variable to reduce growth.

However, not all those earning income have been allowed to vote through much of the sample period. To the extent that it is poorer voters who are disenfranchised, the median *voter* (as distinct from the median *earner*) has a higher income, which will lead to a lower level of redistributive taxes and higher growth. Thus, they expect a positive growth effect from their variable measuring the share of the population that is disenfranchised. To control for convergence and human-capital effects, they also include a schooling variable and a variable measuring the gap between the country's level of per-capita income at the beginning of the 20-year period and the highest income level in the world at that time.

Persson and Tabellini's results support their hypothesis that greater inequality leads to lower growth. An increase of 0.07 in the share of income earned by the top 20 percent of the population (which is an increase of one standard deviation in this variable) lowers growth by about one-half percentage point. They find a slightly negative but statistically insignificant effect of disenfranchisement. They attribute this unexpected result to the lack of variation in this variable in their sample.

[37] The median voter is the one who has an endowment higher than 50% of the population and lower than 50%.

Persson and Tabellini second sample uses a larger group of countries over the postwar period. For this sample, they measure income equality/inequality by the share of income earned by the middle quintile (40^{th} to 60^{th} percentiles of income-earners). An increase in this share corresponds to an increase in equality of incomes, so they expect it to have a positive effect on growth. Again, their results support the hypothesis that increases in income equality lead to increases in growth. As in the other sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in the equality variable leads to a growth rate that is higher by about one-half percentage point.

The evidence of Persson and Tabellini suggests that inequality is bad for growth, but what about the effect of growth on inequality? Do the income distributions in growing countries tend to get more equal or more unequal? Dollar and Kraay (2002) look at the effects of growth on the incomes of the poorest members of society.

Specifically, Dollar and Kraay examine the effect of growth and growth-enhancing policies on the incomes of the lowest 20 percent of the population. Using panel data by decades on growth in 92 countries, they find no effect of either growth or the common economic liberalization policies used to stimulate growth on the share of income earned by the bottom quintile. This means that while growth has not helped to lift the poorest members of society in relative terms, it has raised their incomes in the same proportion that it has raised those of wealthier people. Thus, Dollar and Kraay find evidence in support of what is sometimes called the "high-tide-lifts-all-boats" hypothesis.

Studies of cross-country income differences

To test for level effects of human capital and other variables we can examine the association between levels of human capital and *levels* of per capita real income. Romer reviews two major studies of cross-country differences in income or productivity in section 3.9. In this section, we consider some additional details from these two studies.

Both the paper by Hall and Jones (1999) and the study by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) adopt a growth-accounting approach rather than the econometric method of Barro and Lee. To estimate stocks of human capital, both studies rely on the Barro-Lee estimates of educational attainment. However, to employ these numbers in a growth-accounting framework the raw averages for primary, secondary, and higher education per person must be reduced to a single human-capital number for each country.

How can we combine or aggregate the amount (value) of human capital embodied in people with a high school degree together with people with no high school or other education levels? The answer is that we should aggregate workers together based on their relative productivity levels. If workers with a high school degree are

twice as productive as workers with no high school, then they should count for twice as much human capital.

How, then, might we estimate the relative productivity levels of people with different education level? The method chosen by both studies is to take advantage of many years of empirical research in labor economics where economists have attempted to estimate the effect of education on wages. In a competitive market with perfect information, each worker should be paid a wage equal to his or her marginal productivity. If relative wages accurately reflect the marginal productivity of various kinds of labor, then the wage distribution across education levels should mirror the productivity distribution. Hall and Jones use the results of studies of the wage distribution for many countries to aggregate workers of various education levels into a single human-capital aggregate for each country. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare go a step farther by attempting to correct for quality differences between the schooling received in different countries.

The main result of both studies emphasizes that differences in human capital are an important part of international income differences, but that a large residual remains unexplained. In other words, human and physical capital differences can explain only part of the differences between rich and poor countries. A larger share is due to productivity differences that are not explained within the traditional growth-accounting framework—analogous to the Solow residual discussed in our Chapter 2.

Empirical evidence on rent seeking and growth

The predation model in Romer's section 3.11 suggests that we might see large differences in per-capita income and growth across countries depending on the relative returns to productive activity vs. rent seeking. However, these differences in returns are very difficult to measure empirically. Illegal rent-seeking activities such as extortion and fraud are not measured in economic statistics, so we have no direct measure of their size across economies. Legal rent seeking such as lawsuits and lobbying are measured, but they are also included in national income alongside "productive" activities, so even their measurement is problematic.

Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny attempted to look at the growth effects of rent seeking.[38] They used the share of college students enrolled in law schools and the share enrolled in engineering schools to measure the relative attractiveness of rent seeking vs. production. Table 9 shows the results of a regression that follows a standard model for cross-country growth regressions, but with law and engineering enrollments added. The dependent variable is the per capita GDP growth rate over 1970 to 1985. Their sample includes the 55 countries that had at least 10,000 college students in 1970.

[38] Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991).

The initial GDP variable and the measures of investment, primary school enrollment, government consumption, and revolutions have the expected effects, though not all are statistically significant.[39]

The coefficients on the shares of engineering and law students support the hypothesis that rent-seeking activities reduce growth, although the statistical significance of the coefficients is marginal at best. They authors argue that the effect is actually stronger than the magnitude of the coefficients shown in Table 9 because countries with more engineering and fewer law students also have higher levels of investment. Adding in secondary effects of student composition on other variables leads to an estimated overall effect of engineering share of 0.125 and an effect of law share of –0.065. Based on their estimates, then, if 5 percent of the college students in a country were to change from law school (roughly half of the law students in an average country) to studying engineering, the country's growth rate would increase by about $5 \times (0.125 - (-0.065)) = 0.95$ percentage points.

Table 9. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny's regression results.

Explanatory variable	Estimated coefficient (Standard error)
Investment	0.085 (0.039)
Primary school enrollment	0.012 (0.011)
Government consumption	–0.064 (0.053)
Revolutions and coups	–0.035 (0.009)
Initial GDP (1960)	–0.006 (0.001)
Engineering students	0.054 (0.034)
Law students	–0.078 (0.040)

[39] Note that this study uses primary school enrollment rather than the Barro-Lee school attainment measures. The Barro-Lee measures had not yet been published at the time the Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny study was done.

F. Empirical Studies of Endogenous Growth

One obvious test of endogenous vs. neoclassical growth models is implicit in the convergence literature described in detail above. Because endogenous growth models imply that convergence may not occur, evidence against convergence could be interpreted as favoring these models over ones of the Solow/Ramsey type. However, there are other implications of endogenous growth models that provide alternative (and sometimes more specific) tests. In this section, we shall examine the results of several of these studies. This is an active area of current research, with new results being circulated and published every month. The papers that are described here are but a few representative examples.

Evidence on returns to scale

The presence of constant vs. decreasing returns to scale to produced inputs is central to the distinction between neoclassical and endogenous growth models. A direct test of the degree of returns to scale in a broad concept of capital can potentially distinguish between the models.

Many studies have examined returns to scale at both the micro and macro levels. A recent paper by Catherine Morrison and Donald Siegel tests specifically for the kind of increasing returns to scale that are at the heart of endogenous growth models—those due to the presence of knowledge and human capital alongside the traditional inputs of labor and physical capital. Morrison and Siegel (1997) estimate cost functions at the industry level. Each industry cost function is a relationship between total cost and five kinds of variables: (1) the prices of the variable inputs, (2) the level of output, (3) the levels of fixed inputs (capital), (4) adjustment costs of fixed inputs (which are assumed to be related to the amount of change in the various kinds of capital), and (5) a set of "external scale factors" representing the effects of economy-wide variables such as knowledge. For measurable external scale factors, they use a time trend (the traditional proxy for exogenous growth) and stocks of human capital, R&D capital, and high-tech capital.

Morrison and Siegel use time series data from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database on 450 individual industries to estimate their cost functions.[40] Their

[40] This database uses an industry taxonomy called Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. This classification is very commonly used for industry data. The industries are successively subdivided into "2 digit" industries such as 20: Food and kindred products, 3 digit industries within the 2 digit classification such as 204: Feeds, and 4 digit industries within the 3 digit ones, for example, 2047: Pet foods. The NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database contains data for 450 manufacturing industries, mostly at the 4-digit level of disaggregation.

results suggest that physical capital alone has diminishing returns. Human capital, R&D, and high-tech investment ("external" investment) all increase productivity, making the degree of diminishing returns smaller for "total capital" than for physical capital alone. Moreover, increases in external capital lead to savings in the use of variable inputs that suggest that overall scale economies for both capital and variable inputs may be increasing.

While their study finds diminishing returns overall to produced inputs, Morrison and Siegel do provide substantial evidence of the importance of external capital such as education and R&D. This suggests that endogenous growth models represent an important advance, even if the authors' parameter estimates imply that endogenous growth based solely on produced inputs is unlikely to be sustainable.

Evidence on growth vs. level effects of economic changes

Endogenous growth implies that changes in such parameters as the saving rate, the share of resources allocated to R&D, and government policies that affect these parameters should have effects not only on the level of per-capita income (as in the Solow model) but on the rate of growth. For example, in Paul Romer's R&D model (see equation (3.22) on page 113 of D. Romer's text), the rate of growth of technology depends on a_L, which is the share of labor devoted to the R&D sector.

Jones (1995) argues that under endogenous growth, any permanent change in a variable such as government fiscal policy should lead to a permanent change in the trend growth rate. He finds that there have been significant changes in fiscal policy variables, but no corresponding changes in growth, so he rejects endogenous growth. Jones's study was criticized by subsequent authors for relying too much on the individual behavior of the growth and investment variables and not adequately investigating the time-series relationship between them.

Paul Evans (1997) examined government consumption in detail for 92 countries. His results are strikingly consistent: growth effects (endogenous growth) are supported in only *three* of the 92 countries. Evans concludes that the evidence supports the kind of exogenous growth found in the Solow model rather than the self-reinforcing endogenous growth implied by the modern models with constant returns to produced inputs.

However, using long-sample data for the United States and United Kingdom, Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) are able to reject the hypothesis that growth is exogenous using different government spending variables. Where Evans used government consumption, they use a disaggregated set of government variables. They find permanent effects for both public (government-provided) capital and tax-rate variables.

This databases is available for download via FTP at www.nber.com if you are interested in seeing what the actual numbers look like.

This reinforces their earlier result from Kocherlakota and Yi (1996), for which they found that government investment had permanent effects in the United States.[41]

Evidence on the effects of private human capital vs. public knowledge

Peter Klenow (1998) performed an empirical test to discriminate between the two kinds of models discussed in Romer's Chapter 3. Recall that in the R&D models of the first part of the chapter, knowledge is a public good that increases the productivity of *every* producer in *every* industry once it has been created. In contrast, the human-capital model implies that the enhanced productivity from human capital is embodied in workers. Only producers and industries that employ labor having the human capital will see increased productivity. Klenow noted that in the human-capital model, productivity growth should be higher in labor-intensive industries than in industries that employ less labor, since they will benefit more from human capital investment. However, if knowledge is general (as in the R&D model) then all industries should benefit equally.

Klenow uses data for 450 detailed manufacturing industries from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database to examine the connection between productivity growth and labor intensity. He finds that industries with high labor intensity, however measured, tend to have *lower* rather than higher productivity growth, which is evidence for the general knowledge model over the specific human-capital model. In fact, it supports a model in which knowledge is embodied in capital rather than in labor. He expresses the essence of his result with the following very accessible anecdote in his conclusion:

> Using the human capital I gleaned from a high school typing class, I could have typed this paper on the 1982-vintage typewriter I received for my high school graduation. Correcting spelling errors would have been a slow and tedious process. In contrast, the word processor I used allowed me to correct spelling errors with only a few commands. My knowledge of the required keystrokes surely represents human capital. But I did not need to understand the software or hardware that responded to my keystrokes. With little change in my typing human capital, the ideas embedded in my computer dramatically raised my productivity in correcting typos.
>
> Industry evidence in the NBER Database suggests that this anecdote may be more the rule than the exception. Industries with rapid productivity growth are not intensive in overall labor, nonproduction labor, or high wage labor. I could not explain these facts with either a

[41] See Poot (2000) for a useful survey of the literature on government effects on growth.

> general or industry-specific human capital model. … In the data rapid [total factor productivity] growth industries have rapidly declining … capital and materials prices, favoring [a theory based on] industry-specific ideas embodied in capital and intermediate inputs. [Klenow (1998)]

However, Klenow is careful to point out that theories based on rival human capital and those relying on nonrival knowledge could be complements rather than substitutes in explaining productivity growth. Although his evidence fails to find strong evidence of human-capital-based growth in U.S. manufacturing, that does not mean that it might not be of great importance in non-manufacturing industries or in other countries.

G. Suggestions for Further Reading

Overviews of growth and empirical results

Barro, Robert, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004). (Chapters 10 through 12 have extensive empirical content.)

Durlauf, Steven N., and Danny T. Quah, "The New Empirics of Economic Growth," in *Handbook of Macroeconomics*, Volume 1A, edited by J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1999).

Selected growth accounting studies

Barro, Robert, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), Chapter 10. (A survey of growth accounting results.)

Denison, Edward, *Accounting for United States Economic Growth, 1929–1969* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967). (An old but very detailed growth accounting study, which provides lots of detail on the methodology.)

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Jorgenson, Dale W., Frank M. Gollup, and Barbara M. Fraumeni, *Productivity and U.S. Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987). (A very detailed study of total-factor-productivity growth in various industries.)

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