Alternative Globalities in Mexico City: The Santa Fe Megaproject versus the “Rescue” of Downtown
In a May 2016 Forbes article titled “Is Mexico City Turning into New York City?” Mexico City resident and architect Fernando Madrid celebrates the increased safety of his city and the presence of “big corporations and luxury hotels.” The central comparison of the article is with New York: “Neighborhoods like Roma and Condesa are like Soho, the West Village. In terms of diversity and culture it’s like New York, you can find people from all over the world here.” The article goes on to laud the newfound cosmopolitanism, real estate development, and increasing numbers of young, upper-middle class professionals like engineers and accountants in El Distrito Federal (often abbreviated as DF). Two spaces mentioned as exemplary of the city’s success are downtown, where Madrid lives, and the Santa Fe business district (“maybe the equivalent of mid-town [Manhattan],” according to Madrid). The article makes clear that “Mexico City’s pursuit of New York City’s success isn’t an accident, but rather the result of careful policy making and planning.”

Indeed it is, but upon closer examination we see how DF’s contemporary situation emerged from a variety of plans and forces, not all of which are as rosy and harmonious as the article implies. The article’s comparisons with New York City and its linear narrative of DF’s development from being a “dirty, dangerous city…[to being] a world-class metropolis” are examples of a widespread discursive trend. Through the umbrella analytics of “globalization,” “modernization,” “neoliberalism,” and others, both mainstream and academic discourses homogenize social life across continents and societies. Although these concepts point to the far-reaching effects of trans-local movements of capital and the apparent dominance of Western modern cultural forms, they belie both the targeted and variegated character of the so-called global economy as well as the heterogeneity of discourse and practice within the workings of global capital itself. As Tsing argues, despite the “synergy” of many actors’ “globalist projects,”
(defined as “relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices” that invoke the global), there is no single global process but rather “varied agendas, practices, and processes that may or may not be deeply interconnected at a given historical moment” (Tsing 2008, 85, 73). In this formulation of globalization, *claims* to global connectivity and prosperity are always partial and articulated among other competing claims and realities of scale and substance.

In this analysis of the “globalization” of Mexico City, I target two distinct globalist projects that are both tied by the movements and demands of transnational capital and its contemporary neoliberal forms. Although the neoliberal restructuring to the pace and standards of the global economy in Mexico and Mexico City is a real phenomenon, to rigorously analyze this process of ostensible connection and development we must interrogate the plurality of claims and projects involved and their specific logics. This requires analysis of the implicit or explicit “subjects authorized to participate” in particular globalist imaginaries, of what “channels” or methods are taken to produce a particular globalist ideal, and of the gaps and alignments between imagination and implementation (77). While remembering that “the very search for overlaps, alliances, collaborations, and complicities is one of the most important phenomena we could study,” we see how globalist projects engendered by and for the Mexican state’s neoliberal turn are uniquely targeted, emergent, and coterminous (73). Through comparison of two such projects in Mexico City (namely, the construction of the Santa Fe business district and the “rescue” of historic downtown), we see both commonalities and divergences in the social realities invoked and created in this current moment of neoliberal capitalism. This comparison reveals the way in which neoliberal development and the successful functioning of transnational capital is differentially articulated and implemented (or “channeled”) according to the prior material and cultural positioning of space.
Despite the abstract validity of analyzing both of these projects as articulations of neoliberal capitalism, this analysis emerges from the recognition that the material and ideological differences in how these processes take shape matter for how differently positioned and categorized spaces and persons fit in the so-called “global era.” Both projects involve government abandonment of the city to private actors and market methods as well as violent police coercion, integral practices of an authoritarian neoliberal governmentality. Situated within the hegemonic discourses of legality and “development,” (Escobar 1995) this governmentality is in many ways the necessary counterpart to the social ills created by the Mexican state’s economic restructuring in the 1980s and ‘90s; the macro-scale “opening up” of the Mexican economy to foreign markets engendered the lack of jobs and subsequent preponderance of the “informal economy,” the very target of on-the-ground exclusionary methods. Both projects also entail a kind of Western modern vision. But despite these important overlaps, their divergences are significant. Here I take aesthetic, financial, and spatial-symbolic differences to unpack the variety of “channels” in which physical space can be imagined and inscribed as “global.”

These channels emerge from key socio-historical differences between the spaces of Santa Fe downtown. For one, the Santa Fe megaproject was constructed literally on top of a garbage dump, and the variety of private and public actors involved in its development took this and its other apparent lacks (including its disposable population) as reason to plan as if from scratch into a “non-place” empty of cultural meaning and place-bound identity. This capacity to be a “non-place” requires there to be no recognized history, meaning, or social worth. Downtown, whose more culturally sanctioned history makes it a prime site for “heritage tourism, a cornerstone of the local global city strategy” (Becker and Muller 2013, 84), required a different kind of global imaginary in which Mexican national culture and identity (as spatially bounded and
commodified “local” Culture and History) coexist with global capitalist modernity. Again, for both projects exclusionary measures were taken to undermine the “informal economy,” the group of DF denizens left unemployed and unemployable by the Mexican state’s neoliberal turn. This exclusion is integral to both projects; in order to attract and house both national and transnational capital, globalist actors take action to cleanse space of “local” undesirables. But while in Santa Fe the method of exclusion was insidious planning, a more visible approach was taken for downtown, namely the hiring of former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani by Mexican private actors, ostensibly for help with crime and police reform. This difference in “making globality” reflects the differential “channels” of globalization, the ways that “each project has come into being along a different historical trajectory, with different material and political resources and objectives” (Tsing, 68, 74). These divergent, “unpredictable interactions among specific cultural legacies” both aim for a kind of global development through lines of inclusion/exclusion, but the exigencies of space and culture create and pull from different rhetorical techniques, materialities, and practices of transnational neoliberal capitalism. Different aspects, practices, and entire industries of global capitalist development are put in relief depending on the demands and uses of the projects’ respective spatial-symbolic targets.

These projects are structured by Mexico’s neoliberal reforms begun in the 1980s and the country’s “opening up” to the global economy. Important for these reforms is their reception in urban centers like Mexico City. In particular, this economic restructuring aligns with the emergence of a “network of global cities,” also dating from the ‘80s (Sassen 2002, 2). Sassen argues that the emergence of finance capital and the apparent dispersal of the world economy engendered a concomitant geographic centralization of the global economic system in connected urban centers (3, 4). Acting as a territorial “node” of the ostensibly deterritorialized economy of
finance and transnational capital, Mexico City fits into this connectivity as a “global city.” Important to note is the variegated nature of this connection of capital movements vis-à-vis space. Contrary to mainstream conceptions of globalization as a homogenously distributed connecting force, global city connectivity is predicated on the deliberate disconnection from cities’ “local” surroundings. As Sassen puts it, “there is a specific geography of globalization…it is not a planetary event encompassing all of the world” (10). Furthermore, DF’s entrance into this global connectivity and prosperity was not seamless, involving numerous difficulties characteristic of so-called developing economies’ “opening up” to the global market.

Because of a debt crisis that signaled the failures of the “inward” import-substitution economy, in 1982 the Mexican state (following many nation-states) implemented neoliberal reforms. This neoliberal turn saw the deregulation of the economy and labor market, the liberalization of the financial sector, the privatization of state-owned industries, the reorientation of domestic production to foreign markets, wage reductions, and the withdraw of social services (Parnreiter 2002, 147, 155). This “opening” of the economy initially harmed Mexico City’s standing in the national economy, for its central function as both a domestic market and a production site was diminished (149, 155). The 1980s and 1990s saw a slight recovery of the manufacturing sector, but more important was the growth of the service industry, including a 75 percent increase in employment in “real estate, financial, and professional services” between 1987 and 1997 (151). This matches onto the general trend of global cities’ “formation of a new urban economic core of financial and service activities that comes to replace the older, typically manufacturing-oriented core” (Sassen, 16). As we will see, these massive shift in the economics and labor market of El Distrito Federal entailed serious impasses.
Alongside these developments from Mexico’s neoliberal turn of was the emergence of the so-called informal economy that filled the gaps in employment for the non-professional classes. Mexico City witnessed both a “metropolitization of crime” and a “dramatic informalization of employment and the impoverishment of large segments of the urban workforce” (Becker and Muller 2013, 82). In addition to the collapse of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party-state and the growth of the drug trade as a result of the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency’s closing off of trade through Colombia, economic liberalization (such as the signing of NAFTA in 1994) played a major role in augmenting crime in Mexico and DF, particularly since the 1990s (Davis 2013, 55). As we will see in the cases of Santa Fe and downtown, the social ills of crime and the survival strategies of the informal economy (produced by neoliberal structural reforms) are in turn made the target of authoritarian, coercive, and market-oriented tactics. The dynamic of macroeconomic reform and subsequent micro-scale techniques such as policing reflects the way market ideologies and policies must continually work to create the reality they promote through techniques of exclusion of that which does not fit the market model of global capitalist development. In the case of the informal economy in DF, this neoliberal discipline is ironic and contradictory; what may be called the “entrepreneurial spirit” of many in the informal economy is nonetheless backward and undesirable within the global imaginaries of elite actors.

This accords with the nature of neoliberalism as a philosophical and practical endeavor. As Mirowski notes, neoliberalism has never been static, “but is better understood as a transnational movement requiring time and substantial effort in order to attain the modicum of coherence and power it has achieved today” (Mirowski 2009, 426). Both a “philosophical and political project,” the market ideologies that sanction policies of privatization and state
withdrawal require disciplinary practices to create the reality they attest to (426). Analogous to Escobar’s critique of “development” discourse, neoliberalism “thrive[s] more through the coherence of its internal logic than through any insight into the social situation” in which it is applied (Tsing, 68). In the globalist projects of Santa Fe and downtown, making the claim to global development real requires the tightening of loose screws, so to speak; those left behind by the neoliberal turn and forced to survive in the “informal economy” are rendered threats to the yet-to-come prosperity of the market order and governed as such by both state and market actors. Comparison of Santa Fe and historic downtown (Centro Historico) reveals how this dynamic between market-geared structural reform and small-scale targeting of subjects and spaces is differentially articulated and “channeled.” In other words, the end of ensuring the viability of neoliberal reforms and the successful functioning of transnational capital entails specific culturally and historically defined methods of actualization.

The Santa Fe Megaproject as Neoliberal Overhaul

The Santa Fe megaproject illustrates one “channel” of this authoritarian exclusionary development. As a site of global capital, it articulated and abetted the wider neoliberal transition of Mexico and the eventual emergence of Mexico City as a global “node.” Begun in the 1980s by the city government (in the thick of Mexico’s economic reforms),

the objective of the more than 2,000 acre development was to attract global investment through the creation of a wide-ranging plan that would house transnational companies, shopping malls, cafes, restaurants, movie theaters, a convention center, private schools and universities, health services, high-end gated communities, and exclusive apartment buildings (Moreno-Carranco 2014b, 4).

The history of implementing this plan is tortuous, involving multiple mayors, presidents, and private actors distributed across different moments of the project’s progress. Since the 1950s, the city used portions of the space of Santa Fe as a garbage dump. The land also contained sand
mines, which were owned and quarried by miners until depletion in the ‘80s. The conditions for the megaproject thus included removal of the *pепенадорес* or garbage pickers who made a living off the garbage dump, and of the miners. It is not certain how coercive or mutual were the ceding of former mine lands and the removal of the miners. The *pепенадорес*, who held no titles to the land and were relocated twice, were more clearly expropriated. Their first relocation, in 1987, was to Tlayapaca, a plot of land near a new landfill called Prados de la Montaña. Upon closing of this landfill and their expropriation from Tlayapaca, 900 families of *pепенадорес* were finally removed from the space of Santa Fe into the city’s periphery (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 193).

Other impasses to the project followed larger political and economic trends in Mexico. The Mexican state’s debt crisis, the disastrous earthquake in 1985, and the decline of the state’s oil industry all contributed to slow development in Santa Fe in the ‘80s (193). Although Mexican and foreign private actors invested in the project in the early 1990s, the resignation of then-mayor Manuel Camacho (one of the project’s key progenitors) stunted government involvement, and many plans were left unfinished (Moreno-Carranco 2014, 5). It was also later revealed that Carlos Salinas (the president of Mexico at the time) used much of the money set aside for Santa Fe for other development projects peppered around Mexico City (6). According to Moreno-Carranco (2014), this back and forth in investment and construction “must be viewed as part of a longer history of the deep involvement of political figures and bureaucrats in urban development and landmark projects in Mexico City” (7). Characteristic of “a lack of accountability typical of the Mexican political system,” many development projects are started by mayors with presidential or national aspirations only to be left unfinished (7).

These political setbacks, rather than rendering the project a failure, are in a sense constitutive of Santa Fe’s success. Without understating the role of state and local government
actors in the construction of Santa Fe, the project’s profitability and success in housing transnational capital are ultimately due to the functioning of capital itself; the heavy privatization and commercialization of the land of Santa Fe allowed the project to absorb socio-political impasses. The project’s primary development agency, *Servicios Metropolitanos* (SERVIMET), illustrates this dynamic of state and market. SERVIMET, dubbed a public-private partnership, was chiefly an agency of commercialization that worked to attract national and transnational capital (Jones and Moreno-Carranco 2007, 12). Exemplary of neoliberal development, through SERVIMET the Santa Fe megaproject was effectively “a real estate development project orchestrated by a government agency and operated as a private entity” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 192). Here we have a prime example of the mutuality between state and market in neoliberal development. Contrary to claims that state power is undermined by increased privatization of public space, in the case of Santa Fe such a clear dichotomous power relation between state and market is not analytically useful.

*Figure 1.* “First master plan for Santa Fe. It is possible to see the megaproject as ‘floating’ in the middle of the green areas and splintered horizontally by the Mexico-Toluca Freeway. It is also possible to appreciate how most of the vertical streets are dead ends or cul-de-sacs. The regular and irregular settlements surrounding the megaproject were considered irrelevant to the goals of
the project and were therefore erased. Source: Carpeta básica de información Santa Fe by SERVIMET, early 1980s” (Moreno-Caranco 2014a, 198).

Aiwa Ong (2006) refers to this blurry relation between state and market as the “neoliberal exception.” In Ong’s formulation, neoliberalism is a dynamic negotiation between state and private actors in which citizen-subjects and spaces are differentially included or excluded according to the demands of market-based development. Santa Fe, as a delineated space of global capitalist development with a concomitantly defined population of particular kinds of subjects, exemplifies Ong’s analysis:

The spatial concentration of strategic political, economic, and social conditions attracts foreign investment, technology transfer, and international expertise to particular zones of high growth. Market-driven strategies of spatial fragmentation respond to the demands of global capital for diverse categories of human capital, thus engendering a pattern of noncontiguous, differently administered spaces of “graduated” or “variegated sovereignty” (7).

Though not as drastic as China’s “Special Economic Zone” (SEZs) (see Ngai 2005), the space of Santa Fe was nonetheless rendered “special” and exceptional in its designation as a “Controlled Development Special Zone” (Zona Especial de Desarrollo Controlado, or ZEDEC) (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 195). Despite the many impasses in the project’s development into a hub of global capital, this designation ensured its success. That being said, SERVIMET’s privatization and commercialization are but one level of this story. To fully ensure the success of SERVIMET’s development methods, other acts of socio-spatial engineering were required.

Reinforcing Sassen’s claim that global city spaces require active disconnection, Santa Fe hinged upon a dynamic of exclusion and separation vis-à-vis both symbolic and material space, and financial and human capital.

Financially, the Santa Fe megaproject was to some extent autonomous. On one level, some financial autonomy is inherent to privatized growth. However, it is important to hold in view the state-market dynamic wherein autonomous private growth and control of space is made
possible by prior state orchestration. Thus, SERVIMET, Santa Fe’s public-private development agency, was financially self-sufficient and even “referred to as a company” despite its ostensibly public sanction (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 193). The agency’s financial autonomy was paralleled by its autonomy from popular control, allowing for the near-total commercialization of space to cater to investors. This commercialization was highly profitable because of Santa Fe’s prior economic value; the project started “with almost no financial investment” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 191). In the early ‘80s, the government paid three Mexican pesos per square meter of land; in 2013 the same land could be worth up to $2,000 per square meter (191). This, achieved through both national and international investors, translates to a total profit of approximately US$85 million (195).

This profitability also hinged upon the dynamics of space and capital. Spatially, Santa Fe demonstrates a lack of connection to the rest of the city. This is so in terms of road infrastructure, public transportation, walkability, and even basic city services like access to the public water system (Moreno-Carranco 2014, 6). The latter shortcoming has been accommodated by further private methods such as contracted water companies for individual buildings. Those issues that impact laborers and lower-class residents (analyzed further below) are simply neglected. The government’s failure to provide services to the district has prompted both community action (via the Santa Fe Neighborhood Association) and “further privatization and segregation” to ensure returns on investment (7). This reflects two aspects of neoliberal development: the dominance of the market and the lack of social services engender local survival strategies (also analyzed further below), and the dangers of failed development create the need for greater market presence and capital accumulation.
Santa Fe’s disconnection from Mexico City is not merely an aberrant lack, but is constitutive of the space as a “special” zone of neoliberal development. Spatial disconnection is a practice characteristic of global enclaves within markedly “local” or “underdeveloped” contexts:

In order to draw down global capital and ‘add value’ the poorer parts of the city need to be removed or hidden, kept at a distance through carefully designed highways and open spaces, security apparatus and infrastructure networks that unbind the project from the remainder of the city but rebind projects to each other and other global spaces (Jones and Moreno-Carranco, 4).

Santa Fe’s chief method of disconnection was planning. Through specific zoning measures and the privileging of car-based transportation, the project was materially constructed into an “urban enclave,” “a distinct urban environment totally separated from the rest of the city” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 197). Even within Santa Fe, space is “disarticulated”: living space is portioned off via gated communities, and streets are connected such that it is difficult to move between spaces in the area without a car.

Underlying both its spatial and financial autonomy and disconnection are the lines of inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis subjects or “human capital.” As a site of high-end consumption and bourgeois performance, Santa Fe is inherently exclusionary even without the artful planning and policing; participation in this globalism of expensive consumption and professional labor implies a population with of market-subjects with a certain class background. As the removal of the pepenadores and the sand miners illustrates, low class subjects were not compatible. The space of Santa Fe was rendered effectively empty, ripe for total social overhaul for a future population. The disposability of its residents and the rendering of the space as underdeveloped were part and parcel of a particular globalist developmental path; as one high-ranking government official stated, “A bunch of filthy people are not going to stop modernity” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 187).
Of course, there are gaps between the global ideal of Santa Fe and the space’s daily social life. For one, the inequalities and class conflict inhering in the space’s high-end spaces of consumption are present in varying ways. For one, Santa Fe “is the only area in the city in which people with the highest income per capita are physically adjacent to some of the poorest areas in the city” (Moreno-Carranco 2014a, 190). In the face-to-face sociality of Santa Fe’s consumptive spaces, the prevalent dichotomy pointed out by Hannerz (1990) between the global/cosmopolitan and the local is articulated through race and class: “global” cosmopolitan consumers, restaurant servers, and high-end boutique staff are lighter-skinned, relatively tall, and marked by consumption and dress, and the “local” “auxiliary” staff who clean the tables, guard the stores, or tend to the toilets are shorter and darker than the clientele” (Jones and Moreno-Carranco, 15). In addition to these lower class laborers are those in the “informal economy” mentioned above.

This includes illegal street vendors and frenaleros, illegal car-parkers. The street vendors furtively make a living selling food via cell phones and the trunks of illegally parked cars (18). Although the Santa Fe Neighbors Association promulgated billboards that read: “Do not promote the street vending, it affects us all. It is illegal, generates insecurity, garbage, pollutes the area and damages the development’s image,” the warnings are ignored (20). And while policing of this “informal economy” is also an exclusionary practice in Santa Fe, we will see this method emphasized stronger and through its own globalist channel in the case of downtown. To emphasize the stark contradictions of the space, it is important to note that these laborers coexist alongside two thousand corporations, four shopping malls, 12 hotels, 230 restaurants, 40 movie theaters, schools, hospitals, and up-scale gated communities and apartment complexes (Moreno-Carranco 2014, 6). The active attempts at excluding those working outside of the “formal” labor market are one way of at least visually trying to secure the apparent prosperity of Santa Fe.
In addition to these financial, spatial, and subject-based lines of disconnection, Santa Fe also disconnects itself from its surrounding urban context through aesthetics. Characteristic of globalist megaprojects, Santa Fe symbolically sets itself off from its “local” surroundings through a “non-place” aesthetic devoid of any national or other identity-based marks of distinction (Jones and Moreno-Caranco, 3, 4). This deliberate erasure of the “local” is an attempt to transcend place and culture in favor of a cosmopolitanism marked by high-end consumption and hyper-modern architectural homogeneity. Other examples of this aesthetic practice are airports as well as spaces of financial markets. As Zaloom (2006) demonstrates in her ethnography of the world of finance and trading, space and material infrastructure are central representations of market actors’ conceptions of market activity. In her analysis, market space is envisioned and constructed with the intent of autonomy and disconnection vis-à-vis traders’ and their lives outside the market (Zaloom, 164). The representation of “market rationalization” is, however, always culturally defined: “the materials of rationalization are both human and technological, shaped by social labor and the culturally organized preferences and practices of the same actors they are designed to constrain” (165). The aesthetics of Santa Fe similarly hinges upon a specific cultural conception of “global” existence that is both rational and autonomous.

This translates to the erasure of the social.

The globalism of Santa Fe practices this erasure on multiple levels. This is made possible by its prior rendering as a literal and figurative garbage dump empty of history and filled with persons incompatible with the space’s future as a site of global capital’s productive and consumptive trappings. But, despite the conceptual and architectural attempt at erasing undesirables, so-called “local” life coexists in the informal economy of street vendors and illegal car parkers, and in the surviving sights and smells of the garbage the district is built upon (Jones
and Moreno-Carranco, 21). In short, the aesthetics, spatial and financial methods of implementation, and the subject-based lines of inclusion and exclusion all express a globalism “of an almost-but-not-quite-there globality” that may connect the world to Mexico City vis-à-vis transnational capital, but is also an extended act of authoritarian neoliberal exclusion and targeted disconnection (Tsing, 71). Contradicting globalist rhetoric of “linkage and circulation [that] appears positive for everyone involved,” the project had an audience of investors and an imagined population of bourgeois cosmopolitans, in deliberate neglect of both the area’s prior occupants and the construction workers and other non-professional laborers that make Santa Fe function today (Tsing, 71). The actualization of this project of global development continues.

Figure 2. “Food ‘stand’ in Santa Fe © Courtesy of Maria Moreno-Carranco.” (accessed via http://www.mascontext.com/issues/3-work-fall-09/publics-works/)
Downtown Mexico City has a deep history as a target of globalist projects. To reiterate Tsing’s analysis, plurality is inherent in “globalization.” The analysis to follow is therefore not only coterminous with Santa Fe, but also with other globalist projects located in downtown. Here I take the so-called “rescue” of downtown by prominent Mexican private actors and former New York City mayor Rudolph Guiliani as one kind of globalist project rooted in neoliberal capitalist development. When taken in comparison with Santa Fe, illustrative similarities and differences emerge that have analytic value for unpacking the dynamic between neoliberal capitalism and space. In this case of making globality in downtown, we see practices of exclusion geared toward real estate development engendered by the desire of attracting transnational capital, much like Santa Fe. Also in line with Santa Fe, these exclusionary measures are structured by Mexico’s economic reforms in the 1980s and ‘90s and the subsequent “metropolitization of crime” and informal economy cited above. But the differences in downtown’s prior spatial and cultural...
baggage necessitated different methods of exclusion and a different rhetorical and aesthetic imaginary to manage these social ills for the successful functioning of global capital. These differences put in relief other “channels” of the globalisms constructed on behalf of transnational capital.

Like Santa Fe, this globalism can also viewed in terms of space (as both a material and ideal/symbolic category), capital, and subjects. Unlike Santa Fe’s prior status as a literal and figurative garbage dump, the space of downtown has a culturally sanctioned history, made globally recognized by the UNESCO declaration of the city’s historic center “a leading patrimony of humanity” in 1987 (Davis, 62). This space has a long-running history dating to Spanish colonialism that is too vast to discuss here. For unpacking its role in this particular globalist project, it suffices to say that as an important historical site the space functions as a commodified (i.e., both ideally and materially reified, discrete, and marketable) entity. The “rescue” of Centro Historico points to the reclaiming of this important space for both the nation and the world at large. In this way the space is a site for both national pride and identity (in direct contradistinction with Santa Fe) and a kind of global humanistic responsibility. Catering to the tourism industry is of course a key factor in this commodification of national heritage for “global” consumption, as the ultimate target of much of Guiliani’s reforms turned out to be the centers of tourism. Despite the claims and rhetoric of Guiliani, Slim, and other elite actors involved in this “rescue” mission, we will see that the primary goals of the solicitation of Guiliani were profit and development rather than actually addressing problems with crime or the police.
The case of downtown highlights the larger necessity of global cities to ensure a secure space for capital, a need shared with Santa Fe but articulated through a different global “channel.” For urban hubs of global capital, financial and consumptive, “the increasingly global rhetoric of law and order and zero tolerance relating to physical security has become intrinsically linked with financial security” (Mitchell and Beckett 2008: 94). To be Sassen’s global city with global city functions and global culture (i.e., to effectively carry out the needs of finance capital, accommodate the cosmopolitan aspirations of the subjects involved in such labor, and make the space suitable for other transnational businesses), the image of security is necessary. Specifically, this image is desired for the blessings of U.S. bond-rating agencies like S&P, Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch. These agencies effectively form a hegemonic force that acts upon city governments, for their judgment of a city’s viability as a site of investment capital corresponds to the city’s alignment with the neoliberal market paradigm, of which physical security plays a major role (94). For downtown Mexico City this force was articulated through
the infamous Rudolph Giuliani as well as a group of prominent Mexican private actors, including Carlos Slim, the richest person in Mexico and former richest person in the world. Integral to the story of these two international personages of urban neoliberalism are Giuliani’s international fame for his claims to developing New York City in the 1990s, and Carlos Slim’s leadership in the “rescue” of downtown Mexico City.

During his two terms as mayor of New York City in the 1990s, Rudolph Giuliani not only practiced aggressive neoliberal policies on the structural level (privatization, the withdraw of social services, and laws against labor, the homeless, and other marginal populations), but also promoted micro-scale aggressive law enforcement (Mitchell and Beckett, 85). For Guiliani, “urban ills such as homelessness, panhandling, drug use, petty crime, squatting, and illegal vending were…security risks that should be dealt with quickly and harshly” (88). Central to this dynamic of development and social ills is the role of the bond-rating agencies mentioned above: the “key to attracting capital, tourists, and residents with disposable income is the promotion of a city as a safe place to live, work, travel, and shop” (88). To achieve this safe place for capital and its corresponding subjects and lifestyle, Guiliani practiced a “zero tolerance” policy based on the so-called “broken windows” philosophy of policing (89). This perspective on social ills takes individual minor legal offenses such as public drunkenness, unlicensed vending or other work like washing car windows, panhandling, prostitution, and other illegal minutiae “as very serious matters” that, if quelled, would improve the overall safety and health of society (89). (The infamous “stop and frisk” method of policing emerges from this philosophy). In short, we have an approach to urban development that heightens inequalities through a dynamic of macro-scale neoliberal policies and their necessary exclusionary micro-counterparts. Here we see clearly how
market-oriented plans of social betterment require small, violent coercive measures to exclude those persons deemed a threat to the neoliberal order.

Despite much criticism for his policies in New York, Giuliani gained international renown in the hegemonic circles of bond-rating agencies, and this has made him a likely consultant for developing nations the world over seeking help with crime, particularly in Latin America. Since the agencies’ “expert” judgment of risk is “predicated on a firm belief in the efficacy and necessity of U.S.-style neoliberal market reforms,” city mayors’ “desperate desire to maintain strong relations with U.S.-dominated agencies frequently leads to municipal policies at odds with their stated mandates of poverty alleviation, including new ‘security measures’” (93, 94). In Mexico City, the apparent need to secure the space of downtown through the exclusion of undesirables making a living informally for lack of employment (again, a need produced by the larger neoliberal reforms of the Mexican state) allowed for the direct hiring of Guiliani by a group of prominent private actors, chiefly Carlos Slim. The prominence of profit-seeking actors in handling a supposedly public issue was made possible by Mexico City’s political history of stalemate on police reform and the perceived urgency of the burgeoning problem of crime and the informal economy (Davis, 58).

Analogous to the case of Santa Fe, the failures in the public sphere gave way to reliance on the ostensible stability and power of large amounts of capital to solve social problems. Also like Santa Fe, the hiring of Giuliani by private actors may be viewed in terms of Ong’s “neoliberal exception” in which the normal functioning of the law and the police is suspended to accommodate capital. Thus, despite widespread “outrage at the assumption that foreign consultants with almost no knowledge of Mexican social and legal institutions would be able to address the problems of Mexico City in any meaningful way,” Giuliani was given a US$4.3
million contract (Davis, 58, 59). The details of who invited him and who footed the bill are murky, but there are theories that either Slim or the leftist mayor at the time (Manuel Lopez Obrador) sent the initial invite, and that Slim likely paid for much of the bill (58). Even if Obrador had no active role in the matter, his approval nonetheless points again to the dynamic interplay between the state and market in producing special or exceptional cases for the sake of capital.

In the end, Giuliani’s plan was a transplanted version of his policies in New York, neglecting the pervasive problems with the police themselves (including widespread corruption and violent impunity) and the fact of limited employment and the necessity of the informal economy (Davis, 60). Thus, rather than being a realistic attempt at actual social betterment, the zero tolerance plan was a deliberate act of exclusion in the name of it:

Officially meant to improve the ‘quality of life’ and ‘harmonious cohabitation’ of residents, the law overwhelmingly targeted activities related to the informal and marginalized economic survival strategies of the urban poor and other practices that threatened the preservation of neoliberal urban aesthetics (Becker and Muller, 83).

The contradictions of small-scale targeting of deeply rooted social problems did not register for Giuliani or Slim. Arguably, this was but one aspect of their larger plan of neoliberal development. As Davis maintains, Giuliani’s help was not merely meant to target undesirables, but, from the beginning, “the Giuliani report may have been solicited…because it was tacitly understood that Giuliani would propose policies that would foster downtown real estate development and speed the ‘rescue’ of historic Mexico City” (Davis, 61). Like Santa Fe, Giuliani and Slim’s claims to reform and “development” stand in for projects of capital accumulation. The authoritarian and coercive means of this profit-driven endeavor were made possible by hegemonic discourses of legality and the asymmetrical criminalization of the poor and jobless.
This criminalization is specifically targeted to those in the way of real estate development, in neglect of both police impunity and other forms of illegal behavior.

This argument emerges from the long-held aspirations of Carlos Slim and other prominent private investors toward capitalizing on the global cultural capital of downtown, a goal unattainable in the 1990s because of crime and deteriorating infrastructure (Davis, 62). Previous attempts had been made at this development, but with Giuliani “there would be an official-sounding, externally sanctioned, and authoritative strategy peddled by a world-renowned ‘superhero’ for accomplishing more or less the same aims” (64). On the one hand, we have a globalism that rhetorically equalizes urban space and place; DF’s perceived similarities with and aspirations to New York were at the heart of the endeavor. (This is also reflected in our Forbes article from above, where, incidentally, Giuliani’s reforms are praised). On the other hand, this extended analogy between Mexico City and New York City is meant to conceal the more fundamental similitude of the two spaces as sources of profit.

Analysis of the content of Giuliani’s plan reveals his complicity in this endeavor; car theft, the most common form of crime in Mexico City, and drug dealing, are notably absent from the report, which is filled with “a strong concern with land use, downtown development, and public space” (64). Included in this plan was the implementation of high-tech monitoring software throughout the city and a new “quasi-private” police force (65). Of course, both Giuliani and Slim, among others, profited off of the project in varying ways (for Giuliani, consulting contracts; for Slim, ownership of land bought just before and after Giuliani’s visit) (65). Ultimately, we have an extremely coordinated scheme in which social ills produced in part by neoliberal reforms themselves become objects of neoliberal discipline to ensure the success of the former structural measures. It is important to note that this kind of arrangement is not unique
to Mexico; Giuliani and his firm Giuliani Partners have had contracts elsewhere in Latin America, in Europe, and Africa (Mitchell and Beckett, 99). It is thus one pervasive “channel” of a particular globalism of urban neoliberal development.

To conclude, these two distinct cases of bringing “development” and “globalization” to the spaces of downtown and Santa Fe in Mexico City show how different “channels” and different articulations of global capital take shape emergently and contextually. Not only are these sites themselves discrete and targeted (as Ferguson points out, capital does not “flow…it hops” [Ferguson 2006, 38]), they are also translated and made “global” through their own specificities and “cultural legacies.” Comparison of the Santa Fe megaproject and the “rescue” of historic downtown Mexico City reveals how actors claiming a global scale target particular sites, and how such sites structure and limit the globalist projects envisioned within them, the methods of their application, and the ways in which they are received. Between Santa Fe and downtown we see how elite globalist actors choose similar but distinct globalist aesthetics based on the pre-inscribed meanings of space. The construction of Santa Fe into a “non-place” of global modernity was possible not only because of the fact that it was literally a garbage dump, but also because of the rendering of its history and its residents as equally undesirable; the space was a blank canvas, ripe for the erasure of place-based meaning in favor of hyper-modern aesthetics and function. In contrast, downtown’s culturally sanctioned history and culture gave way to its construction as a commodified “heritage” site of national culture that coexists with modern capitalist globality, and its social ills rendered it in need of “rescue” rather than complete overhaul. In short, the demands of space and pre-inscribed meaning shape distinct visions and channels of neoliberal capitalist development.
Comparison of these globalist projects has analytic implications vis-à-vis the different scales and methods of neoliberalism. Both projects are emblematic of Mexico’s macro-scale neoliberal reforms begun in the 1980s, and the tactics of ensuring their viability as sites of global capitalism entailed the concomitant micro-tactics required for the success of such reforms, namely the disciplinary exclusion of those persons deemed “local” or not in line with the market order of things, a status articulated through rhetoric of safety, legality, and the social good. But despite these shared aims, the differential demands and uses of space establish different “channels” of creation. For Santa Fe, being an infrastructural blank slate allowed planners to exclude insidiously through restricting the means of access to those with cars and cash. For downtown, the heightened visibility and prior cultural status of the space gave way to a much more public method of exclusion and development: the hiring of former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani and the adoption of his infamous “zero tolerance” policing. Both megaprojects and the contracting of private consulting firms like Giuliani Partners are dominant globalisms in neoliberal capitalism and can be found elsewhere in the world, though of course they are always articulated through socio-historical specificities of place and culture. Although not discussed in detail here, both these projects in Mexico City are marked by great criticism and disenchantment in their own ways by elites as well as illegal street vendors (Jones and Morrenco, 9; Mitchell and Beckett, 98). In sum, despite many real and interesting similarities between these two projects, their failures and disenchantments should caution social analysts from taking the apparent homogeneity of skyscrapers and Starbucks as “the beginning of an era” (Tsing, 73). The movements and demands of transnational capital are dominant and far-reaching, but they are always discretely spatialized, uniquely articulated, and made possible in particular sociocultural ways.
Bibliography


